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Most of you probably played it as a child. I am referring to the so-
called “telephone game” that we used to play at school. One person 
comes up with a story and whispers it into somebody else’s ear, and 
that person recites the same story to the next, until the story reaches 
the last person who is supposed to narrate the story in public. After 
passing through a dozen people, this game often left the whole group 
giggling since it turned out that the final version had very little to do 
with the original story. Along the way, many elements of the story 
became lost in translation, and in a similar way it appeared that new 
elements were added or original ones were given new life. At each 
moment the story is retold by one person to the next, a translation 
process takes place that generally entails a reinterpretation and re-
definition of the last version of the story. The focus of my research 
bears many similarities to this game. 
This thesis came to fruition in two ‘worlds’. In the first one, dis-
courses about humanly induced climate change came to life. This 
world consists of the Northern, industrialized countries that at the 
same time can be held responsible for lying at the root of the per-
ceived crisis. Negotiations, summits, conferences and scientific as-
sessments with alarming predictions about the future of the planet 
have been manifold; yet no binding set of rules has been put into place 
to oblige countries to cut their CO2 emissions. This is in a nutshell 
how the scientific ‘source’ of the story is framed: 
The Earth’s global mean climate is determined by incoming energy from 
the Sun and by the properties of the Earth and its atmosphere, namely the 
Sara de Wit 
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reflection, absorption and emission of energy within the atmosphere and 
at the surface. Although changes in received solar energy (...) inevitably 
affect the Earth’s energy budget, the properties of the atmosphere and sur-
face are also important and these may be affected by climate feedbacks. 
The importance of climate feedbacks is evident in the nature of past cli-
mate changes as recorded in ice cores up to 650,000 years old. Changes 
have occurred in several aspects of the atmosphere and surface that alter 
the global energy budget of the Earth and can therefore cause the climate 
to change.1 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
The other world, the Bamenda Grassfields in the Northwest region 
of Cameroon where I conducted six months of fieldwork, is part of the 
underdeveloped countries and part of what is perceived to be the con-
tinent most vulnerable in terms of suffering the consequences of cli-
mate change; while it has played an insignificant role in causing it. 
This is more or less the story as we know it. And here are some of the 
expected devastating effects that African countries will face: 
Africa is one of the most vulnerable continents to climate change and var-
iability, a situation aggravated by the interaction of ‘multiple stresses’, 
occurring at various levels, and low adaptive capacity. (...) Agricultural 
production and food security (including access to food) in many African 
countries and regions is projected to be severely compromised by climate 
variability and change. African farmers have developed several adaptation  
 
                                                          
1  P. 21 in: Solomon, S., D. Qin, M. Manning, R.B. Alley, T. Berntsen, N.L. 
Bindoff, Z. Chen, A. Chidthaisong, J.M. Gregory, G.C. Hegerl, M. 
Heimann, B. Hewitson, B.J. Hoskins, F. Joos, J. Jouzel, V. Kattsov, U. 
Lohmann, T. Matsuno, M. Molina, N. Nicholls, J. Overpeck, G. Raga, V. 
Ramaswamy, J. Ren, M. Rusticucci, R. Somerville, T.F. Stocker, P. 
Whetton, R.A. Wood and D. Wratt, 2007: Technical Summary. In: Cli-
mate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working 
Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change [Solomon, S., D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. 
Marquis, K.B. Averyt, M. Tignor and H.L. Miller (eds.)]. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA. 
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options to cope with current climate variability, but such adaptations may 
not be sufficient for future changes of climate.2  
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
 
Figure 1.1 CO2 emissions and increases3 
 
                                                          
2  P. 435 in: Boko, M., I. Niang, A. Nyong, C. Vogel, A. Githeko, M. Me-
dany, B. Osman-Elasha, R. Tabo and P. Yanda, 2007: Africa. Climate 
Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of 
Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change, M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Pa-
lutikof, P.J. van der Linden and C.E. Hanson, Eds., Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge UK, 433-467. 
3  Source: Figure TS.3. In: IPCC, 2007: Climate Change 2007: The physical 
science basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Solomon, S., 
D. Quin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K.B. Averyt, M. Tignor & 
H.L. Miller, eds.). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United King-
dom and `New York, NY, USA, 996 pp. 
 http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/tssts-2-1-1.html 
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Figure 1.2 Estimated mean global temperatures4 
 
 
Since the beginning of the modern environmental movement in the 
1970s, which is said to represent the debut of the so-called ‘new envi-
ronmentalism’, the focus on environmental degradation has become 
increasingly a global concern. Due to high levels of urbanization, air 
pollution and depletion of natural resources, industrialized societies – 
                                                          
4  Source: Figure TS.6. In IPCC, 2007: Climate Change 2007: The Physical 
Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Solomon, S., 
D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K.B. Averyt, M.Tignor and 
H.L. Miller (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United 





informed by a general critique against the capitalist model of unlim-
ited growth – for the first time saw themselves confronted with the 
(idea of the) planet’s finitude. Parallel with the rapid expansion of the 
environmental movement and worldwide Green consciousness, a true 
‘politics of the earth’ (Dryzek 1995) has come into existence. In the 
course of time, on a global scale a multitude of climate-change dis-
courses have developed, shaping both the way we understand and 
relate to the environment and the world around us. This is a fragment 
that represents the more ‘popular’ version of the story: 
If you look at the ten hottest years ever measured, they have all occurred 
in the last fourteen years, and the hottest of all was 2005. Scientific con-
sensus is that we are causing global warming. [...] Within a decade there 
will be no more snows of Kilimanjaro. This is really not a political issue, 
so much as a moral issue. Temperature increases are taking place all over 
the world; that is causing stronger storms. Is it possible that we should 
prepare against other threats besides terrorists? We have to act together to 
save this global crisis! Our ability to live is what is at stake. 
From: ‘An inconvenient truth’, Al Gore 
Global warming’s broad appeal and ‘apocalyptic aura’ also reso-
nate with the fact that, for more than two decades at this point, climate 
change is a highly securitized and top-priority matter on international 
policy and development agendas. Climate change is recognized as one 
of the major factors behind the growing inequality between the rich 
North and the poor South, and thus as the ultimate symbol of injustice. 
Due to the trans-boundary nature of the climate and the increasing 
importance of environmental issues in international politics, a com-
plex multi-stakeholder field of global environmental governance has 
been generated, which, in turn, has profoundly shaped North-South 
relations (Duffy 2006). Moreover, climate change embraces all as-
pects of human existence and human security; a ‘Green paradigm 
shift’ has made its way into development thinking. This change has 
entailed the expansion and re-shaping of adaptation and mitigation 
projects at the local level – thus setting new norms and standards 
about how to deal with the environment – which have been incorpo-
rated into new development models. By virtue of the sheer size of the 
global funds that are made available for adaptation and mitigation in 
Sara de Wit 
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Africa, it can be said that this marks the beginning of a new era in 
global environmental governance. 
 
 
Photo 1.1& 1.2 The popular global warming discourse is generally  
 accompanied by this type of visualization 
 
Source:  Photo 1  Bearded seal in Kongsfjorden, Svalbard. Courtesy of Elise Biersma.
 Photo 2  Melting Kongsbreen glacier, Kongsfjorden, Svalbard. Courtesy of  
  Thomas Oudman 
 
 
Within the so-called ‘development context’ of climate change, it is 
assumed that current development policies are not equipped to protect 
people from environmental disasters, and therefore the focus has shift-
ed to the adaptation and mitigation of billions of people in the devel-
oping world. This, in turn, will inevitably result in an intense re-
shaping of environment/society-related relations in Africa (Cannon & 
Müller-Mahn 2010). In brief, the ‘climatic threat’ has been by and 
large invested with an alarming narrative by leading actors in interna-
tional climate-change discourses. The diagnoses on this matter, as 
much as the understanding of how it can be mitigated and how people 
should adapt to it, have become the ultimate guidelines for contempo-
rary environmental and development policies:  
Climate change may be the most significant challenge the world faces to-
day. It will affect everyone, regardless of geographical location or socio-
economic status. It may determine the way we produce food, our access 
to water, our health, where we live, and the diversity of plant and animal 
species. No other current concern can claim the scale of climate change – 
and the scope of the potential catastrophe if the world fails to act in time. 
Introduction 
7 
[...] As a phenomenon that affects the whole world, climate change clear-
ly warrants a comprehensive global response.5 
United Nations Non-Governmental Liaison Service 
‘Think Globally, Act Locally’, the slogan that became popular 
within the Kyoto Protocol’s framework in 1997, has since then been 
promoted as a global moral responsibility, as the sine qua non for 
combating the negative consequences of climate change. At this point, 
in the search for the solution to saving the planet, the two ‘worlds’ 
have suddenly merged into one. Africa is vested with a crucial role to 
play in this ‘fight’ by preserving its forests and by investing in (mas-
sive) reforestation projects. For African leaders and representatives 
these emergent climate change policies and discourses have created 
the chance to plea for ‘climate justice’: an opportunity that they 
wholeheartedly seized by demanding billions of dollars in compensa-
tion from the industrialized countries . At the grassroots level as well, 
voices can be heard that strive for ‘climate justice’. The International 
Indigenous Peoples Forum on Climate Change (IIPFCC) made a clear 
statement at the Copenhagen Summit: ‘Considering our spiritual and 
traditional attachment to land we need to be compensated, for we nev-
er contributed to the climate mess, in which we are today’ (The Stand-
ard Tribune Cameroon, 20 November 2009). 
Since Cameroon is part of the Congo Basin – the second largest 
forest in the world – the country forms an important target for the 
international community in mitigating climate change. Most recently, 
Paul Biya, the president of the republic, announced the installation of 
a national climate change observatory to monitor climate data and to 
help facilitate decision-making in all climate change-related sectors. In 
September 2009 the head-of-state attended the UN preparatory meet-
ing for the Copenhagen Conference that was held in New York. Apart 
from using climate change (and thus the North) as a scapegoat for the 
deplorable situation Cameroon finds itself in, he and other representa-
                                                          
5  In Adams, Barbara & Luchsinger Gretchen (2009). ‘Climate Justice for a 
Changing Planet: A Primer for Policy Makers and NGOs’, New 
York/Geneva: United Nations/NGLS.  
http://www.un-ngls.org/IMG/pdf_climatejustice.pdf 
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tives of the Congo Basin countries demanded compensation for this 
‘historical debt’. What follows is a fragment of a Cameroonian ver-
sion of the story: 
We are certain that the issue of climate change today is not caused by Af-
rican countries, because African countries almost have nothing to do with 
this as far as the climate is concerned. But you know the consequences 
are more on the African continent. And you know the forest is very im-
portant when it comes to regulating the world climatic conditions. Now 
the Amazon is falling out, the only major forest reserve that we have here 
in the world today which can act as a regulator for climate change is The 
Congo Basin. Now the world has asked African countries to stop deplet-
ing their forests, and instead to practice ‘reforestation’. But we also know 
that most of the countries who have this forest have their river popula-
tions living there. They depend on the forest for wood, for food, for eve-
rything that you can imagine. Now if we stop them from using the forest 
as they were using it in the past you will understand that they will go 
hungry. And this is where president Paul Biya and other leaders of the 
Congo Basin are insisting that if they must stop using the forest for food 
then they should be compensated.6 
A Cameroonian journalist covering the UN Summit in New York 
At the governmental level, climate change is becoming more and 
more an important axe of intervention. Several ministries are occupied 
with fighting deforestation by realizing tree planting projects and rais-
ing awareness among the population about adaptation and mitigation 
of climate change. But at the broader institutional level as well, we 
can find climate change-related campaigns and projects. International 
organizations like the WWF, UNDP, FAO and the World Bank, as 
well as NGOs and civil society groups throughout the country are 
increasingly becoming involved in so-called Green campaigns. 
The Bamenda Grassfields are situated in the mountainous North-
west Region of Cameroon, and, as the name indicates, are part of the 
grass savannah zone of West and Central Africa. The region exhibits 
characteristics of the tropical grassland regions. The high altitude 
farming zones with volcanic soils are rich in organic matter and, with 
an annual average rainfall of almost 2500 mm, the area has great po-
                                                          
6  Broadcasted on national TV by Cameroon Radio and Television (CRTV), 
22 September 2009. 
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tential for intensive agriculture and the growth of a variety of fruits 
(Molua & Lambi 2000). It can therefore be said that Bamenda is an 
extraordinarily rich and fertile agricultural zone. People often stated to 
me, ‘you know Bamenda is very very poor, but there is enough food 
for everybody.’ Driving through the Grassfields in the midst of the 
rainy season inevitably leaves one with a great feeling of awe for these 
mountainous, green and fertile landscapes. My choice to do research 
in Bamenda was a rather arbitrary one, for it was partly guided by 
practical considerations. Once in the field – especially against the 
background of the region’s favourable climate and fertile ecological 
zone – I soon realized that the scope of the ‘Green consciousness’ was 
much bigger than I expected. I was in fact stunned by the widespread 
knowledge and awareness concerning global warming and climate 
change. In many sectors of society I came across climate change-
related activities, and I encountered people who were speaking about 
‘this thing called global warming’. 
 
 
Photo 1.3 President Paul Biya, the only survivor of this  
‘global war’? 
 
Source: The Post newspaper, October 2009 
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The government, NGOs, the media, schools, churches and tradi-
tional rulers have taken up initiatives to sensitize the population in the 
fight against climate change. But for an ordinary farmer, who is living 
on the outskirts of Bamenda, and for most people in town as well, the 
issue of climate change was in many instances not a strange phenom-
enon. To me, it appeared to be a contradiction that, in such an envi-
ronment, global warming would be such a prominent theme. However, 
I believe that there are many good reasons to argue that ‘speaking 
about’, ‘adapting to’, and ‘mitigating’ global warming and climate 
change in Bamenda (and in any other place) is not a mere reflection of 
the biophysical realities. In other words, the fact that many people 
relate their visible experiences of changing weather patterns to global 
warming indicates that there is a discursive frame at hand that enables 
people to make sense of the perceived changes. Thus, the fact that 
people speak about global warming all the time means that there is a 
new message circulating in society that changes the way people per-
ceive the world and their relationship with their environment. 
 
 





Due to the newly available money flows coming from international 
donors and organizations, many NGOs in Bamenda have shifted their 
policies to work on climate change-related issues. Whereas once 
HIV/AIDS took centre stage in the organizations’ policies, nowadays 
climate change is on its way to taking the lead. Part of these projects 
are sensitization and awareness campaigns, in which people are dis-
couraged from burning their land and cutting down trees. Moreover, at 
the grassroots level, planting trees has become the ultimate imperative 
in the call for ‘thinking globally and acting locally’. However, NGOs 
do not operate in isolation but rather jointly implement their activities 
with, for example, the government, churches, schools and the tradi-
tional rulers. In November 2009 I attended the launching ceremony of 
the so-called Cameroon Traditional Rulers Against Climate Change 
(CAMTRACC) organization. Inspired by the FAO of the United Na-
tions, traditional rulers of the Northwest region have united to form a 
solid front at the grassroots level in order to fight against climate 
change. During this meeting the traditional rulers – called Fons – were 
informed about the possible risks of climate change by a representa-
tive of the FAO: 
  
Threats: 
Climate change is the rapid change of weather patterns or the rapid 
change of general weather conditions faster than the normal climatic 
changes that human kind has been used to since the beginning of time. 
These changes are caused by land use and land use changes leading to the 
faster and increasing emission of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, 
which resulted in the depletion of the ozone layer that protects the earth 
against dangerous Ultra Violet Rays from the sun. [...] Africa is one of the 
regions of the world particularly vulnerable to the potential impacts of 
climate change. [...] It is affecting water resources, agriculture and food 
security, economic activities and health, and in particular the poorest 
countries where poverty limits the capacities of adaptation. 
Prospects: 
African countries must become fully involved in international negotia-
tions on climate change so that the implementation of the UNFCCC and 
the Kyoto Protocol offers them opportunities and possibilities for choos-
ing environmental options. The interactions of climate change and other 
environmental problems offer opportunities for creating synergies among 
Sara de Wit 
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the United Nations multilateral environmental agreements. [...] Let’s pro-
tect the global; it is very fragile. 
Representative FAO, launching of CAMTRACC 
 
 
Photo 1.5 & 1.6 The following images were used to communicate  
 the threats of climate change 
 
 
The consequences of drought in the vicinity of Lake Natron, Tanzania. Courtesy of: 




Source: Presentation Launching CAMTRACC, FAO. 
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While the international organization’s aim is to establish a col-
laboration with the rulers, the traditional rulers themselves seize 
the opportunity in order to have their own piece of the hegemonic 
pie. Since they are the ‘natural rulers’ and custodians of culture – and 
are inextricably bound to the environment – climate change turns out 
to be an outstanding opportunity for the Fons to reinforce their (sym-
bolic) power and to revitalize their ‘traditions’. In the same meeting, 
the Fon of Guzang – as the president and initiator of CAMTRACC – 
addressed the other traditional rulers: 
We are here today because the world is at risk of extinction. [...] We are 
here today because of the fear of the unknown. We are here today because 
we know the world is not an inheritance from our parents, but a borrowed 
good from our children that one day we have to refund. [...] The reason 
for this gathering is to look into one of the toughest challenges facing 
human kind today. Global warming is on the lips of all politicians, aca-
demics, development experts, journalists, environmentalists, diplomats, in 
fact anybody that matters to a society. We have not yet heard the voice of 
the traditional rulers. [...] We are here today because of the fear of losing 
our culture and indigenous knowledge in protecting this precious gift of 
life and nature left to us by our parents, to pass to our children and our 
children’s children. Traditional rulers are the custodians of our culture, 
and natural heritage, the guarantors of our traditional knowledge and the 
fathers of our land. That is why the Cameroon traditional rulers have 
gathered to join this challenging fight against climate change. 
Fon of Guzang, president of CAMTRACC 
After the launching of CAMTRACC the traditional rulers attracted 
widespread media attention, and several newspaper items and TV and 
radio programs covered the launching of this organization. In the 
course of time, more and more traditional rulers joined CAMTRACC, 
and soon a second and third meeting followed. During the third 
CAMTRACC meeting, that was held in February 2010, more than two 
hundred people attended the event, two national TV stations were 
broadcasting it, and many national and international NGOs were par-
ticipating. After several presentations given by government officials, 
traditional rulers and NGO representatives, the moderator of the day 
was asked to summarize the ongoing discussion in Pidgin in order for 
all the rulers to understand: 
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[...] 70% of mankind has already heard about it. But to do something is 
something else. Plant species are becoming scarce like the raffia-bush in 
Cameroon, and the prices of white wine are high. We inherited this raffia-
bush which is the main source of income for men. The climatic conditions 
of raffia wine are becoming harsh and climate change affects our culture 
and traditions. No other drink can replace raffia wine in our localities. It is 
the alpha and omega of our traditions. No marriage can exist without raf-
fia wine. Funeral rites: the wine shows the love for the deceased. It is 
used in rituals as the communication between the dead and the living. 
When we pour wine in our cups and want to complain with our ancestors 
we use wine. Enthronement, coronation, raffia wine is the language to the 
ancestors. The climate is the main determinant of life. Global warming is 
increasing bush fires. Climate change is very dangerous to the planet. 
White wine is disappearing due to climate change. There will be a fall in 
income, high scarcity level and prices will be doubled. The long-term ef-
fects will be affecting our culture: if we have to start communicating with 
the ancestors with a foreign drink it is the end of our being. Who says our 
ancestors will no longer listen to us because of climate change? 
Moderator of CAMTRACC explaining the effects of climate change to 
other rulers 
 






Within two months, more than fifty Fons were sensitized about 
climate change and gradually took up the task to inform the councils 
in their palaces and began with disseminating this ‘new message’ to 
the villagers. One of the rulers invited me to attend a monthly council 
meeting in his village. The purpose of the gathering was to settle a 
conflict, and to inform the council and other interested villagers of the 
new developments in town. The Fon welcomed everybody and spoke 
the following words: 
I need to tell you about this thing that we call climate change. The world 
is very dangerous now. We have to be very careful. You are the first quar-
ter to hear about this, so you are very lucky. I want this village to be very 
exemplary for the rest. When I formed this quarter it was good and not 
bad. Before I was enthroned this quarter was not here yet. I beg, respect 
land matters! [...] We burn down our bushes indiscriminately and cut 
down our trees. If the traditional council sees you burning the soil it will 
be reported. All this land belongs to me, and no man can burn my soil or 
he will be in big trouble. I am here to tell you to plant trees, except for eu-
calyptus. Plant any tree! The quarter heads will mark where the trees have 
been planted. By all means: no slash and burn. This is no joke. The world 
is very very dangerous. 
Fon of Nsonghwa sensitizing (or warning) the villagers 
For most farmers, however, the sensitization by the Fon will not be 
the first time that they have come to know about climate change. They 
have either heard it on the radio, seen it on TV, read it in a newspaper, 
or have spoken about it with a neighbour. While many farmers express 
their fear of the phenomenon, the notion of climate change remains 
relatively incomprehensible to most of them. Moreover, the communi-
cated ‘Green message’ at the grassroots level often entails the con-
struction of guilt and a sense of a moral responsibility that lies in the 
hands of each individual farmer. The following citation gives an idea 
of how a farmer in the Grassfields understands the story: 
I heard it on the radio three or four years ago. What I understood is that 
the trees that we cut down are providing us with the air that we breathe, 
and that it helps agriculture. And, that there is a layer of air in nature that 
has already been overused. That is the reason that we have to plant many 
trees because those trees will replace the air that has been used. [...] If this 
is going to continue like this we will soon face the end of the world. 
Therefore we have to plant. If the community will not do it and the gov-
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ernment does not do it the world will come to an end, because we have 
cut down all our trees. Until today we are still afraid. (Focus group dis-
cussion, Bawock market, February 2010). 
Jean-Claude Toukam, a subsistence farmer in Bamenda7 
This rather sketchy portrait of a ‘discursive journey’ of globally 
constructed climate-change discourses and the encounter with the 
‘local’ lies at the heart of what this thesis seeks to explore. What I 
depicted above is the broad and complex field of different ‘translation 
regimes’ through which climate-change discourses find their way to 
the Bamenda Grassfields. A basic assumption of my approach in this 
research is that dealing with climate change is as much a matter of 
discourses as it has to do with the so-called ‘positive’ or biophysical 
facts. For a long time climate change-related research has been domi-
nated by climatology and other natural sciences. While social sciences 
and the humanities were nearly absent in the debates on climate 
change (De Bruijn & Van Dijk 2008), these disciplines are increasing-
ly becoming involved in this area of study. Nevertheless, most studies 
have by and large taken objectivist stances as their point of departure. 
An underlying question that generally guides these studies is how 
climate change as a biophysical phenomenon is affecting people’s 
livelihoods in those parts of the world where it is assumed that poverty 
limits people’s adaptive capacities. Very little or no concern at all has 
been expressed for a critical assessment of the social construction of 
climate change, and thus for the impact of climate-change discourses 
upon the local level. A discourse, a term that was given new meaning 
by Michel Foucault (1967), is here basically understood as the way we 
understand and speak about the world. Discourses are part and parcel 
of the power dynamics that shape the architecture of global environ-
mental governance in the developing world.  
 
 
                                                          
7  Names of informants in my thesis may or may not have been changed. 
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Photo 1.8 An ordinary discussion about climate change with farm-
ers at Bawock market 
  
 
All the talks, activities, Earth Summits, proposed solutions, meet-
ings and negotiations shape (our understanding of) the world. The 
social construction of reality is inextricably bound to the language that 
we use and the talks that we are engaged in. Put differently: ‘What we 
do about climate change depends on the stories that we tell about it, 
and as the stories change, the world changes too’ (Onuf 2007: xi). For 
this reason, in order to comprehend how the world changes and to 
comprehend the power dynamics, in which this takes place, it is essen-
tial to gain insight into the stories that are being told, by and to whom, 
where, and who is excluded from the storytelling. This research is 
concerned with those stories. In this study I seek to explore the power 
processes that are encompassed by the stories that are being construct-
ed at the global level, how this trickles down to the local and what 
happens at the crossroads of their discursive encounters. And, what 
happens when global climate-change discourses – which can be char-
acterized as fairly alarming or apocalyptic messages – ‘travel’ from 
the global, to the national and the local level, but only rarely travel 
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back again? And finally, what does it entail to ‘Think Globally and 
Act Locally’ for a farmer in the Bamenda Grassfields? This leads me 
to the following research question: 
How are globally constructed discourses on climate change trans-
lated, negotiated and appropriated by different ‘translation regimes’ in 
the Bamenda Grassfields, and how does this discursive journey possi-
bly lead to social transformations at the local level? 
The translation process is structured by different translation re-
gimes that are constituted by a specific set of actors, knowledge re-
sources, networks of communication and institutional patterns of in-
teraction. The analysis of each translation regime will focus on the 
claims-makers, the claims themselves and the process of claims-
making. Even though a large part of my study draws from stories of 
my fieldwork in the Bamenda Grassfields, these are stories that cannot 
be confined to a village, a region or a country. This study, therefore, 
transcends the idea of a ‘classic’ ethnography, taking place in a de-
marcated geographical space; rather, it should be seen as an ethnogra-
phy of a continuously moving story that is shaped by its own border-
less journey. The pathways through which climate-change discourses 
are channelled – at the intersection of the global and the local – will be 
examined by taking a closer look at how particular dominant actors 
assume a role in this collective fight and convey climate change as a 
‘new message for Africa’. 
In Bamenda climate change (here understood as a scientific dis-
course constructed in the West) is the ‘new talk of the day’. Important 
questions to be addressed are: How do different truth regimes fuse in 
their encounter, and how do people discard old elements of their 
worldviews and give new meaning to their existing ones? And, how 
does the appropriation and negotiation of discourses in different social 
spheres take place? By using social constructivism as an alternative 
lens this research aims to contribute to a broader understand of how 
‘speaking about’ climate change potentially shapes local realities. 
In chapter two, the methodological and theoretical foundation for 
the overall analysis of this thesis will be explicated. Central in the 
discussion will be how one can conduct an ethnography of a ‘travel-
ling discourse’, which means something else across a distance and in 
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different contexts. By analysing different discursive fields (from the 
Kyoto Protocol to Bamenda’s day-to-day realities), I want to make 
clear how the ‘global’ and the ‘local’ are connected but also discon-
nected. Through the method and theory of critical discourse analysis, 
this chapter aims at unravelling the power processes, in which the 
social construction of climate change takes place. In chapters three, 
four and five, the focus will be on different ‘translation regimes’ and 
on how global climate-change discourses have the capacity to rein-
force existing power relationships. 
Chapter three addresses the development of environmental dis-
courses in historical perspective. It will become clear how, over the 
course of time, changing perceptions of the relationship between hu-
mans and their environment in the Northern countries have profoundly 
shaped North-South relations. The focus will be on Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs), as they are here considered to 
be crucial vehicles in communicating ‘the Green message’, and there-
by imposing policies on how people should adapt to and mitigate cli-
mate change. Moreover, by exploring what it means to ‘Think Global-
ly and Act Locally’, I wish to demonstrate that global interests – trans-
lated into climate change-related policies – possibly obfuscate local 
perceptions and definitions of problems. 
Chapter four consists of two parts. Here, I will place the develop-
ments of the patterns of power in the Grassfields in historical perspec-
tive, and the role of the Fons therein. It will become clear that local 
cosmologies have the adaptive capacity to encapsulate climate-change 
discourses, and in turn that the latter have the potentiality of revitaliz-
ing the first. In the second part, I will shed light on the active role of 
the traditional rulers in their joint fight against climate change, and 
how climate change enables them to redefine their (symbolic) power. 
The final ‘translation regime’ will be discussed in chapter five. By 
distinguishing farmers by their accessibility to discourses, I scrutinize 
how knowing about climate change shapes people’s ideas about a 
changing environment and a changing world. 
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Map 1.1 Map of Cameroon 
 
Source: Nel de Vink  
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It was foretold long ago 
That after Noah’s deluge 
The next destruction of the world 
Would be by fire 
And can’t you feel the heat building up already, 
The global warming up? 
 
And so to fulfill the prophecy 
Copenhagen is going to be 
Just some more hot air 
Presaging the sparks that would turn 
Into the flames in which the world will be consumed 
And then out of the ashes of ecocide capitalism 
It won’t be Christ on his second coming presiding 
On Judgement Day 
But Karl Marx returning like a revolutionary phoenix 
Out of the ashes of the busting bubbles 
Of the lopsided economies 
Of our over-heated world 
 
-  Mbella Sonne Dipoko8     - 
                                                          
8  Chief Mbella Sonne Dipoko was a popular Cameroonian writer and poet, 
who was internationally known for his – often militant – writings. He 
wrote this poem in December 2009, just before the beginning of the UN 
Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, three days before his death 




Theoretical and methodological  
considerations 
 
The scope of study: From Kyoto to the  
Bamenda Grassfields and back to Copenhagen 
The fifteenth United Nations Conference on Climate Change (COP-
15) that was held in December 2009 in Copenhagen was characterized 
by international actors and, in the media, as the most important meet-
ing since the end of the Second World War. In view of the approach-
ing expiration date of the Kyoto protocol in 2012, this conference was 
supposed to be a historical moment, in which world leaders and head 
of states would ‘seal the deal’, and come up with a solid and fair plan 
to ‘save the future of our planet’. Never before in the fifteen-year his-
tory of the Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC1 were expecta-
tions that high. The world awaited an ambitious new treaty, the Co-
penhagen protocol, to replace the Kyoto protocol that was ratified in 
1997. The key objectives were to establish a binding agreement, in 
which each country – according to the ‘polluter pays principle’ – 
would shoulder its responsibility by reducing greenhouse gas emis-
sions. Likewise, technology transfer and financial assistance to the 
developing countries was on the agenda for helping the poor in vul-
nerable regions to mitigate and to adapt to the negative consequences 
of climate change. With the slogan ‘One Africa, One Voice, One Posi-
                                                          
1  United Nations Convention on Climate Change. 
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tion’, the representatives of African countries in Copenhagen seemed 
to be united as never before. Yet on a global scale the world found 
itself in sharp opposition between the North and South, the rich and 
poor nations, the developed and developing world, the most and least 
polluting countries.  
The African Union prepared a document that pleaded for ‘climate 
justice’. In essence, ‘climate justice’ is concerned with principles of 
distributed fairness, that people everywhere have the right to be free 
from suffering from the impacts of climate change. It deals with ques-
tions such as how are the burdens and benefits of climate 
change/global warming distributed across the population? And how 
can people be protected against and compensated for the inequities of 
environmental burdens? A fair and just deal should, accordingly, take 
into consideration historical emissions. Cameroon’s president Paul 
Biya fully embraced this environmental human rights discourse by 
turning climate change – and, as such, the developed nations – into the 
ultimate scapegoat for all the existing troubles in his country. In Sep-
tember 2009, during preparations for the Conference on Climate 
Change in New York, he stated that the widespread poverty, the agri-
cultural problems faced by the majority of Cameroonian farmers, and 
the deplorable situation Cameroon finds itself in can all be attributed 
to the effects of climate change.2 In view of Climate Justice, and the 
related historical debts, the African delegation demanded two trillion 
US dollars annually from the industrialized countries. Moreover, the 
African position has been to curb the rise of global temperatures at 1.5 
degrees Celsius by the year 2020, as opposed to the 2 degrees pro-
posed by most industrialized countries. Borrowing language from 
human rights discourses, compelling slogans were proclaimed during 
demonstrations by both African representatives and human rights 
movements: ‘We stand by Africa’; ‘There is no planet B’; ‘If the cli-
mate was a commodity, the West would have stored it at a bank’; 
‘Reparations for historical and economic debt’; ‘While we are negoti-
ating with the rich to adjust, the climate is forcing the poor to adapt’ 
                                                          
2  Speech of president Paul Biya during the Summit on Climate Change in 
New York, 22 September 2009 (CRTV). This preparatory Summit was 
held to ‘mobilize political momentum in Copenhagen’. 
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(CRTV, 14 December 2009). Lumumba Di-Aping, ambassador to the 
UN for the African group and chief negotiator of the G77, stated that: 
‘If we don’t act now it will be tantamount for genocide in Africa’ 
(BBC, 19 December 2009). In the course of the conference, African 
leaders, indigenous and human rights movements, NGOs, civil society 
organizations and environmentalists saw their hope of reaching an 
equitable and ambitious agreement vanish.  
The importance and high-level concern that was attached to this 
meeting by multiple stakeholders and international actors worldwide 
(more than 35,000 participants and 120 Head of State) epitomizes the 
fact that climate change is a globally accepted environmental claim. A 
claim that is by and large informed by scientific models, which under-
pin the idea that global warming and climate change are actually hap-
pening, something ‘real’. In both popular and academic discourses 
(even though in the latter the picture is often more nuanced) climate 
change is framed as a global threat that needs immediate worldwide 
action.3 Taking into account, on the one hand, the scientific discourses 
that are sustained by epistemic communities at the international level, 
which emphasize the dangers to the planet if nothing is done to cut 
down the emissions of greenhouse gases, and, on the other hand, the 
failure to reach a binding agreement, there is at least a discrepancy 
between the construction of the problem, and the political will to solve 
it. Moreover, the trans-boundary nature of the climate reinforces the 
notion that it is a global issue that involves a global responsibility. In 
Copenhagen the head of states were neither ‘thinking globally’ nor 
willing to ‘act locally’, which left the world sharply divided. Another 
discursive element that illustrates the discrepancy between the social 
construction of the problem and the outcome of the summit is what I 
                                                          
3  It goes without saying that we cannot speak about a popular, a global, or 
a scientific discourse as mutually exclusive and unambiguous claims. 
Neither can we state that all the actors, representatives, institutions and 
organisations in the developed countries, on the one hand, and the devel-
oping nations, on the other, take opposing and opportunistic positions. It 
is almost impossible – and moreover, beyond the scope of this study - to 
elaborate on the myriad of differing nuances; but what can be done is to 
discern dominant tendencies that characterize distinctive discursive 
realms.    
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call travelling discourses. As stressed before, climate change is a 
Western construct, a scientific discourse that has occupied, for ap-
proximately three decades now, an increasingly prominent role in 
global politics. In Copenhagen it became all the more clear that the 
South had appropriated the discourse, in which Africans are depicted 
as the first victims, and needed to remind the North of their own ‘gos-
pel’. 
The stark opposition between North and South can best be exem-
plified by the countries’ positions during the summit and their respec-
tive perceptions of the results. For example, for the developing coun-
tries the main concerns were about money – compensation for adapta-
tion and mitigation – under the denominator of historical debts and 
Climate Justice. Nations of the developed world, on the other hand, 
were more concerned with new technologies, how to offset their car-
bon emissions, and negotiating Green models of growth. The attempts 
of the developed nations to plead for a fight against climate change on 
a global scale is by many African representatives considered as a re-
straint on their economic development. Climate change has turned the 
long-awaited promise and hope for development and modernization 
into a call to comply with environmental sustainability and, as such, a 
call to obey the global interest. This model of sustainable development 
entails that the industrial modes of production – which enabled the 
developed countries to achieve their levels of wealth – no longer can 
be replicated by the underdeveloped countries. The situation is further 
complicated by appeals to alternative, Green technological innova-
tions and solutions that are only affordable by the wealthier nations. A 
delegate of the Pan African Climate Justice Alliance (PACJA) in 
Cameroon commented upon the summit to me: ‘Compensate: that is 
the word. Make Them pay, because We need to develop too.’  
In a similar vein, many of my respondents regarded the proposed 
strategies by the United Nations to replant Africa as an ethical prob-
lem. One of the initiatives to mitigate climate change has been the 
United Nations’ ‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degra-
dation’ (REDD) mechanism. Since trees serve as a carbon sink, the 
two largest forests in the world ‘the Amazon’ and ‘the Congo Basin’, 
are perceived to be the ‘lungs of the earth’. Replanting trees and 
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fighting deforestation are therefore seen as an indispensable way to 
absorb the released carbon dioxide and, as such, to regulate climate 
change. Despite the fact that the Copenhagen Conference resulted in 
an nonbinding agreement, large amounts of money have been prom-
ised to enhance the REDD(-plus) mechanism.4 The basic principle of 
the REDD mechanism is that the developed nations can pay off their 
carbon dioxide emissions by planting trees in Africa, and financing 
environmental projects. The REDD policy document has identified 
many positive ‘side-effects’ of tree planting, such as biodiversity con-
servation and the support of pro-poor development. Nevertheless, 
critical observers lamented that this form of carbon trading enables the 
big polluters to sustain their own CO2 emissions. 
The United Nations have identified tree planting in forest rich 
countries as one of their key strategies for fighting climate change. 
Among many other African countries, Cameroon is targeted by the 
international community for projects to regenerate the forest and has, 
as a result, significantly shaped national and local (environmental) 
politics. The delegate of the Ministry of Environment and Nature Pro-
tection in Bamenda ironically remarked about the government’s mas-
sive tree planting activities:  
If you look at the oppression in the field, now the ministry of forest and 
wildlife is planting trees, and the ministry of wildlife and nature protec-
tion is planting trees. [...] Because ‘somebody’ has finished their trees, 
now they are telling to Africa, that Africa should keep their trees. [...] The 
impact is more on those poor economies, because the developed econo-
mies can absorb the shock that is coming through climate change. Be-
cause if we go to other countries, we see that the responds to climate 
change costs money. In Africa many more people will die than in the de-
veloped countries.5 
                                                          
4  It is estimated that financial flows for the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions through the REDD-plus mechanism can reach 30 billion US 
dollars a year. The (UN) REDD-plus mechanism builds on the expertise 
and financial support of the UNEP, UNDP and the FAO. In chapter three, 
I will elaborate more on the ethical considerations of massive tree plant-
ing campaigns in Cameroon. 
5  Interview with the delegate of the Ministry of Environment and Nature 
Protection. 
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It may be evident that global discourses and global environmental 
politics have transformed and directed national and local environmen-
tal politics in forest-rich countries like Cameroon. However, what is 
less emphasized in scientific research is that, apart from being merely 
a political challenge between states, dominated by the big economic 
powers, climate change and perceptions on how to combat it touch 
upon profound ethical considerations. Dale Jamieson frames the prob-
lem as follows: ‘Climate change is a dramatic challenge to the moral 
consciousness of human kind. It not only challenges people to act in a 
morally responsible way but it also challenges the very idea of a moral 
responsibility’ (Jamieson 2008: 459).  
Representatives of the developing countries framed the unbinding 
agreement as unacceptable, a disaster. Lumumba said: ‘The “deal” is 
suicidal for Africa, and will turn the continent into a furnace. It is the 
single-most disturbing document in the history of the UNFCCC’ (The 
Post newspaper 21 December 2009). Representatives of the big eco-
nomic powers (China, India, Russia and the US) perceived it to be a 
first step into the right direction. President Barack Obama – ‘Africa’s 
hope’ – described the talks as ‘a meaningful and unprecedented break-
through’. Many climate change experts stated that the negotiations 
were dominated by five major powers (predominantly the US and 
China) and that the meetings’ failure was due to the unwillingness of 
China (currently the biggest emitter in the world) to offer deeper cuts 
in CO2 emissions, since this would jeopardize its rising economic 
position.6 As such, the Copenhagen summit seemed to be more the 
product of global capitalism and a forum for the redistribution of 
wealth, rather than a genuine attempt to ‘save the future of our plan-
et’.7 
                                                          
6  This is, however, not the full picture. China became the world’s biggest 
polluter partly due to the so-called outsourcing of industries from the 
West to China; meaning that the West can continue with the same level of 
production but China will be billed for it. 
7  For the Copenhagen Accord see:  
http://www.denmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/C41B62AB-4688-4ACE-BB7B-
F6D2C8AAEC20/0/copenhagen_accord.pdf.  
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My concern here is not, however, to explain why this conference 
did not meet expectations nor to speculate about who was acting 
‘rightly’ or ‘wrongly’. This brief discussion of global vis-à-vis local 
environmental politics demonstrates that dealing with climate change 
is as much a matter of discourses and paradigmatic politics as it has to 
do with so-called ‘hard’ or ‘objective’ facts. All the activities, ‘com-
municative events’, proposed solutions, ‘speech acts’, meetings and 
negotiations shape our understanding of the world. The social con-
struction of reality is inextricably bound to the language that we use 
and the talks that we are engaged in. Therefore, to repeat Nicholas 
Onuf’s words, ‘What we do about climate change depends on the sto-
ries that we tell about it, and as the stories change, the world changes 
too’ (2007: xi). What happens when emerging global climate-change 
discourses, which can be characterized as fairly apocalyptic messages, 
‘travel’ from the global, to the national and the local level, but only 
rarely back again? How do different ‘truth regimes’ fuse in their en-
counter? Who can benefit from these emerging discourses and who 
cannot? And finally, what are the methodological and theoretical im-
plications of a research agenda about ‘translating the climate’? Or, in 
other words, how does one conduct an ethnography of connectivity 
and encounters related to climate change? This chapter will address 
these questions and form the analytical foundation for the chapters 
that follow hereafter. 
 
‘Travelling discourses’: Studying global and local connectivity 
During the Copenhagen Conference I was in the midst of my field-
work in Bamenda. Being in the fortunate position of having access to 
the Internet, radio and television, I had insight into both the media 
coverage in the ‘West’ as in Bamenda and (to some extent) in Came-
roon at large. This made me realize that the Summit, apart from being 
a global political manifestation that showed the clashing interests of 
the North vis-à-vis the South, was also a platform for something else. 
Copenhagen showed all the more so that climate change is pre-
eminently a symbol of the interconnectedness of the world. With this, 
I refer not so much to the physical interdependency of sharing a globe 
and the climate. In fact, as will be discussed in section 2.3, I argue that 
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in common understandings of climate change the discursive construc-
tion of a shared climate, and hence, a shared responsibility serves as a 
powerful tool to obfuscate local interests. Both the ‘tangibility’ of 
sharing the climate and the abstraction that is derived from it (i.e. a 
global climate and a global responsibility) make the problem of cli-
mate change a multi-stakeholder’s playground to negotiate different 
regimes of truth, responsibilities and power. In this light, when speak-
ing about interconnectivity I am concerned with the density of the 
interlinked activities and discursive practices that have a significant 
influence on how different actors understand, see and know about the 
world. The Copenhagen Conference served as an arena for global 
connectivity where public, scientific, indigenous and human rights 
discourses were negotiated: a space for the encounter of the global 
and the local. This research addresses the relationship between what is 
being said at the global and the local levels, and what happens at the 
intersection of their discursive encounters. Even though large parts of 
my study draw from stories of my fieldwork in the Bamenda Grass-
fields, these are stories that cannot be confined to a village, a region, 
or a country. This study therefore transcends the idea of a ‘classical’ 
ethnography taking place in a demarcated and predefined geographical 
space, and should rather be seen as an ethnography of a continuously 
moving story that is shaped by and along its own borderless journey. 
By conducting an ethnography about global and local connectivity, 
challenging questions arise such as how and where does one locate the 
‘global’? And what do we mean when we speak about the ‘local’? 
With emerging and intensified processes of globalization, these terms 
were brought to the fore as two opposing and binary representations. 
Scholars in the field of economics, political sciences and communica-
tion were the first to address ‘globalization’ (which emerged in aca-
demia as a popular concept in the mid 1980s) and formulated a theory 
about ‘globality’ as a homogenizing and unifying process that gradu-
ally would lead to a global village, in which all the cultural differ-
ences would disappear. This world was envisaged as a world, in which 
the ‘local’ would be squeezed and be dissolved into one dominant 
‘global’ and hegemonic culture. Half a decade later, this one-sided 
approach – that was informed by premature assumptions about the 
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effect of new information and communication technologies, transport 
systems and intensified trans-border circulation of goods and people – 
underwent a critical re-examination that addressed more carefully the 
cultural aspects of globalization (Geschiere & Meyer 1998). Important 
contributions from the social and cultural sciences indicated that the 
apparent homogenizing tendencies inherent to globalization implied at 
the same time a continuous heterogeneity in cultural terms. It increas-
ingly became clear that, paradoxically enough, homogenization exerts 
emphasis on cultural differences and that it is often the process of 
globalization itself that appears to lead to a deepening of cultural con-
trasts (ibid: 602). This redefinition of globalization broadened the 
scope of the understanding processes of cultural encounters and ena-
bled scholars to dissolve the alleged dichotomy between the global 
and the local, for, as Hall (1991) framed it, ‘The global and the local 
are two faces of the same movement’.  
Globalization connotes an even more elastic process, as it comes in 
many forms and encompasses different issues ranging from technolo-
gy, culture, politics, the economy, to the environment and the climate. 
Globalization has been defined by Giddens as ‘The intensification of 
worldwide social relations which link distant realities in such a way 
that local happenings are shaped by events occurring miles away and 
vice versa’ (1990: 64). A rather confusing characteristic of globaliza-
tion is that it increasingly connects the ‘global’ and the ‘local’ by the 
intensification of open global (information) flows, enduring intercon-
nectivity and interpenetrations of states and societies. This process is 
mainly being facilitated by technological advancements and by the 
enhanced trans-border circulation of goods, people, images, products 
of culture and knowledge. However, the paradox of globalization is 
that it is a process marked by accelerated flows and, at the same time, 
accelerated closures (Geschiere & Meyer 1998; Nyamnjoh 2004; Cas-
tells 2000). Globalization in all its forms denotes in- and exclusion; it 
divides as much as it unites and, above all, it engenders greater ine-
qualities between the rich and the poor, as global capital flows are, 
mainly in Africa, open for an elite few and closed for a marginalized 
majority (Nyamnjoh 2004).  
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Closely related to the paradoxes inherent to globalization of ho-
mogenization and heterogeneity, on the one hand, and of ‘flow’ and 
‘closure’, on the other, is what Meyer and Geschiere (1998) call the 
‘flux’ and the ‘fix’. They state that ‘There is much empirical evidence 
that people’s awareness of being involved in open-ended global flows 
seems to trigger a search for fixed orientation points and action 
frames, as well as determined efforts to affirm old and construct new 
boundaries’ (1998: 602). The possibilities of global flows go often 
hand in hand with a closure and fixing of identities that used to be 
much more fluid and permeable. This implies that the problem of how 
to deal with ‘flow’ and ‘closure’, or ‘flux’ and ‘fix’, highlights the 
precariousness of locality, that it is not only a self-evident unit for 
study but also a given orientation point for the people being studied 
(ibid). One of the main merits of this broader understanding of global-
ization is that it has enabled social scientists to dismiss the idea of the 
local as a given, bounded unit, and that the challenge should rather be 
to ‘grasp the flux’ (Hannerz 1992 in Geschiere & Meyer 1998: 603).  
Globalization, as such, has posed new challenges to anthropology’s 
original obsession with and commitment to ‘boundedness’ and ideas 
of locality. The somehow troublesome convergence of the so-called 
emic and etic perspective, or in Appadurai’s words ‘the mutually con-
stitutive relationship between anthropology and locality’, have forced 
social scientists to critically reflect upon how they construct their ob-
ject, or how they ‘produce locality’ (1996: 178). The changed context 
of ethnography in an increasingly connected world has led Appadurai 
to criticize ethnography for failing to undergo a corresponding shift in 
disciplinary practices. He points out that ‘the task of ethnography be-
comes the unraveling of a conundrum: what is the nature of locality, 
as a lived experience, in a globalized, deterritorialized world?’ (1991: 
196). The paradox that he touches upon is that, even though anthro-
pology has long since given up the idea of fixed and territorial com-
munities, remarkably enough the practice of fieldwork takes ‘the lo-
cal’ for granted. In a similar vein, James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta 
(1997) state that within contemporary anthropology ‘the field’ is cen-
tral to a ‘real’ anthropologist’s intellectual and professional identity – 
since it distinguishes itself by and large from other disciplines by the 
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practice of fieldwork rather than by the topics studied – and yet it is a 
largely unexamined one. According to them, everything that entails 
anthropological methods has been subject to reflection and analysis, 
but the very field itself, the where, has remained a ‘mysterious’ and 
‘taken-for-granted’ space that has been left to common sense, beyond 
the threshold of reflexivity (Jameson & Gupta 1997: 2). Therefore 
they propose:  
(…) A reformulation for the anthropological tradition that would decenter 
and defetishize the concept of “the field”, while developing methodologi-
cal and epistemological strategies that foreground questions of location, 
intervention and the construction of situated know-ledges. [...] It seems 
most useful to us to attempt to redefine the fieldwork “trademark” not 
with a time honored commitment to the local but with an attentiveness to 
social, cultural and political location and a willingness to work self-
consciously at shifting or realigning our own location while building epis-
temological and political links with other locations (ibid: 5).  
In this study the terms global and local are used as analytical (per-
meable) constructs rather than merely as geographical denominators, 
or empirical realities. Inspired by the above-mentioned critical re-
thinking of ‘the field’, a premise taken up in my fieldwork is that in 
the site of study (i.e. Bamenda), in which global discourses become 
visible at the local level, there is no absolute unaffectedness from 
global discourses. With the unprecedented rise and significance of 
global flows of images, ideas, consumption goods and the intensifica-
tion of connections, globalization in Africa can no longer be consid-
ered a new phenomenon. However, there are interlocutors within the 
global chain that have more access to those ‘flows’ (and thus to in-
formation and discourses) than others. The task is then to observe and 
critically examine what local forms these discourses take, how they 
are appropriated, translated, played out, negotiated and how they 
move into local repertoires of identity, worldviews and power strug-
gles. As stated before, because ‘the field’ tends to suggest misleading 
conceptions of its demarcated and bounded ‘locality’, an analytical 
shift is proposed here, namely that the focus of study is rather on the 
discursive journey or on a ‘story-in-motion’, and what happens at the 
‘in-between’ spaces where discursive connections become apparent.  
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In their book The Social Life of Connectivity in Africa De Bruijn 
and Van Dijk (2012), develop a similar approach that draws attention 
to connections and to the significance of linking rather than on the 
‘people’ involved in the network. By making use of the metaphor of a 
bridge, they demonstrate how connections are socially and politically 
appropriated, how connections can take on ‘a life of its own’, and how 
connections have transformative powers (De Bruijn & Van Dijk 
2012). This proposed idea of connectivity as the focal point of analy-
sis similarly calls for a dissolving of the ‘global’ and ‘local’ dichoto-
mies that are here considered to be indispensible in understanding 
social transformations. The authors refer to both the material and im-
material connectivity and how this relates to wealth and power. I be-
lieve therefore that a clear parallel can be drawn between them and the 
connectivity that I am concerned with in my research, namely the 
immaterial connectivity to global discourses, ideas, images and 
knowledge (which is in general materially facilitated and communi-
cated by intensified flows and information and communication tech-
nologies), one that gives way to emerging interdiscursive spaces. In 
their proposition that one should think beyond the juncture of what 
they term post-globality, De Bruijn and Van Dijk have explicitly 
shifted to a ‘connection perspective’, in which the significance of link-
ing becomes central. They state that ‘We need to allow for the possi-
bility that it is the connection that enables a new constellation to 
emerge, and it is not the ‘dots’ in the network that are being connect-
ed’ (ibid: 4). 
The idea of an interdiscursive space can, on the one hand, be un-
derstood in the very physical sense, for example when and where 
NGO workers or traditional rulers go to a village and speak with 
farmers. On the other, when speaking about spaces of connections, we 
can draw a parallel with the virtual world or cyberspace, as being a 
multidimensional global space with unrestrained and interpenetrating 
sub-spaces (Kearney 1995: 549), facilitated by technological ad-
vancements and (new forms of) media. In this latter case we can think 
of farmers who listen to the radio, watch television, read newspapers, 
read items on the Internet and converse with each other about a chang-
ing climate. An example, which illustrates the blurred boundaries of 
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my own ‘field’, is how I (as a Dutch researcher in Bamenda) was fol-
lowing the climate change negotiations that were being held in Co-
penhagen, speaking to Cameroonian journalists, delegates and grass-
roots representatives who had travelled to Copenhagen to represent 
their own localities, and who carried back stories that brought to life 
their own ‘local’ life. This characterizes and illustrates the permeable 
boundaries between the global and the local understood as an empiri-
cal and analytical construct.  
The term global does not claim to describe what is being said about 
climate change throughout the world at large but is rather a notion that 
refers to trans-nationally constructed, and accepted, discourses on 
climate change that guide global environmental politics and actions. 
Obvious examples of representatives and mediators of global dis-
courses (I prefer using the plural form, for no discourse stands on its 
own) are international regulatory bodies and institutions like NGOs, 
the World Bank and the United Nations. On the one hand, local 
NGOs, but also government-related bodies, are often strongly in-
formed by discourses that shape global environmental politics, and 
hence, are part and parcel of similar discursive and political realms. 
On the other, there are local media, traditional rulers, religious leaders 
and farmers in Bamenda who can also be seen as interlocutors in the 
global chain of climate-change discourses. Nevertheless, we should 
keep in mind that each social group has a different connectivity to 
information flows, technology, media and ‘mediators’, and, for this 
reason, has different accessibilities to global discourses. These dynam-
ics of accessibility (or the lack thereof) to discourses place grassroots 
farmers inevitably in a less powerful and, more often than not, even a 
marginal power position. This assumption is underlined by De Bruijn 
and Van Dijk, who emphasize in their volume that connections are 
never a neutral phenomenon, but that the appropriation by people and 
institutions form part of power hierarchies in ways that are historically 
informed (p. 6). 
As I demonstrated above, the ‘global’ can be found in the ‘local’ as 
well as the other way around (although to a much lesser extent). For 
example, I spoke with farmers living in the outskirts of the Bamenda 
Grassfields, who followed the Copenhagen Conference on the radio. 
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At the first day of the summit I had a talk with a farmer who lives in 
one of the relatively remote villages. In the course of our conversation 
I asked him if he was aware of the climate-change negotiations in 
Copenhagen, to which he replied: ‘Of course we are aware of that. We 
listen to our radios and hear about Copenhagen. We expected that the 
rich countries would finally come and help us here, because when we 
first heard about this climate change we thought the world was com-
ing to an end. And now, they say that nothing is going to be done in 
Copenhagen’.8 In a reverse direction, indigenous groups and farmers 
from the developing world joined together in a so-called ‘climate car-
avan’ to let their voices be heard in Copenhagen.9  
Despite the above-mentioned farmer’s reproduction and reinterpre-
tation of global discourses – which demonstrates that there is a glance 
of global discourses present in local realities – for most farmers the 
access to information flows is fairly limited. Farmers are dependent on 
radios and other forms of media channels, and on the information that 
NGOs, the government and educational systems provide them with. 
This means that global information flows in general, and global cli-
mate-change discourses in particular (and the extent to which Grass-
fielders have access to knowledge) are thus highly dependent on prac-
tical and technological possibilities and restrictions. The potential 
intensity of global and local ‘discursive connectivity’ in Bamenda 
varies widely amongst different localities, but also between different 
social groups. When I speak of grassroots farmers, I generally refer to 
‘ordinary’ subsistence farmers who have limited access to technology 
and media – and thus to information. Some of them (mostly men) 
                                                          
8  Interview 17 December 2009, Bali. 
9  An example of the ‘local’ being present in the ‘global’ is the International 
Indigenous Peoples’ Forum on Climate Change (IIPFCC) that denounced 
the following in the press: “As December draws nearer, masks have start-
ed falling and it is now becoming clear here in Barcelona (a preparing 
Summit on climate change, SdW) that environment enemies in the name 
of developed countries have been using their usual dirty tricks of divide 
and rule, financial and political power to break the developing countries’ 
firm stand to hold them to pay for the climate damage they created since 
industrial revolution days” (The Standard Tribune Cameroon December 
7, 2009). 
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have access to a radio, but others (mostly women) do not. A small 
amount of farmers have a television, which often remains ‘switched-
off’ due to power cuts. These technological limitations leave most 
farmers dependent on the information they receive from the aforemen-
tioned key players like NGO workers, traditional rulers, church lead-
ers, government workers or other, educated farmers. One can imagine 
that along this interconnected chain of actors, crucial information easi-
ly gets lost in ‘translation’. This implies that farmers do not have ac-
cess to the ‘full’ discourse, but instead receive fragments of infor-
mation that are often less nuanced than the ‘original’ version of the 
story. The extent to which actors along the global chain are connected 
or disconnected to climate-change discourses was quite similar to the 
ways, in which I was able to connect to them. 
In her book Friction (2005), about environmentalism and global 
connectivity in the Indonesian rainforest, Anna Tsing raises an essen-
tial question, namely, how does one conduct an ethnography of global 
connections? She rightfully points out that it is impossible to gain a 
full appreciation of every social group that is involved in the global 
chain. Therefore she proposes the following: 
My answer has been to focus on zones of awkward engagement, 
where words mean something different across a divide even as people 
agree to speak. These zones of cultural friction are transient; they rise 
out of encounters and interactions. They reappear in new places with 
changing events. The only ways I can think of to study them are 
patchwork and haphazard. The result of such research may not be a 
classical ethnography, but it can be deeply ethnographic in the sense 
of drawing from the learning experiences of the ethnographer (Tsing 
2005: xi). 
This study is the fruit of my ethnographic experiences guided by 
what Tsing calls ‘awkward engagements’. I experienced those mo-
ments of awkwardness most vigorously when global messages 
reached the very local level and when farmers were told, for example 
by NGO workers or traditional rulers, that ‘the world is in danger and 
that their farming methods are part and parcel of the problem. So if 
they don’t act fast the world will see its destruction soon’. To me, the 
apocalyptic aura of these messages was certainly stunning, but the fact 
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that farmers were blamed for causing climate change, I found even 
more troublesome. This patchwork of engagements manifests itself in 
a variety of different settings, people and across different contexts and 
spaces. By following the pathways of key players who, for their own 
reasons, operate as mediators of global climate-change discourses, I 
navigated along the ‘in-between’ spaces and moments of connection 
that shape the global chain. The pathways are the channels through 
which the key players disseminate their messages, symbols, systems 
of meaning, ideas and knowledge. One of these pathways is the route 
that (most) international NGOs follow. The story and action begin 
with a conceptual development at the international level that becomes 
reshaped by a multitude of climate change-related projects at the na-
tional level, and reaches the local level in terms of concrete projects. 
These steps are facilitated by back-donors (such as governments, min-
istries, internationally created funds, etc.) who are again informed by 
global climate-change discourses. Even though it was impossible to 
cover all levels of communication, in order to follow what I call ‘trav-
elling discourses’ I spoke with NGO workers specialized in the field 
of climate change, read policy documents, attended sensitization meet-
ings, press meetings, policy meetings, accompanied NGOs into the 
field while they communicated their Green message to farmers. Fur-
thermore, I carried out many in-depth interviews with farmers (outside 
the NGO realm) and was engaged in informal talk continuously, all of 
which was part and parcel of my attempt to get a grip on this global 
chain. Most of those pathways, however, appeared not to be so clear 
cut. The communication channels and connection points of NGOs 
often intermingled with those of traditional rulers or with government-
related bodies. For instance, NGOs made use of the traditional rulers 
to sensitize the population as well as the other way around. Moreover, 
during most awareness and policy meetings (e.g. ‘Greening the Judi-
ciary’ or ‘Cameroon Traditional Rulers Against Climate Change’) 
different parties and stakeholders coalesce to form a forum of a global 
and local connectivity.  
From the outset of my research I started to develop an account of 
how NGOs and INGOs in Bamenda framed the problem of climate 
change and of how they incorporated (globally proposed) measure-
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ments for mitigation and adaptation into their policies (see chapter 
three). After some time I found myself in ‘sensitization meetings’ of 
female common initiative groups (CIGs) who informed each other 
about this global threat. I visited different palaces and was present in 
meetings, in which traditional rulers united to take part in this ‘collec-
tive fight’. I interviewed government officials and spent time with 
grassroots farmers on their lands, in their villages and at markets. 
Tracking these linkages of communication and sensitization enabled 
me to gain insight into commonly held views about the changing envi-
ronment, along with insight into local appropriations of climate-
change discourses. 
Being an anthropologist nowadays – in this increasingly intercon-
nected and interdependent world – studying discursive global connec-
tivity conceals an ironic symbolism behind the term ‘travelling dis-
courses’. A fundamental premise that underlies the relevance of study-
ing discourses in general is that ‘reality’ can never be reached outside 
of discourses, and therefore discourse itself becomes the object of 
analysis. Following this premise, there is no way to escape discourses. 
As a Dutch researcher in Bamenda carrying my own discursive ‘lug-
gage’, speaking with people about climate change and, as such, being 
part of the data generation process, and then writing about it and 
bringing back those stories to the Netherlands – all of this makes me 
in fact a subject of travelling discourses myself. This rather complex 
relationship between myself as researcher as well as ‘the researched’, 
which I faced, deserves at least some epistemological reflection. Giv-
en that any researcher unavoidably influences the setting by his/her 
mere presence and that people are always affected by the process of 
being studied, I found it rather challenging to position myself without 
distorting the alleged ‘neutrality’ of the research setting. Talking to 
professionals in the field, such as delegates of the ministry of envi-
ronment and agriculture, educators, journalists and NGO workers, did 
not occur to me as problematic. These interviews were relatively 
structured, and remarkably enough I often received very similar an-
swers (see chapter three). The part of my fieldwork that appeared 
much more challenging to me was talking to grassroots farmers who 
had never heard of the notion of climate change. For farmers who are 
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directly dependent on nature, the climate has always been changing, 
and as soon as I provided them with the language to speak about cli-
mate change, I created a discursive frame, in which they could make 
sense of their experienced realities. In other words, while speaking to 
them about climate change, I risked ‘talking it into existence’. This 
clearly does not mean that the climate is not changing, nor that it does, 
but it is very likely that each anomalous rainfall, unexpected heat 
wave or crop failure will be understood through this lens, while before 
it was ‘just’ a heavy rainfall (see chapter five).  
The only way I could think of omitting this was by using a lan-
guage that the farmers were already familiar with. My Cameroonian 
co-researcher played an essential role in developing questions that 
appeared mostly emic to the people concerned. For example, we 
would never ask if they thought that the climate was changing. We 
shall see in chapter five that climate change for farmers is in fact an 
empty notion. We would rather ask questions such as whether they 
faced any irregularities in the rainy season and in the dry season, and, 
if so, how this was twenty years ago. Or, we asked about whether they 
experienced any changes in the hot and the cold weather, and how this 
was in the past, etc. It was not my objective to determine whether the 
farmers in Bamenda are affected by the impacts of climate change or 
not. Instead, I wanted to gain insight into how climate-change dis-
courses shaped their worldviews and perception about the environ-
ment. Therefore, the group of non-cognizant farmers served as a con-
trol group for the farmers, who had more access to global climate-
change discourses and who were more aware of the supposed risks it 
entailed. We should keep in mind that being a non-cognizant farmer 
does not imply having no knowledge about the environment and the 
climate; it rather refers to knowledge about climate change as a West-
ern construct.  
In this section I presented some basic methodological and episte-
mological reflections. As became clear, the theoretical considerations 
of a globalizing world – and anthropology’s role with its commitment 
to localities therein – that have been discussed inevitably have impli-
cations for methods and theory. In the following section I will elabo-
rate on social constructivism as the theoretical roots of my research, 
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and how critical discourse analysis as a theory and method guided me 
in analysing my data. 
Social constructivism as an alternative ‘lens’ 
That something is socially constructed and interpreted does not necessari-
ly mean that it is unreal. Pollution does cause illness, species do become 
extinct, ecosystems cannot absorb stress indefinitely, tropical forests are 
disappearing. But people can make very different things of these phenom-
ena and – especially – their interconnections, providing grist for political 
dispute. 
(Dryzek 2005: 12) 
Taking on a social constructivist approach as a means to explore cli-
mate change issues involves risks of being accused of neglecting the 
biophysical aspects and the consequences of the phenomenon. Over 
the course of time, especially within other disciplines like biology and 
environmental ethics, social constructivists have had to face fierce 
criticism, and have been depicted as ‘perverting the force of sociologi-
cal understanding and ignoring the “reality” of the environmental cri-
sis’ (Hannigan 2005: 29). In this section I will make clear that this 
approach does not reject the evidentiary basis of climate change nor 
say that it is simply an ‘invention’ that takes place in our minds in 
order to execute power; instead it should be seen as an alternative lens 
to look at ‘climate change realities’. This lens should be considered as 
an analytical view rather than an instrumental one that mainly aims at 
problem-solving. I want to elucidate that this approach enables us to 
view climate change in the light of a political concept, which involves 
power, knowledge and discourses.  
With regard to the Green thinking that last decennia made its way 
into development thinking – with a particular emphasis on Africa – I 
argue that if we want to gain a broader understanding of the climate 
change problematic, it is highly relevant to disclose processes and 
discourses that up until now have been largely neglected and underex-
posed in academia and policy-making. The very basic question that 
will be central in the discussion below is how our understandings of 
climate change have been socially constructed? The section below 
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will shed light on the importance of the context, in which climate 
change is constructed, on the one hand, and on how we can analyse 
those processes and discourses, on the other. The age-old and compli-
cated relationship between power and knowledge in general and poli-
tics and science in particular (along with the media that increasingly 
complicates this relationship) will be addressed.  
At the first day of the Copenhagen Conference something remark-
able happened. Professional hackers illegally released more than four 
thousand emails and other documents from the computer server of the 
Climate Research Unit (CRU), which is one of the leading institutions 
concerned with the study of natural and humanly induced climate 
change. Allegations followed from critics and other observers that the 
emails – which contained exchanges between climate scientists – re-
vealed the manipulation of data within the epistemic community of 
climate science. The media played its role by covering and presenting 
the incident in such a way that climate change could be seen as turn-
ing out to be a hoax and thus actually an ‘inconvenient lie’. Climate 
scientists were initially criticized for withholding information, delet-
ing raw data, and for the subversion of peer review to make the prob-
lem of global warming and climate change look more threatening. 
Subsequent inquiries by various scientific panels and committees indi-
cated that there was no evidence of bias in data selection, and thus no 
grounds for discrediting the scientific evidence of anthropogenic cli-
mate change.10 On the other hand, an independent panel review 
stressed the importance of transparency and openness in climate 
change science, and they acknowledged that the emails suggest a blunt 
reluctance to share information with others (report p. 5). This contro-
versy that became adopted in the media as the ‘Climategate Affair’ 
evoked conspiracy sentiments and, as such, widely (at least in many 
parts of the Western world) touched upon deeply rooted attitudes of 
belief and disbelief. Despite the fact that in climate science and in 
                                                          
10  The House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, the Inde-
pendent Scientific Appraisal Panel and the Independent Climate Change 
Email Review. For the official report of the UK’s Government Response 
see:  
http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm79/7934/7934),pdf.   
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other fields it is uncommon to publish raw data, the panel review stat-
ed that in the case of climate change this is problematic since the issue 
is of global importance and of public interest (ibid).  
The urgent request for transparency in this field resonates with the 
existing scepticism and distrust vis-à-vis climate science, and with the 
idea that we all have the right to know about the truth: a truth that lies 
in the hands of the epistemic communities (like the IPCC and CRU) 
who are producers and owners of climate change knowledge. An in-
teresting element of climate science as a regime of truths is that it has 
become a public matter, appropriated by an increasing number of ac-
tors that dance across different social and political spheres. The wave 
of scepticism at the end of 2009 and the beginning of 2010 was further 
nourished when serious errors were uncovered in a text box of the 
Impacts and Adaptation report of IPCC working group II, and that it 
was one of the coldest northern winters in many years. This, however, 
should be set against the background of the attendance of more than 
35,000 people and 120 heads of state, who participated in the Copen-
hagen Conference (Grubb 2010: 128), and the media attention that it 
received. We are here confronted with an alleged discrepancy that 
discloses some basic characteristics and dynamics of how discourses 
possibly manifest themselves.  
On the side of the developing (and least polluting) nations, no trac-
es can be found of a ‘culture’ of climate scepticism.11 To me it was at 
least remarkable that during the six months of my fieldwork I did not 
encounter anybody who called the existence or magnitude of the ‘cli-
matic threat’ into question. However, there has been one exception 
that in fact proves the ‘rule’ and is therefore worth mentioning. During 
a trip to the South I met a man (middle aged, Italian origin) who has 
been living in Cameroon for thirty years, and owns three of the largest 
                                                          
11  However, Myanna Lahsen demonstrates that Northern nations over-
whelmingly dominate the production and framing of climate science that 
guides international environmental negotiations. Less developed coun-
tries’ representatives are not blind to their disadvantage when it comes to 
science-infused political discussions, and this leads to suspicions related 
to science among Southern policy-makers and scientists (in Brazil) (Lah-
sen 2005). 
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timber exploitation companies in Cameroon. More than 80% of the 
exported timber falls under his control. Considering his profession and 
companies that highly contribute to deforestation – and against the 
background of the increasing pressure in this business – I asked him 
whether he was concerned with the climate, to which he replied:  
To me that is all one big joke. I see it more as one political game and I 
don’t want to listen to all that. Here, people say that the sea level is rising 
and that the sea is more and more approaching the coast. But this has 
nothing to do with rising temperatures or global warming, but with the 
fact that people remove the sand for new construction purposes. (…) I 
mean in Italy it is snowing and freezing ten degrees, and then they say 
that there is global warming? To me it is one big lie. (Interview (original 
in French), 28 December 2009). 
While the ‘Climategate Affair’ was breaking news in Western me-
dia and tended to overshadow the negotiations during the Summit, 
there was no Cameroonian media that covered this matter. Contrary to 
the (almost) complete absence of climate scepticism in Bamenda and 
Cameroon, in the US the growing environmental awareness and con-
cern go hand in hand with the emergence of a conservative movement 
that consists of conservative ‘think tanks’ and sympathetic sceptic 
scientists who try to undermine the scientific consensus on the reality 
of global warming (Dunlap & McCright 2000). Riley Dunlap and 
Aaron McCright explain that the motives of conservative groups are 
first and foremost those of opposing the efforts of the environmental 
movement to establish global warming as a widely accepted problem, 
and should therefore principally be understood as a countermovement. 
The counterclaims of this movement contest the evidentiary basis of 
global warming, state that, if it occurs, it will have substantial bene-
fits, and warn that proposed actions to combat it will do more harm 
than good. The authors demonstrate in their article that government 
action to promote environmental protection threatens essential ele-
ments of conservatism, such as the primacy of individual freedom, 
private property rights, free enterprise, etc. This traditional frame 
about humans and nature that has been called the Dominant Social 
Paradigm, and includes core elements of conservative ideology, in-
cluding support for economic growth, faith in material abundance, and 
faith in future prosperity (Dunlap & Van Liere 1984, in ibid 504-505). 
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It becomes clear that both claims as counterclaims should be viewed 
within a particular sociocultural and historical context and that analys-
ing the content of the claims might give us insight into the frame, in 
which claims-making takes place. The aforementioned discrepancy 
between emerging – and conflicting – movements shows once more 
the social construction of dealing with climate change, and can be 
explained as being two faces of the same movement. Likewise, con-
flicting perspectives reveal the dynamics of how discourses are used 
in different social settings as not only resources to meet and pursue 
but also to oppose diverging interests. Nevertheless, in section 2.4 I 
will demonstrate that discursive dimensions are not necessarily such a 
clear cut and deliberate process as presented here. 
The constant obsession with believing or disbelieving in the exist-
ence of climate change and global warming are inextricably bound 
together with who is speaking and why. Thus the urge to prove or 
disproof climate change often bears an ideological fundament and 
inevitably colours climate-change negotiations. An outstanding exam-
ple is the prevailing scepticism that exists in the US, and the conse-
quent role this plays in impeding climate negotiations. A quantitative 
poll held in the US has shown that Republicans are much more scepti-
cal about whether global warming is occurring. Moreover, this poll 
demonstrates that both political affiliation and ideology inform views 
on the environment overall, and global warming in particular: 
Democrats and liberals are more likely than Republicans and conserva-
tives to say the environment’s in bad shape, and more apt to believe that 
global warming is occurring, to call it a threat and to support government 
action to address it. Liberals are twice as likely as conservatives to identi-
fy climate change as the world’s biggest environmental problem. [...] 
They (Evangelical white protestants) are less likely than other to think 
about their personal impact on the environment or to say the government 
should address it. Evangelicals also are no more likely than others to think 
scientists agree on the issue – and they’re 12 points less likely than other 
Americans to trust environmental scientists in the first place. 
ABC News/Times/Stanford poll 2006)12  
                                                          
12  http://woods.stanford.edu/docs/surveys/Global-Warming-Woods-ABC-
Release-on-2006-Global-Warming-poll.pdf  
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Former president George Bush proclaimed in 2001 that the scien-
tific evidence for global warming was too uncertain and that the eco-
nomic costs were too high to require an immediate response. In a 
similar vein, James Schlesinger (2005), policymaker and former US 
Secretary of Energy, has suggested that in the ‘theology of global 
warming’ the burning of fossil fuels is the secular counterpart of 
man’s Original Sin. He therefore states that ‘the issue of climate 
change urgently needs to be brought down from the level of theology 
to what we actually know’ (Schlesinger 2005, A10). While climate 
scientists have been accused of exaggerating data to attract public 
attention and research funds, news stories have appeared about ‘scep-
tical’ scientists who were directly paid by oil companies and who’s 
aim was to disprove global warming.13  
Over the course of time, climate change has come to have a myriad 
of meanings, has undergone paradigmatic shifts and has, accordingly, 
played different roles in environmental and development policies. 
Over the last thirty years, smaller and bigger steps have been taken to 
address, conceptualize and understand climate change. Yet the exist-
ence and its potential impacts remain largely contested and continue to 
thrive in political, social, economic and scientific battles. What be-
comes clear is that the different meanings that are attached to climate 
change are defined in social settings and should therefore be under-
stood as such – an idea that lies at the heart of social constructivist 
approaches. 
 
Media(ted) discourses of science and politics  
The case of the ‘Climategate’ story and the different responses that it 
evoked gives us insight into the complex and often competitive power 
play between science, (mass) media and politics. It is the interconnec-
tion of these different discourses that makes climate change such a 
highly politicized and disputed matter. We can view those different 
discourses as regimes of knowledge that are competing about what is 
true and false and, as such, being responsible for creating different 
                                                          
13  See: http://www.nytimes.com/1998/04/26/us/industrial-group-plans-to- 
battle-climate-treaty.html 
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‘truth effects’. According to Foucault, ‘truth’ should be understood as 
a system of procedures for the production, regulation and diffusion of 
statements, and is embedded in, and produced by, systems of power. 
Since truth is unattainable and there is no position outside of discours-
es, it is fruitless to ask whether something is true or false. Instead, he 
argues that the focus should be on how effects of truth are created in 
discourses. What is then to be analysed are the discursive processes 
through which discourses are constructed in ways that give the im-
pression that they represent true or false pictures of reality (Foucault 
1972; 1980, in Philips and Jorgensen 2002: 14). Each discursive realm 
has its own particularities, time horizons, and dimensions that are 
subject to rules of selectivity. For example, the media has in general a 
relatively short time frame because a topic needs to be ‘hot’ and ‘sen-
sational’ to be newsworthy; in policy-making spheres the time horizon 
is much longer and environmental issues are usually not on top of the 
priority list; and it is in the nature of science (especially with such a 
complicated issue as climate science) that there is long-term research 
and an on-going collection of data required. This section will address 
the discursive interconnection of different regimes of truth, and how 
they shape and influence one another. 
In the last three decennia the role and power of climate science 
have changed, first and foremost due to the overwhelming attention 
that global warming has received in the mass media. The media has 
played a crucial role not only in bringing global warming into the 
arena of public discourse but also in gaining political momentum. 
While early news stories relied heavily upon science as a source for 
knowledge and understanding, over time economic and political spe-
cialists have edged out scientific experts as the dominant sources for 
generating news stories (Dunlap & McCright 2000: 500). This dimen-
sion sheds light on how climate change as a scientific discourse has 
increasingly become a public and popular discourse that inevitably 
shapes our worldviews and thus involves power. The US infotainment 
industry – with Hollywood movies such as The Day After Tomorrow, 
Sate of Fear and Al Gore’s doomsday scenario movie An Inconvenient 
Truth – increasingly depict diverging climate change interpretations, 
and illustrate that the media and other mass means of communication 
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have become powerful actors in nurturing our understandings of cli-
mate change (Pettenger et al. 2005: 4). The same holds true, to a lesser 
or greater extent, in Bamenda where Grassfielders frequently get to 
know mostly about the destructive forces of climate change through 
(mass) media. In contrast to commonly held perceptions within envi-
ronmental sociology about the positive view of the media’s role as an 
agent of environmental education, and the importance of media visi-
bility in moving environmental problems to policy concerns, I will 
demonstrate that we should view the role of the (Western) media in a 
rather different way in the context of the Bamenda Grassfields. The 
powerful role and influence of the media as a key factor in shaping 
Grassfielders worldview will be discussed throughout the subsequent 
chapters. In this section I will assess the more theoretical considera-
tions related to the media’s power in constructing climate change real-
ities. 
In their article about climate-change discourses in science, media 
and politics in Germany (from the period between 1975 and 1995), 
Peter Weinart et al. (2000) demonstrate how useful it is to distinguish 
dynamics among the separate discourses in order to understand the co-
constitutive relationship between them in constructing climate-change 
understandings. Their findings suggest that there are commonalities as 
well as disparities to be discerned within each of the three spheres. It 
appears that the problem is perceived and communicated with great 
variance in the separate spheres, which leads to specific risks of com-
munication, because – in line with Tsing’s idea of ‘awkward engage-
ments’ – the disturbances of communication among these spheres are 
rather the rule than the exception. They stipulate that the worldwide 
attention that global warming increasingly receives, and the national 
and international policies that are developed by governments at first 
sight seem like an excellent example of a successful communication 
of a serious environmental risk. Namely, human societies seem capa-
ble of anticipating and altering the unintended consequences of their 
own actions, and of preventing life-threatening outcomes. Neverthe-
less, scientists, policymakers and journalists have all experienced the 
problems and complexities resulting from this ‘success’ story. The 
complex arena of climate change communication has led to mutual 
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accusations of downplaying or exaggerating risks, sensationalism, 
inciting public hysteria and even conspiracy. In this light, according to 
the authors, ‘modern societies must cope not only with environmental 
risks but also with the risks inherent in communication’ (p. 261). An 
example of a disturbance in communication that negatively impacted 
upon science’s credibility is when in Germany in 1986 a working 
group of the German Physical Society warned of ‘an impending cli-
mate catastrophe’. This new and rather threatening framing of the 
problem, which overly dramatized scientific findings, never disap-
peared from discourses in mass media and politics (ibid).  
Indeed, most accounts on the social construction of environmental 
problems (both in science and policy-making) employ their approach 
in order to determine the necessary factors that are needed to bring 
environmental problems to the attention of the public, and thus to take 
appropriate action to prevent damage (see for example: Hannigan 
2005; Haas 2004). This way of thinking is what Weingart et al. refer 
to as a naïve rationalist-instrumental model of communication that 
consists of the following information flows: scientific research helps 
to discover an environmental problem, informs politicians of these 
findings and proposes potential solutions; in the spheres of politics 
environmental concerns often suffer from inertia or are distorted by 
other interests, thus scientists can also try to create public awareness 
that leads to political pressure. The basic idea of this model is ideally 
that the content of the information flows, unchanged and unaffected, 
among these spheres and automatically leads to political action. If the 
information does not engender action, this model assumes misrepre-
sentation of scientific information by the media or ignorance from 
policy makers (Weingart et al. 2000: 262).  
However, as may be evident from the aforementioned events re-
garding the politics and framing of climate change, along the discur-
sive ‘journey’ from science, to the media, to the sphere of politics and 
back, many redefinitions and translations take place. For example, a 
complicated issue like climate change is subject to many criteria be-
fore it is newsworthy. Raw climate data is unattractive for media cov-
erage and journalists need to create their own language to make the 
issue appealing, ‘sensational’, and comprehensible for a wide public. 
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Thus, the mass media have their own rules for determining if and how 
a given issue is covered. Political decision-making requires a compli-
cated agenda-setting process. And it is the nature of science that many 
initial findings are preliminary, uncertain and hypothetical. And 
hence, climate science has to cope with many methodological prob-
lems and open questions that must be met with on-going research and 
worldwide data collection (Weingart et al. 2000: 263). Taking a closer 
look at the discursive ‘journey’ from science to media and politics 
(and back), I believe that a parallel can be drawn with the discursive 
journey that is the focus of this research. Namely, from the level of 
science to globally constructed discourses on climate change in policy 
spheres, to the subsistence farmers in Bamenda, the mediation of cli-
mate-change discourses inevitably leads to a simplified redefinition, 
which eventually tends to take apocalyptic shape. In Cameroonian 
newspapers I regularly encountered the following constellation of 
words to term climate change: ‘Climate change is the biggest threat in 
the world’; ‘Climate change demons’; ‘The world is at risk of extinc-
tion’, or ‘A monster called climate change’.14  
According to Weingart et al. the problem of interferences of dis-
courses – that are characterized by specific selectivities – are more 
likely to occur in modern societies where there is a close relationship 
between science, politics and the media than has hitherto been the case 
(p. 280). In addition to this, I believe that in this ‘post-global’ world 
where the concept of modern societies no longer applies, the intimate 
and complex relationship between the above-mentioned spheres can 
be extended to (almost) any society. In other words, the images, 
knowledge and ideas that flow from global networks to ‘the rest of the 
world’ can no longer be confined to ‘modern’ societies alone. Because 
of the distortions that information and knowledge go through, the au-
thors employ a fruitful and broader concept of communication that 
goes beyond flows of information and takes into account notions of 
credibility, legitimacy, entertainment, etc. (p. 262). In other words, 
mediated information and discourses never follow a rational path be-
cause of the disparate communication arenas among three crucial sec-
                                                          
14  Collected from The Post newspaper. 
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tors of society. As the authors show, the differences between the three 
sectors of science, politics and the media are systematic and not ran-
dom. This results in the following: the credibility of science as an 
institution that produces reliable knowledge is jeopardized, and like-
wise may threaten the legitimacy of political decisions based on them 
(ibid: 280-281). A remarkable example, in which the realms of sci-
ence, politics and the media coalesce, is the above-mentioned movie 
An Inconvenient Truth, by former US Vice President Al Gore. While 
this representation of scientific knowledge was later criticized for 
being ‘bad’ science, this movie can similarly be considered as a suc-
cessful ‘speech act’, since Gore received the Nobel Peace Prize for 
addressing this ‘life threatening issue’, and gave further impetus to 
creating public awareness and calling for political commitment. 
In brief, on the one hand, the mass media have taken centre stage 
in influencing national and international policy responses and, on the 
other, have played a role in eroding science’s credibility. Scientists, in 
turn, have played their part in politicizing the issue. The mediated 
discourses in the web of linkages between science, media and politics 
is further complicated when we take Anabela Carvalho’s thesis into 
consideration, namely that the discursive (re)construction of climate 
change in the British ‘quality press’ is highly entangled with ideologi-
cal standpoints. She argues that ideology works as a powerful selec-
tion device in deciding what is scientific news (what are the relevant 
facts and who are the authorized ‘agents of definition’). This represen-
tation of scientific knowledge has again important implications for 
evaluating political programs and assessing the responsibility of both 
governments and the public in addressing climate change. She notes 
that the consequences the media draw are profoundly ideological. 
Values such as freedom, responsibilities and equity that may be at 
stake justify action or non-action (Carvalho 2007: 223). In her illumi-
nating approach Carvalho succeeds in unpacking ideological stand-
points that are dominant in the British press. In doing so, she convinc-
ingly demonstrates how media discourse and ideology are mutually 
constitutive: 
On the one hand, media texts result from ideological standpoints. On the 
other hand, media texts produce ideology: news and other media genres 
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always reproduce and/or challenge a certain ideology. The media should 
not be seen as mere conveyers of the ideologies of other actors. Besides 
allowing or disallowing other social actors to advance their ideological 
standings, the media can also have an important agency in bringing in 
new ideological readings of issues or confronting those of the dominant 
(ibid: 225). 
Based on my own findings in my research, I underscore the view 
that media and ideology are co-constitutive. However, as I will argue 
in the subsequent chapters, I opt for a more comprehensive and critical 
evaluation of the media’s powerful and responsible role in the context 
of the Bamenda Grassfields in communicating the ‘Green message’. 
In this thesis I want to make clear that instead of functioning as an 
agent of environmental education or enhancing agency, the (Western) 
media is similarly imposing a Green ideology of how to ‘Think Glob-
ally and Act Locally’ (see chapters three and five). 
 
Science and its struggle for ‘truth’ 
Taking the basic assumption of social constructivist approaches into 
account, namely that climate change must be understood within the 
context of social settings – which traverses the realms of science and 
politics – an important question needs to be addressed. How can we 
view the role of science in the social construction of climate change? 
This epistemological concern should also be placed in historical per-
spective, since the available knowledge on climate change is not the 
same as ten years ago, and this applies to the various scientific disci-
plines. Hannigan points out that an important difference between envi-
ronmental problems and social problems in general is that the former 
mostly have their origins in a body of scientific research. For example 
acid rain, global warming, ozone layer depletion, biodiversity loss, or 
desertification: all were brought to the fore after a set of scientific 
observations. However, he argues, while this profile of science might 
suggest that scientific findings reflect the physical reality of the natu-
ral world in a relatively straight-forward manner; science is not a 
search for truth, in which the goal is to obtain a clear reflection of 
nature, being as free as possible from any social and subjective influ-
ences that might distort the ‘facts’. Quite the contrary: the assembly of 
scientific knowledge is highly dependent on a process of claims-
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making. Researchers, as such, act as ‘gatekeepers’ screening potential 
claims for credibility (Hannigan 2005: 95). The aforementioned com-
plexities of the claims-making processes among the separate realms of 
science, politics and the media indeed not only apply to the incongrui-
ties of selectivities between those spheres but are also to be found 
within each discursive realm. Within science, for example, a distinc-
tion can be made between cognitive and interpretative claims. Cogni-
tive claims aim to convert experimental observations, hypothesis and 
theories into publicly accredited factual knowledge. Interpretative 
claims are in a similar way subject to conditions under which scien-
tists are likely to make such claims (ibid). In this regard, Haas argues 
that science is indeed highly politicized: 
Scientific consensus is often suspect because the scientists themselves are 
part of a broader cultural discourse, and thus lack autonomy or independ-
ent stature: in part scientific findings may reflect the bias of sponsors, but 
more deeply they may reflect the broader culture of the society from 
which they emerge and about which they may not be fully conscious. The 
universe of what is known or deemed knowable may be biased by the 
availability of funding resources for research, and thus reflect the con-
scious or unconscious bias of major public and private funding bodies 
(Haas 2004: 572). 
As stated before, despite the scientific evidence that supports the 
causal relationship between human activities and climate change, un-
certainty about the evidence remains (Pettenger et al. 2005: 3). What 
gives further impetus to the contestation of scientific claims is sci-
ence’s inability to give absolute proof for the anthropogenic causes of 
climate change. Different climate models that are used to predict glob-
al warming show differing results depending on the quality of the 
models. Former director of the Dutch meteorological institute Ger-
brand Komen explains in an interview that the first problems with 
reliability already occur in the data collection process. To illustrate his 
point, he poses an interesting question: how can you determine the 
quality of measuring rising temperatures in China during the Cultural 
Revolution? He adds that the climate is a very complex phenomenon 
with many processes that work against each other, and that climate 
change is not such a black and white process as it might appear. For 
example, due to desertification an increasing amount of sand is 
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dropped in the oceans that is good for life under water, and enables the 
water to absorb more CO2 (Trouw, 12 October 2010).  
A major difference between scientific and popular discourses is 
that the latter are often less nuanced than the scientific explanation, 
and tend to ascribe ‘sensational’ or exaggerated and clear-cut charac-
teristics to global warming. However, after the errors that were found 
in the IPCC report in 2009, they were accused of using similar exag-
gerative strategies, and climate science in general widely lost signifi-
cant credibility. On top of this battle, there is disagreement about 
whether there is uncertainty about the evidence or not – thus meaning 
that there is in fact uncertainty about whether there is uncertainty. In 
her essay ‘Undeniable Global Warming’, historian Naomi Oreskes 
(2004) claims that there is scientific consensus, and we should there-
fore stop repeating nonsense and thinking that there is disagreement 
about global climate change. Contrary to this, Schlesinger points out 
that global warming is based on politics, not science. He states that ‘it 
is, of course, quite likely that the greenhouse effect has to some extent 
contributed to global warming – but we simply do not know to what 
extent’ (Schlesinger 2005, A10). To make the confusion complete, 
Myanna Lahsen – adhering to a social constructivist perspective – 
calls our attention to the fact that ‘science in many cases is the politics 
of climate change’ (Lahsen 2005: 190). In her essay about the problem 
of knowledge in decision-making she demonstrates how the perceived 
material reality of climate change is defined in social settings by both 
scientists and policymakers. She puts forward that scientific facts, and 
hence discourses about them, do not transcend particularities of per-
spective (ibid: 173). 
Together with the growing societal concern and attention for envi-
ronmental issues in the late 1960s and early 1970s, sociologists began 
to examine the popularity of environmentalism and the environmental 
movement. One of the founders of the field of environmental sociolo-
gy, Riley Dunlap, identifies two stages since the evolvement of this 
fields as a distinctive (sub)discipline. From the outset, researchers 
were mainly preoccupied with studying the social characteristics of 
environmental activists and social movements, and they applied tradi-
tional sociological perspectives to public opinion, to the strategies 
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employed by environmental groups and to environmental policy-
making. Over time, sociologists’ perspectives gradually shifted to the 
point where scholars began to analyse the relationship between mod-
ern industrial societies and their biophysical environment. This devel-
opment occurred at the same time that the term ‘environmental sociol-
ogy’ began to be used in the early and mid 1970s (Dunlap 2002: 329). 
The birth of the scientific sub-discipline itself can therefore be seen as 
being part and parcel of a societal and ideational change, rather than 
being driven by merely material changes in the environment. Even 
though environmental sociology has exhibited several major theoreti-
cal trends over the past decades, Frederick Buttel (2002) notes that 
there has been a surprising degree of continuity regarding the fact that 
most of the empirical issues of interest to environmental sociology 
today are the very same as those that were brought to our attention in 
the past:  
[...] The nature of environmental social movements; states, politics and 
environmental policy formation; environmental attitudes, beliefs and val-
ues; the relationships between consumption and production institutions; 
the reciprocal impacts of societies and environments; the role of technol-
ogy in social and environmental change; and the significance of ‘the 
global’ in terms of ‘environmental ‘scale and social institutions (Buttel 
2002: 28).  
An overall theme that can be determined from these topics is the 
focus on man’s relation with the natural world, both in societal (or 
discursive) as well as in material terms – and their mutual impacts. 
However, the ways, in which sociology has viewed this relationship, 
have been subject to different paradigms and theoretical shifts. In the 
early days of this discipline there were key contributors who distin-
guished between a real ‘environmental sociology’, focusing on the 
study of environment-society interaction, and a ‘sociology of envi-
ronmental issues’ that did not (Dunlap & Catton 1979; Catton & Dun-
lap in Hannigan 2005: 11), a distinction that nowadays no longer ex-
ists. The view that the material and the ideational are complexly in-
terwoven and interdependent (Pettenger et al. 2005) only gained 
prominence much later, within the social constructionist paradigm that 
emerged in the late 1990s. Hannigan emphasizes that the most endur-
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ing – and at times rancorous – debate in the field is the realism-
constructionism debate (Hannigan 2005: 16) that up until the present 
day still yields tension across different disciplines. A few words about 
this major controversy that still continues to set proponents and oppo-
nents against each other are worth including at this point. 
In the field of environmental sciences, social constructivists have 
often been criticized for denying that the earth is suffering from envi-
ronmental hazards. These accusations have, according to Hannigan 
(2005), led to serious misrepresentations about what constructionists 
stand for. Only a ‘false reductionism’ can create a constructionist ac-
count as claiming that environmental risks do not exist, and that the 
natural reality does not exist or play a role in identifying these risks 
(Wynne 2002: 472 in Hannigan 2005: 29). This rare stance can be 
placed on the extreme side of the constructionist spectrum, and we 
might refer to this as ‘hyper-constructionism’, meaning that there is no 
extra-discursive nature of nature, and there is thus nothing beyond 
human discourse. A more moderate view is the so-called critical ‘po-
litical ecology paradigm’ that avoids this extreme and acknowledges 
that we do not have any shared access to reality other than through 
discourse (see section 2.4). On the other side of the spectrum, envi-
ronmental realists can be found whose allegations against constructiv-
ist perspectives often stem from an activist driven sentiment and, 
hence, the fear that such approaches undermine action that is urgently 
needed to fight environmental hazards. Even though the ‘construction-
ist-realist’ debate that for a long time was considered a major contro-
versy in dealing with environmental issues has recently began to set-
tle; Hannigan notes that it is worth emphasizing how constructivism 
might continue to make a useful contribution in understanding envi-
ronmental issues. According to him, constructionists are actually say-
ing that there is a need to look more closely at the social, political and 
cultural processes by which certain conditions are defined. This, how-
ever, does not mean that we should relax about the possibility of the 
polar ice caps melting, but that it is just not wise to allow a discussa-
ble issue to become an evident crisis, especially where the evidence is 
open for multiple interpretations (ibid: 30). In line with Hannigan’s 
constructivist approach towards environmental issues, I believe that it 
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is indeed crucial to explore the construction of the questions related to 
climate change rather than taking a pre-given set of assumptions as a 
point of departure. While this stance might appear evident, this suppo-
sition does not predominantly come out if we take a closer look at 
research that has been conducted as far as climate change in the con-
text of Africa is concerned.  
Even though the body of literature related to climate change in Af-
rica is expanding, research has, over the years, predominantly taken 
positivist stances and is largely based on scientific and economic 
models (e.g. Pak Sum Low eds. 2005). For a long time, the debates 
have largely been dominated by climatology and other natural scienc-
es, which are principally concerned with climate modelling. While 
many climate models show anomalies in, for example, annual rainfall 
patterns in different African regions, scholars acknowledge that many 
limitations and uncertainties in knowledge continue to exist. For ex-
ample, Hulme et al. point out that particularly the extent to which 
rainfall variations are related to greenhouse gas-induced global warm-
ing remains undetermined. Moreover, there has been relatively little 
work published on future climate change scenarios for Africa (Hulme 
et al. 2005: 37). In this regard, Johan van Boxel contends that there 
are regionally large differences between the climate models, especially 
in the projections for future precipitation amounts. Therefore, he con-
cludes that the outcome of the climate models is not yet accurate 
enough for a regional interpretation (Van Boxel 2004: 40). While 
many uncertainties exist within the natural sciences regarding climate 
change modelling in Africa, and, in this regard, climate modelling is 
in its early stages of development: the social sciences have hardly 
been visible at all in the debates on climate change. 
In the last two decennia researchers in different fields, such as ge-
ography, biology, climatology, geophysics, microbiology, meteorolo-
gy, etc., and later carefully the social sciences and humanities, have 
increasingly been exploring the possible consequences of climate 
change on the world’s supposedly most vulnerable continent. Central 
questions that up till now have preoccupied researchers in this field 
have been to ask how and to what extent climate change is affecting – 
and will continue to affect – livelihoods in Africa. While covering a 
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wide spectrum of topics, research has by and large aimed at contrib-
uting to understanding the challenges and opportunities that African 
countries are facing, amidst the growing concerns of climate change 
and its impacts (see for example Pak Sum Low et al. 2005; Dietz, 
Ruben & Verhagen 2004; Breusers 2001; De Bruijn et al. 2005). As 
such, climate change has in recent years evolved from an environmen-
tal issue into a complicated and contested development-related matter. 
Recurrent themes related to climate change – often framed as climate 
variability – in Africa have varied from understanding drought risks,15 
to changing rainfall patterns (Hulme et al. 2005), to land and liveli-
hood changes (Dietz et al. 2004), to the assessment of pathway analy-
sis for understanding local actors’ responses.16 Nevertheless, especial-
ly in the field of African Studies, little (or no) concern has been ex-
pressed for the power dynamics at the local level that are constituted 
by the discursive (re)presentations of climate change, and thus rarely 
have been explored from social constructivist approaches. In this the-
sis I contend that aforementioned (mainly objectivist) research is 
mostly valuable if complemented with detailed constructivist and eth-
nographic analyses. Moreover, I believe that this latter type of re-
search is becoming more and more important because of the high level 
of concern at the international level with climate change issues and 
Africa’s role herein. In other words, as the ‘world’ is talking about and 
acting upon climate change and ‘Africa’s future’ in terms of adapta-
tion and mitigation – in addition to the presumed and expected bio-
physical effects that climate change entails – it is crucial to compre-
hend how these emerging discourses shape society-environment rela-
tions and African realities. The primary objectives of social construc-
tivist approaches related to climate change are not to ask questions 
such as how climate change is constituted, whether the claim is ‘true’ 
or not, or how and even if we should respond, but rather to unravel the 
constructions of those questions and the consecutive responses (Pet-
tenger et al. 2007). What does it mean to say that Africans need to 
adapt to and mitigate climate change? Therefore, a leading analytical 
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question of this study is: by and for whom are the discourses, and who 
is excluded from them? The section below will address this question. 
The power of discourses, or discourses as power? 
It is difficult these days to speak about discourses without bringing in 
the notion of power. This is due, in large part, to the influence of 
Michel Foucault, who transformed generally accepted ideas about 
power, and played a central role in developing and conceptualizing 
discourse analysis in both theoretical work and empirical research. 
Over the last two decades, discourse has become a fashionable term; it 
has been used indiscriminately in scientific texts and debates, often 
without being defined (Philips & Jorgensen 2004: vii). The more this 
term has been used and meanings have been attached to it, the more it 
has been beset with vagueness. Therefore, in this section I briefly 
want to elaborate on how discourse analysis is a valuable method and 
theory in my research. From the outset it needs to be stressed that 
discourse analysis cannot be used as a method of analysis detached 
from its theoretical and methodological foundations, but is rather an 
integrated whole: a complete package (ibid: 3-4). As mentioned in 
chapter one, discourses can be understood in very basic terms as the 
way we view the world and the way we talk about it. In each social 
domain we can think of different patterns and instances of language 
use, such as scientific, political or public discourse. As we shall see in 
chapter three, in order to speak about environmental issues many dif-
ferent categorizations of discourses have been developed. Delimiting 
discourses in such a way is, in turn, a social construct in itself, but 
often necessary in order to speak about and to make sense of them. 
Discourses are, as such, not merely a speech or a text but a system of 
representations that give meaning to things (Frerks 2007: 45). 
The proposed general definition about discourses, however, does 
not tell us anything about how discourses operate, manifest them-
selves, and how they are produced and received, and, hence, about 
how to analyse them. Among different discourse analytical perspec-
tives, there is also no clear-cut consensus; nevertheless, there are 
shared premises that are embraced by most approaches, to which I will 
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limit myself in this study.17 In this section I will briefly discuss the 
main epistemological and ontological principles that embrace most 
discourse analytical approaches as presented by Vivien Burr (1995). 
As mentioned earlier, a fundamental premise that underscores the 
relevance of discourse analysis in general is that ‘reality’ can never be 
reached outside of discourses, and therefore discourse itself becomes 
the object of analysis. In his work The Archaeology of Knowledge 
(1972) Foucault defines discourse as follows:  
We shall call discourse a group of statements in so far as they belong to 
the same discursive formation (… Discourse) is made up of a limited 
number of statements for which a group of conditions of existence can be 
defined. Discourse in this sense is not an ideal, timeless form [...] it is, 
from beginning to end, historical – a fragment of history [...] posing its 
own limits, its divisions, its transformations, the specific modes of its 
temporality (Foucault 1972: 117). 
Here, Foucault introduces a second basic premise that underlines 
general social constructionist and discourse analytical perspectives, 
namely that knowledge is not just a reflection of reality. Truth is a 
discursive construction, and different regimes of knowledge determine 
what is true and false. And the historical rules of a particular discourse 
delimit what is possible to say (Philips & Jorgenson 2004). In the 
course of time, ideas about the environment have changed quite dras-
tically with major implications for politics, environmental policies, 
and consequently, for social life. Dryzek illustrates this idea in the 
following statement: ‘What is the earth? We have long known that it is 
a planet, but the idea that it might be a finite planet with limiting ca-
pacities to support human life has only received widespread attention 
since the late 1960s. This drastic shift in thinking has led to the most 
basic consequence that we now have a politics of the Earth, whereas 
once we did not’ (Dryzek 2005: vii). In the field of environmental 
sociology, international relations and communication studies, dis-
                                                          
17 I refer here to three central approaches, which are widely used within so-
cial research: Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, and Fairclough’s 
critical discourse analysis and discursive psychology. For a basic discus-
sion about the similarities and differences among the approaches, see: 
Philips & Jorgenson 2002, and Burr 1995.  
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course analysis is increasingly being used as an influential method to 
analyse and contextualize the production, reception and strategic use 
of environmental ‘communicative events’.18 In this study it is used in 
a broad sense as an abstract mapping of discourses that circulate with-
in society, which connects and shapes different worlds across a dis-
tance. 
Another premise that underpins and is embraced by different dis-
course analytical approaches is the assumed inherent link between 
knowledge, social processes and actions. In other words, discourses 
largely determine (but are also in a dialectical relationship with) our 
actions. What follows from this statement is that our ways of talking 
do not neutrally reflect our world, but rather play an active role in 
creating and changing them. Therefore, in order to understand envi-
ronmental affairs, we need to examine the discourses that guide the 
political agenda, for – borrowing Dryzek’s words – ‘the history of 
environmental affairs is largely a matter of the history of discourses 
[...]’ (Dryzek 2005: v). However, he notes that while discourses have 
always been important in ordering the system, what is different about 
the evolving world is the extent to which discourses are amenable to 
contestation. According to him, many if not most of the main axes of 
conflict in today’s world can be interpreted in term of discourses, but 
their role is not universally appreciated. And that those who do appre-
ciate the role of discourses often treat them as singular and accepted, 
rather than multiple and contested (p. vi). As I pointed out before, we 
should indeed keep in mind that no discourse is a closed or fixed enti-
ty, but that discursive boundaries are permeable and are rather in a 
constant flux of negotiation. This thought can be found in the post-
structuralist idea that discourses construct the social world in meaning, 
and that, due to the fundamental instability of language, meaning can 
never be permanently fixed (Philips & Jorgenson 2004: 6). As I tried 
to make clear in this chapter, this holds all the more true for discourses 
on climate change. On the one hand, this can be explained by the rap-
idly changing and interconnected world, in which climate change has 
                                                          
18 A communicative event is here understood as every instance of language 
use such as a text, speech, interview, article, a talk, etc. 
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– across a distance – penetrated different spheres of social, political 
and economic life, and makes the issue unavoidably prone to contesta-
tion. On the other hand, the trans-boundary nature of climate change 
and, consequently, the discursive construction of a global responsibil-
ity (thinking globally and acting locally) have profoundly shaped ide-
as about development and ‘the politics of the earth’, and makes deal-
ing with it a negotiable multi-stakeholder’s endeavour. At this point, 
Foucault has been criticized for trying to identify only one knowledge 
regime in each historical period, while they operate with a more con-
flictual picture, in which different discourses co-exist and struggle for 
the right to define the truth (Philips & Jorgenson 2004: 13). 
A fourth premise, that touches upon this so-called discursive strug-
gle, insists that we take a critical stance towards taken-for-granted 
knowledge and ways of understanding the world, including ourselves 
(Burr 1995: 3). Knowledge should not be treated as an objective 
‘truth’ but rather as the product of our categorizations and understand-
ings of the world (thus products of discourse). Thus, the way we 
commonly understand the world and the concepts that we use are con-
tingent and historically specific (ibid). In his archaeological ‘phase’, 
Foucault (1972) was interested in studying the rules that determine 
which knowledge claims were accepted as meaningful and true in a 
particular period in time. In his writings about these historical config-
urations of knowledge, he argued that the reorganizations of 
knowledge also constituted new forms of power (Rouse 2005: 92). 
While in his early work Foucault referred rather implicitly to (mecha-
nisms of) power, in his genealogical work that followed later, he fo-
cused more explicitly on power (see below). His objective was to ex-
amine the structure of different regimes of knowledge, or what is pos-
sible to say and what are the so-called truth effects created within dis-
courses (Foucault 1980). In broad terms, discourse analysis (embed-
ded in general social constructivist approaches) can be understood as 
an analytic tool that enables us to analyse these patterns.  
The final premise that is worth mentioning – and brings again to 
the fore the link between discourses and social processes – is the idea 
that different understandings of the world lead to different social ac-
tions, and therefore the social construction of knowledge and ‘truth’ 
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has social consequences (Burr 1995: 3-4). Following these premises, 
we can state that discourses are always in a dialectical relationship 
with aspects of the social; in other words, they are created, shaped and 
reshaped, maintained or contested through social processes, and have 
again social consequences.19 With these ideas in mind, the ‘securitiza-
tion’ of global discourses on climate change – and its strong influence 
on shaping environmental politics in the developing world – are an 
important matter to explore. The primary exercise of discourse analy-
sis here is not so much to sort out whose rhetoric is right or wrong but 
to understand how the negotiation processes of different ‘truths’ are 
being played out through changing power relations and multiple nor-
mative systems.  
Against this background – and all the more because across social 
settings discourses take on a life of their own – it is not an easy task to 
analyse, follow and delimit globally constructed discourses on climate 
change, which are retold and reshaped in the process of communica-
tion. Therefore, the aim of analysing these patterns cannot be more 
ambitious than to develop an account of how climate-change dis-
courses are used or manifest themselves, by discerning dominant dis-
cursive tendencies and to view them in specific cultural, social and 
historical context. Nevertheless, since discourses cannot be detached 
from aspects of the social, in the chapters that follow I attempt to re-
veal – in addition to discursive focus – the (possible) social conse-
quences entailed in the struggle of negotiating climate change as a 
regime of truths: this, with a particular attention and concern for the 
social consequences of different discursive representations of climate 
change for farmers who do not have access to high profile forums to 
negotiate and question these ‘realities’. Since discourses are here un-
derstood as a form of social action that plays a part in creating the 
social world, it should be noted that discourses are not simply imposed 
upon people, but that people also use the available discourses as a 
platform to negotiate and produce representations of the world. How 
                                                          
19  This idea has already been expressed in a fundamental sociological law, 
introduced by W.I. Thomas in 1928, in which he developed the idea that: 
‘If people define things as real, they are real in their consequences’. 
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discourses and knowledge inhabit power will briefly be discussed 
below by focusing on Foucault’s theory of power/knowledge. 
 
Foucault’s notion of power/knowledge 
An essential element in Foucault’s conception of power is that it is 
embedded in social relationships. As such, he dismissed the existing 
idea that power necessarily resides in institutions, nor that power is 
solely oppressive, but that it is a fundamental feature of everyday hu-
man interaction (Foucault: 1980). In his genealogical phase Foucault 
developed a theory of power/knowledge, in which power plays a fun-
damental role as a mechanism that is being spread across different 
social practices. A primary important distinction that Foucault makes 
is between, on the one hand, power as domination or as an oppressive 
force, and, on the other, power as something productive: 
What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact 
that it does not only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it 
traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, pro-
duces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive framework 
which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative 
instance whose function is repression (Foucault 1980: 119). 
What can be derived from this statement is that power is responsi-
ble for both constructing the social world and for the particular ways, 
in which the world is framed and can be talked about, ruling out alter-
native ways of being and talking. Power then can work both as a pro-
ductive and as a constraining force (Philips & Jorgenson 2004: 13-14). 
Our analysis of how power and discourses work as a constraining 
force depends on how we conceptualize the subject (individual) and 
the ‘freedom of action’ within the discourse. Foucault understood the 
subject as being de-centred, or ‘dead’, meaning that the subject is cre-
ated within discourses. Even though this idea is shared in general by 
most discourse analytical perspectives, there is disagreement about the 
extent to which the subject is ‘free’ or can act as an agent of change. 
Whereas Foucault viewed the individual as determined by structure, I 
adhere to the approach (found in Norman Fairclough’s critical dis-
course analysis and discursive psychology) that discourses can be 
used as resources, with which people create new constellations of 
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words, which enables them to function as agents of discursive and 
cultural change. However, discourses are here also seen as frame-
works that limit the subject’s scope of action and possibilities for in-
novation (ibid: 17). Moreover, I believe that the scope of the subject’s 
‘freedom of action’ largely depends on an individual’s accessibility to 
discourses, sources of knowledge and, moreover, the social and politi-
cal position that people fulfil within society.   
With regard to perspectives upon the environment, and hence envi-
ronmental policies, Hannigan states in his book ‘Environmental soci-
ology’ (1995) that discourses define what is meaningful, shape pro-
cesses of socialization and therefore provide institutions with a power-
ful means of incorporating individuals into relations of domination. 
While Foucault dismissed the idea that power does not solely belong 
to particular individuals or the state, he argued that, at the level of 
institutions, power is most effective in discourses because they reduce 
resistance and internalize consent (Foucault 1967). Foucault regarded 
this as central to a process of social control. In this study I want to 
show that Foucault’s understanding of discourse serves as a fruitful 
analytical tool to look at negotiation processes of ‘truth’ making in the 
context of my research. Foucault focuses on the question of how some 
discourses have shaped and created meaning systems: the ways, in 
which they gain the status and currency of ‘truth’ and thereby domi-
nate how we define and organize both ourselves and our social world, 
whilst other, alternative discourses are marginalized and subjugated 
(Foucault 1971: 37). Every society has its own ‘regimes of truth’, its 
‘politics’ of truth, that is, an arena where different discourses are be-
ing bargained. Therefore, in discourses power, knowledge and truth 
are inextricably bound together. As mentioned before, knowledge is 
created through social interaction, in which we construct ‘common 
truths’ and compete about what is true and false. Power then follows 
from our acceptance of the ‘reality with which we are presented’ 
(Pinkus 1996).  
To make this more concrete: with the global authorization of a dis-
course on climate change, as an existential and global threat as truth-
ful, at the expense of other discourses, the increasing concern with 
climate change and the encompassing consequences of global envi-
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ronmental governance is inevitably a field of power relationships and 
domination. The dominant global discourse on climate change is thus 
a mechanism of power, as it has become a highly prioritized matter on 
international policy agendas. In this instance, power can be seen as a 
substance, through which so-called ‘expert knowledge’ (science) as a 
regime of truths is embodied by people through institutions and inter-
actions. The following chapters will examine the patterns and identify 
the social consequences of different discursive representations of re-




Talking climate change into  
existence – the role of NGOs in  
disseminating the Green message 
 
Introduction 
I arrived in Bamenda in the midst of August 2009. This period was 
said to be one of the wettest months for many years. While August is 
indeed generally the time of maximum rainfall, according to many 
Grassfielders, and confirmed by geo-environmentalist Fonye Francis, 
the torrential rains were particularly severe this year.1 Some people 
exclaimed that they never experienced such heavy rains before. Oth-
ers, who were less impressed, stated that many years ago their crops 
had to face similar excessive rainfall. It was in this same period that a 
sequence of environmental catastrophes took place. In a recent study 
on environmental hazards, human ecologist Emmanuel Nyambod 
states that ‘the first few days of the month of August 2009 were char-
acterized by sporadic outburst of natural environmental hazards in the 
city of Bamenda’ (Nyambod: 21). Due to the heavy rainfall several 
streams and rivers had overflowed their banks and destroyed houses, 
                                                          
1  ‘Environmental and social considerations of the recent natural catastro-
phes (landslides and floods) in North-West region with special reference 
to Mezam division’, Bamenda, 20 August 2009. Presented by Wadt-zela 
Fonye Francis, Regional delegate of environment and the protection of 
nature. 
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farmlands, bridges and roads, which in some areas forced people to 
relocate their houses elsewhere. One particular incident attracted me-
dia attention and alarmed many people: a heavy landslide at 
Bamenda’s Up-station2 carried the governor’s residence away and led 
to the death of a young boy. In the media the event was by and large 
attributed to the consequences of climate change or global warming, 
and soon the idea that these environmental catastrophes are the first 
signs of global warming became common knowledge among many 
Grassfielders. Moreover, this event showed that climate change not 
only affects the poor but touches upon all layers of society. 
In a similar way, government officials partly blamed climate 
change for causing these phenomena – due to the variations in both 
rainfall and temperature patterns of particular places – and partly at-
tributed it to man’s activities like infrastructural works and the bad 
farming methods of the population (Fonye Francis 2009). A critical 
observer, working for the FAO, had a fairly different view of the in-
discriminate use of climate change by the government for the explana-
tion of existing problems: 
Climate change is too much politicized. It is used as a scapegoat for poor 
management, used as a scapegoat for lack of action, used as a scapegoat 
for everything. [...] The production of maize has been fallen due to cli-
mate change; fuck that! You are not giving these people the input, you are 
not encouraging them, you have not liberalized the fertilizers, you have 
not given them anything! But you are blaming climate change? It’s crazy. 
That is how politicians have taken it as their baby. It’s all bullshit, let me 
tell you. [...] Just like the recent landslide. Are you going to blame climate 
change or are you going to blame bad management? They talk about cli-
mate change and that is what really aches me. For years, even a blind per-
son could see that that hill was going to collapse (Interview with Emman-
uel Yuh, September 2009, FAO Bamenda). 
Geographical studies of this region (e.g. Nyambod 2010; Chi 1998) 
that have focused on land surface changes, and the social and ecologi-
                                                          
2  Bamenda’s geographical divide in up-station, where most of the govern-
ment departments reside and where mainly wealthier and well-off people 
live, and downtown where the ‘commoners’ live, can at the same time be 
seen as a symbol of the existing hierarchies and the social (and economic) 
segregation within society.   
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cal implications, provide us with a comprehensive insight into recent 
environmental problems and developments in Bamenda. The socio-
environmental account of Acho Chi (1998) has shown that, due to the 
rapid urbanization and sustained population growth since the 1980s, 
an increasing dislocation in the relationship between human settle-
ments and the environment exists, because the settlements continue to 
encroach on all land sites. Chi has demonstrated that especially within 
and around Bamenda’s urban city centre human interference with the 
natural regimen of the steep surface slopes creates ecological disequi-
librium. Moreover, the expanding urbanization has been accommodat-
ed in informal settlements on steep slopes and flood plains and, as 
such, has increased the risks of environmental catastrophes like land-
slides (Chi 1998: 161-163).  
The Bamenda Grassfields are situated in the mountainous North-
west Region of Cameroon and, as the name indicates, are part of the 
grass savannah zone of West and Central Africa. The town of 
Bamenda suddenly emerged around 1899 as the largest urban area in 
the Western Highlands of Cameroon. The sustained population growth 
which has taken place since then owes much to its location in the heart 
of the Grassfields, as well as to its closeness to the city states of Cala-
bar and to a colonial regional city Enugu in Eastern Nigeria. Apart 
from its geographical location, a growing and changing demand for 
labour and economic development are factors that have contributed to 
urbanization and the high growth rate (ibid). Currently, Bamenda has 
an extraordinarily high population density of about 100 inhabitants per 
square kilometre, with an annual growth of almost 8%. While 
Bamenda is indeed facing more and more of the environmental prob-
lems – such as soil degradation, erosion, deforestation and the in-
creased risks of environmental catastrophes – entailed in rapid urbani-
zation, the area is nevertheless blessed with an abundance of streams, 
rivers and crater lakes, and the topography is characterized by ex-
tremely varied relief composed of mountains, escarpments, valleys, 
plains and plateau. The majority of the land is situated above 900 me-
tres in altitude, and the plains are generally rich in alluvial deposits, all 
of which endows the area with a great potential for intensive agricul-
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ture and the growth of a variety of fruits.3 In general, the short dry 
season lasts four months (November – February), and the rainy season 
lasts about eight months (March – October). More precisely, what we 
learn from the Grassfielders is that the rainy season starts every year 
on the 15th of March and ends on the 15th of October. It is not surpris-
ing that due to the favourable climate, the Northwest Region is con-
sidered to be the breadbasket of Cameroon. Against the backdrop of 
this allegedly (relatively) stable climate, I was stunned by the wide-
spread awareness of global warming and climate change among dif-
ferent social spheres that I encountered during my stay in Bamenda. 
To me it appeared to be a contradiction that, in such an environment, 
global warming (or climate change) would be such a prominent 
theme. Thinking about high risks environments like many parts of the 
Sahelian Drylands  that have faced recurrent great droughts and irreg-
ular rainfall (and are considered to be among the most vulnerable to 
climate change (cf. Dietz et al. 2004)), one can more easily imagine 
global warming to be of a major concern. 
This is not to say that in Bamenda climate change cannot be a pos-
sible threat to agriculture or affect people’s daily lives. In fact, people 
speak about it all the time. It is fairly common to find people in 
Bamenda who complain about global warming while referring to 
changing weather patterns, for example, that there is too much heat 
during the day or too much cold during the night, or that the rains 
were too heavy this year and that the dry season is becoming too 
harsh. Nonetheless, according to meteorologist Mr Awah, if we take a 
look at the statistics of average, minimum and maximum temperature, 
and the rainfall data over the last fifty years (see appendix I), we do 
not find significant changes in the weather patterns in Bamenda.4 
                                                          
3  Studies of the fruits and vegetables sub-sectors in the Northwest region of 
Cameroon. Final Report, Ministry of Scientific Research and Innovation – 
Northwest Region, September 2009. 
4  Interview Mr Awah, December 2009. The data and statistics that show the 
measured weather indicators before 1963 are not taken into consideration 
here, as they are not to be found at the meteorological institute in 
Bamenda but in Nigeria. It should be noted however, that this data does 
not say anything about whether the climate is changing or not, for this re-
quires many more indicators, and elaborate and long-term measuring. 
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While he goes on to state that Bamenda has also experienced very 
significant rainfall (580 mm of rainfall in the month of July, whereas 
the average is 444 mm during this month) in the year 2009: ‘we 
should be very careful to say that everything is due to climate change, 
because in fact we do not know’ (Interview, Mr Awah, meteorological 
institute Bamenda, December 2009).  
 
 
Photo 3.1 & 3.2 Landslide at Up-station at the 




Talking climate change into existence 
71 
In addition to this, I believe that there are many good reasons to ar-
gue that ‘speaking about’, ‘adapting to’, and ‘mitigating’ global 
warming and climate change in Bamenda (and in any other place) are 
no mere reflection of the biophysical realities. In other words, the fact 
that many people relate their visible experiences of changing weather 
patterns to global warming indicates that there is a discursive frame at 
hand that enables people to make sense of these perceived changes. 
For example, the fact that environmental hazards are on the rise in 
Bamenda and its surroundings makes the idea of global warming very 
acceptable. In order to disclose these discursive dynamics, and how 
they shape and relate to policies, I chose discourses – and how they 
shape and are shaped by the sociopolitical landscape – as my point of 
departure. In this chapter, I wish to demonstrate that due to the promi-
nent role and activities of INGOs in Bamenda – which are informed 
and funded by the international community – these organizations are 
among the most crucial vehicles in the mediation of globally con-
structed discourses on climate change.  
However, NGOs are not individual, isolated players in this field. If 
we place their role in a broader perspective, they are instead one 
among many actors, such as epistemic communities, lobby groups and 
civil society organizations that constitute the so-called transnational 
norm-building networks (Jakobeit, Kappel & Mückenberger 2010), 
that shape environmental policies and ideologies in the South. Harri-
son and Bryner (2004) developed a theory of ‘emergence processes’ 
as applied to the production of international environmental policy. 
They argue that international environmental policy should be seen as 
being not only the creation of states but rather the product of a com-
plex interaction of many related processes, including the negotiated 
conclusions of authoritative scientific reports, international discourse 
between states, the emergent demands of interest groups and the pub-
lic through domestic political processes, along with the beliefs and 
preferences of governments and leaders (2004: 343). In other words, 
since NGOs are not operating in isolation, their activities cannot be 
detached from other sources of discursive mediation. Noteworthy is 
the fact that in Bamenda the government and the donor consortium 
work hand in hand to achieve the overall aim of combating climate 
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change. The complex arena, in which environmental issues are ad-
dressed and managed results, in many instances, in a so-called hybrid 
field of discourses. For example, many NGOs have norms and values 
that are rooted in Christianity, and are therefore closely linked to 
churches. This means that some churches are apt to convey messages 
about climate change that are informed by NGO policies, and, vice 








The widespread consciousness of climate change in Bamenda is 
given further impetus by different media and taken up by civil society 
initiatives, ranging from TV programs, newspaper items, religious 
movements, churches, educational programs, environmental clubs at 
schools, common initiative groups (CIGs), government campaigns, 
etc. For our general understanding of the sources of funding, it should 
be noted, however, that the wide range of different institutions and 
organizations that have incorporated the climate change problematic 
into their activities are in many cases encouraged and by and large 
financially supported by NGOs. This means that the resources to ad-
dress this issue as much as the norms and ideas on how to go about it, 
can be found in external – that is, Western – donors. Activities that are 
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geared towards combating climate change in Bamenda are frequently 
termed Green campaigns. These campaigns convey – as Wendy Ber-
nadette, president of a women empowering CIG explains: 
Everybody should go green. Eat as much vegetables as possible, and if 
you cut one tree, plant twenty-five, all to fight climate change. By the 
year 2020 we want zero CO2. [...] Illness is just here and it is all climate 
change, which is not far away. We want to save lives! Go green. You are 
fighting the climate change your own way (Interview, January 2010, 
Bamenda). 
Another example of a civil society initiative that indeed fights the 
issue ‘its own way’ is the ‘Mister Bamenda Organization’ that was 
founded in 2004. They concentrate on the most significant concerns 
facing Cameroonian society. With a yearly contest for ‘Mister 
Bamenda’, this organization seeks to ‘enable youths [to] learn to hear 
their own voices and articulate their own concerns with defiant bold-
ness and piercing clarity’. Mister Bamenda is seen as a role model and 
spokesperson about a particular theme, a person who should devote 
his time and energy to mandate the public’s attention along with a 
requisite call for action.5 Topics like HIV-Aids, unemployment, dis-
crimination against women and social ills have previously set the 
agenda. One of the founders and organizers of this yearly event elabo-
rated on the plans for Mister Bamenda 2010 in the following way:  
We are looking for alternative strategies to communicate climate change 
through music. In Africa all is done through songs. Music is going into 
climate. A grassroots approach. [...] We found already sixty musicians 
who are very excited to sing about climate change. A new field is a new 
vocabulary for their music. We want to make a festival about climate 
change in green ways, so producing a green formula. We want a multi-
sectoral approach. We cannot talk about climate change and leave other 
sectors out. Climate change is not in isolation and leaves no one indiffer-
ent. Parts of our culture are being affected by climate change. Dressing 
for example. [...] We want to organize a fashion show to introduce lighter 
materials for traditional dresses. Since the heat is here, the traditional ma-
terial has become unbearable. Too hot. The year 2010 Mister Bamenda 
will be the role model of how to deal with climate change (Interview, 
Colbert Gwain, 19 January, Bamenda town).  
                                                          
5  Announcing Mister Bamenda contest 2005:  
http://www.postwatchmagazine.com/2004/10/announcing_the_.html  
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Here, Colbert is raising a very crucial idea, namely that a new 
‘field’ (or theme) entails a new vocabulary. Within critical discourse 
analysis and discursive psychology approaches it is stressed that dis-
courses are used as resources with which they create a new constella-
tion of words and sentences that have never been used before. Follow-
ing this view, through producing discourses in this way people func-
tion as agents of discursive and cultural change (Philips & Jorgensen 
2002: 17). This brings us back to the ‘power of discourses or discours-
es as power debate’, and the subjects’ ‘freedom of action’, as dis-
cussed in the previous chapter. While Foucault viewed individuals as 
determined by structures – the subject as de-centred – the idea I pro-
pose here is more in line with what Roland Barthes (1982) lucidly 
explained as ‘people are both masters and slaves of language’. How-
ever, even if we accept the agency of subjects, discourses can similar-
ly be seen as limiting the scope of action, for example by obscuring 
alternative perspectives. In the discussion that follows, the subject’s 
role and thus the ‘power of discourses and discourses as power’ de-
bate will be a focal point in the analysis of my empirical data. 
In a similar vein with the aforementioned activities, several schools 
have adopted the Green campaigns as part of their curriculum, in 
which tree planting through environmental clubs lies at the heart of 
the awareness endeavours. Many of these sensitization campaigns are 
fostered by NGOs like SHUMAS. The project manager of this NGO 
for Strategic Humanitarian Services emphasizes that if you want to 
fight this challenge as a community, it is indispensible to start teach-
ing at the elementary level: 
[...] And then we have the school environmental project, which is all 
about teaching the young pupils, inculcating the environmental notion 
from the base. So that they grrrow (persuasive emphasis) with it. The 
problem is today and tomorrow. So it is not just going to the elders and 
telling them about the environmental problems, but we go to the base and 
teach them practical skills on how to protect the environment, the elemen-
tary forms of the protection of the environment (Interview, September 
2009, Bamenda). 
On the one hand, all these initiatives reveal the opportunities creat-
ed by means of emerging discourses for people to jump on the cli-
mate-change bandwagon, but, on the other, they assert the importance 
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of fighting climate change by ingraining the urgency and threat at 
elementary levels of society. Organizations’ slogans like ‘Our envi-
ronment, a war we must win’, ‘Together we overcome’, ‘Green our 
towns, reduce global warming’, ‘Go organically’, ‘Together let’s fight 
bush fire pollution’, ‘Green light to success’ and ‘Save our planet, 
change your life’, underpin the perceived urgency of the matter. In 
brief, globally constructed discourses on climate change with their 
‘apocalyptic aura’ have deeply penetrated development thinking and 
NGO policies in this region and, moreover, have found their way into 
regional politics and different social spheres in Bamenda.  
This chapter seeks to understand how the growing environmental em-
phasis of NGOs – who convey climate change as ‘a new and threaten-
ing message (and responsibility) for Africa’ – is translated, communi-
cated and appropriated by NGO workers in Bamenda. For the analysis 
of discourses on climate change, I distillated the following recurring 
discursive elements from my data, which deserve a thorough reflec-
tion: the globality of the issue (both in terms of a global threat as well 
as a global responsibility), the perceived urgency and magnitude of 
the issue (how serious and grave is it, and what will be the conse-
quences), and how the causes and the proposed necessary responses 
are framed. The overall aim of the analysis is to gain a broader under-
standing of the discursive dynamics of climate change, as reinterpret-
ed by different ‘translation regimes’, and how this translation process 
influences and shapes patterns of power. How do people give meaning 
to this new story that circulates within society and make sense of it? 
This framework will guide the analyses throughout the following 
chapters.  
This chapter consists of two parts. In order to comprehend how 
climate change has penetrated and gradually encompassed a wide 
variety of topics within development thinking, the first part discusses 
the history of environmental discourses. This section concludes with a 
general and tentative discourse analysis of contemporary conceptuali-
zations of global warming and climate change as construed within 
global environmental politics. The second part provides a more analyt-
ical account of the abstract mapping of how INGOs in Bamenda trans-
late and negotiate discourses on climate change. 
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The modern environmental era: The social construction  
of climate change in historical perspective 
In order to comprehend the current ‘development context’ of climate 
change and how, over the course of time, global discourses have 
shaped environmental politics, and have led to new developments in 
North-South relations, a brief historical contextualization is needed. 
This section provides a concise historical account of the development 
of the social construction of environmental issues and problems in 
general, and global warming and climate change in particular. Follow-
ing Hannigan, the underlying idea is that the social construction of 
environmental issues does not reflect a self-evident, asocial and fixed 
set of criteria. Rather, Hannigan argues, they depend on the success 
(or failure) of ‘claims-making’ by several social actors such as activ-
ists, politicians, journalists and scientists (2006: 64). For example, 
already in 1827, physicist Jean Baptiste Fourier demonstrated how 
carbon dioxide, methane and other greenhouse gases captured radia-
tion to warm the earth (Tennesen 2008). In 1896, the possibility of 
global climate change, known today as an anthropogenic event,6 was 
already recognized by the Swedish Nobel Price-winning physicist 
Svante Arrhenius. He was the first to speculate that burning fossil 
fuels might increase atmospheric carbon dioxide and so affect climatic 
conditions. Arrhenius predicted that a doubling of carbon dioxide in 
the atmosphere would lead to a rise of 4 to 6 degrees Celsius in the 
mean global surface temperatures, an estimation that is close to fig-
ures calculated by current climate models (Jamieson 2008: 458). Near-
ly a century passed before this problem had sufficient ground or data 
to become legitimized and acknowledged by a wider public, embed-
ded in the ‘rhetoric of claims-making’ (Hannigan 2006), and hence 
reached a prominent place in global politics. This illustrates that an 
important scientific finding does not necessarily provide a guarantee 
for a widely shared and accepted response. Several factors, dynamics 
and people are needed before an environmental problem is successful-
ly constructed, accepted, and becomes part of our daily talk.  
                                                          
6  Meaning that it is caused by humans, and thus does not have a natural 
cause. 
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Hannigan distinguishes six factors that are necessary for the suc-
cessful construction of an environmental problem: the validation of 
the claim by a scientific authority, ‘popularizers’ who can bridge the 
gap between environmentalism and science, media attention, visual 
and symbolic dramatization of the problem, economic incentives to 
take action, and institutional sponsors who can safeguard both the 
continuation and legitimacy of the issue (Hannigan 2006: 63-78). 
With the above-mentioned factors in mind, the question how (and 
possibly why) ‘environmentalism’ as a nascent ideology developed 
from what was primarily a modest concern and protest into something 
mainstream – which would profoundly shape global thinking and poli-
tics – will be central in the discussion that follows.  
According to Hannigan, environmental problems share many char-
acteristics of social problems in general. However, a crucial difference 
is that environmental problems are not so much rooted in personal 
troubles as they are often directly linked to scientific findings and thus 
have a more imposing physical basis (p. 63). For instance, one hot 
summer, a landslide or torrential rains inevitably give the scientific 
claim of a changing climate a visible experiential focus. For a long 
time sociologists adhered to a functional structural approach, in which 
social problems were regarded as the product of tangible objective 
conditions. Since sociology abandoned this approach – due to Spector 
and Kitsuse who in 1973 suggested that ‘social problems are a se-
quence of events that develop on the basis of collective definitions’ – 
the process of claims-making is treated as more important than the 
question of whether the nature of a claim is true or not (Spector & 
Kitsuse in Hannigan 2006: 64). The same can be said about environ-
mental problems like global warming. Regardless of whether the 
claim of global warming is true or not, speaking about the possibility 
of its existence – which can either lead to scepticism, ‘belief’ or some-
thing in between – directs our actions (or non-actions) and becomes a 
distinctive reality. In other words, discourses are ‘real’ and invoke 
‘real’ action. In this regard, for a better understanding of the circum-
stances under which (the construction of) environmental problems are 
prone to arise, social constructivism – apart from being a method and 
theory – is, in this section, used as an analytic tool. Before turning to 
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the history of environmental discourses, a brief introduction of differ-
ent ‘discursive typologies’ that have been used in environmental stud-
ies will be presented. 
In academia, several typologies of environmental discourses have 
been provided to study environmental problems. Brulle (1996), for 
example, discerned environmental discourses that varied from preser-
vation and conservation, to ecocentrism, ecofeminism, political ecolo-
gy and deep ecology (Brulle 1996: 63). Ecofeminism derives from the 
standpoint that ecosystem abuse mirrors male domination in society. 
Another attempt has been provided by Herndl and Brown (1996), who 
called their typology a ‘rhetorical model for environmental discourse’. 
This model takes the shape of a triangle with at each end a distinctive, 
but not mutually exclusive, discourse. At the top we find the regulato-
ry discourse, which represents the powerful institutions that develop 
environmental policy. In this discourse, nature is seen as a resource 
for a greater social welfare. The political power lies in its institutional 
context, but the rhetorical power emerges from the notion of ethos: the 
culturally constructed authority of the speaker or writer (ethno-centric: 
ethos). At the bottom left of the triangle is the poetic discourse. The 
rhetorical power of this discourse lies in the emphasis that is put on 
the beauty, the value and emotional power of nature. Here, nature is 
regarded as a spiritual or transcendental unity, with human beings 
considered to be part of nature (ecocentric: pathos). The bottom right 
of the triangle represents the scientific discourse, in which nature is 
regarded as an object of knowledge, constructed through careful scien-
tific methodology. In this discourse humans are epistemologically 
placed outside or above nature. The immense cultural power is de-
rived from our rationalist faith in science, and the appeal to objective 
fact and reason (anthropocentric: logos) (Herndl & Brown 1996: 11-
12). A final illustrative typology of environmental discourses that 
provides us with a fruitful lens to comprehend the development of the 
construction of environmental problems is presented by Hannigan 
(2006). Building upon prior work, Hannigan offers a comprehensive, 
chronological typology of three distinctive environmental discourses 
that rose to prominence at different historical stages, and will be used 
as a framework in the following discussion. The first one is the Arca-
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dian discourse that is similar to the ‘poetic discourse’ as used by 
Herndl and Brown. The second major discourse that has significantly 
shaped thinking about the environment is the Ecosystem discourse. 
The third influential discourse is what Hannigan frames as the Justice 
discourse (Hannigan 2006: 38-39).  
In order to describe and analyse historical specific environmental 
discourses, a few analytical considerations need to be taken into ac-
count. Firstly, as stated before, discourses are no closed entities, nor 
are they mutually exclusive. Secondly, discourses cannot be separated 
from the practices of interaction. Collective action is based upon 
commonly constructed views of reality: discourses. Brulle states that 
the establishment of a discourse and the creation of a network of 
communicative interaction are co-generative of one another (Brulle 
1996: 60). In this light, influential environmental organizations are 
both the effect and cause of historically developed discourses. Follow-
ing Brulle, discourse analysis does not depart from the point of view 
that there is a predefined structure regarding the internal logic of a 
discourse or the relation between different discourses. Instead, Brulle 
argues that in a social order there are multiple discourses that are his-
torical creations of social actors. The starting point of analysis is then, 
not so much to analyse the plurality of different viewpoints by consol-
idating them into some constructed logic, but rather to describe the 
multiple realities that have been proposed, contested, negotiated and 
defined by actors themselves (ibid). 
 
Poetic and Arcadian discourses 
At the end of the nineteenth century, when Europe and America in-
creasingly urbanized, views of nature underwent radical transfor-
mations. Ideas about ‘wild nature’ as a threat to civilization gave way 
to a ‘back to nature movement’ that celebrated romanticized notions 
of the wilderness. The first influential conservation organizations that 
contributed to an increasing environmental awareness were ‘The Sier-
ra Club’ (1892) and ‘The Wilderness Society’ (1935), which both 
originated in the United States. These clubs were concerned with the 
aesthetic value of the environment, and focused on the conservation of 
the ‘untamed’ and ‘wild’ nature for the sake of ‘enjoying and explor-
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ing the wild places of the earth’.7 This paradigm shift is vividly illus-
trated in the following text fragment: ‘The wilderness, like the forests, 
was once a great hindrance to our civilization; now, it must be main-
tained at great expense because society cannot do without it’ (Shelford 
1926, in Schmitt 1990: 174; in Hannigan 2006: 41). 8 These changing 
ideas about nature were also projected upon Africa. The most famous 
example is Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness (1902), in which Afri-
ca’s ‘dark’ wilderness symbolizes the uncivilized and barbarian peo-
ple that inhabit the continent. Later, as ideas about nature changed 
with the ‘back to nature movement’, depictions of Africa were trans-
formed into romantic and breathtakingly beautiful portraits of the 
‘pure’ and ‘untouched’ African landscape. These shifting worldviews 
of the natural world demonstrate the social construction of this ‘back 
to nature cult’.  
A number of prominent political and institutional sponsors, along 
with media attention, gave further impetus to the rise of these so-
called ‘Arcadian’ or ‘Poetic’ discourses. These discourses, which em-
phasized the aesthetic and spiritual value of nature, preceded the peak 
of the modern environmental movement of the early 1970s. According 
to Van Koppen, the Arcadian tradition is best understood in the con-
text of its complementarity. In other words, it stands in counterpoint to 
urban industrial society, and to the social and all of the environmental 
ills attached to it (Van Koppen 1998: 74-5, in Hannigan 2006: 39). 
The emerging environmental awareness in the 1950s and 1960s has – 
amongst other reasons – been explained by the occurrence of danger-
ous smog in major cities, predictions of mass starvation, and warnings 
of an environmental catastrophe related to unprecedented and on-
going population growth (Farley 2008: 45). Manuel Castells (2000) 
stipulates that at the turn of the third millennium a new world (an in-
formation age) is taking shape, which he calls ‘The Network Society’. 
According to him, the genesis of this new world originated in the his-
torical coincidence, around the late 1960s and mid-1970s, of three 
                                                          
7  See: www.sierraclub.org and www.wilderness.org.  
8  Ecological Society of America’s Committee on the Preservation of Natu-
ral Conditions, in Naturalist Guide to the America’s (Shelford 1926, in 
Schmitt 1990: 174). 
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independent processes: the information technology revolution; the 
economic crisis of both capitalism and statism,9 and their subsequent 
restructuring; and the blooming of cultural social movements such as 
human rights, feminism and environmentalism (p. 367). Castells does 
not simply refer to the rise of environmentalism but places this within 
a broader framework of emerging social movements as a decisive 
feature of a new world. In line with the aforementioned scholars who 
explain the expanding environmental awareness as a counter-reaction 
to excessive growth, Castells similarly emphasizes that social move-
ments were not reactions to the economic crisis but that they surged in 
the late 1960s, in the heyday of sustained growth and full employ-
ment, as a critique of the ‘consumption society’ (ibid: 370). In a simi-
lar vein, Umberto Eco has noted that it is very likely that the current 
ecology forms the most important moment in contesting modernity’s 
quest for cumulative progress, and symbolizes a deep moral crisis 
(Eco 1998: 31-32). 
 
Ecosystems discourses 
Amongst the profound political changes that occurred in the final dec-
ades of the twentieth century was the emergence of environmental 
ideologies that touched upon fundamental and existential aspects of 
human life, namely the relationship between human beings and the 
natural world (Lee 1997: ix). ‘Earth Day 1970’ is often seen as the 
beginning of the ‘modern environmental era’: a symbolic claim that 
gained wide public attention since it was instantly embraced by the 
US mass media. With the concern to prevent an environmental disas-
ter from happening, ‘Earth Day’ started as a ‘teach-in’ to raise envi-
ronmental awareness, change human behaviour and to accumulate 
political weight for an environmental agenda.10 Beyond everybody’s 
                                                          
9  Statism is understood by Manuel Castells as ‘a social system organized 
around the appropriation of the economic surplus produced in society by 
the holders of power in the state apparatus’ (2000: 8). 
10  The initiator of ‘Earth Day’ was environmental activist and US senator 
Gaylord Nelson. The idea of an environmental teach-in day was born af-
ter he witnessed the devastating effects of the oil-spill that happened in 
1969 off the coast of Santa Barbara.  
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expectations, the first ‘Earth Day’ brought twenty million Americans 
together to protest against environmental deterioration. This led again 
to widespread recognition in public and political arenas, and to the 
emergence of both radical and mainstream environmental movements.  
This second major discourse that changed the ways people related 
to the environment, focused on notions of ‘ecology’ and the ‘ecosys-
tem’. Basic ideas that underline these discourses are the fact that hu-
man interference in the biosphere leads to a misbalance in nature. 
Examples of emerging movements that fostered these discourses are 
‘Greenpeace’ and ‘Friends of the Earth’, both envisioning a ‘Green’ 
and peaceful world. Greenpeace started as a rather radical, three-
member organization that decided to act against nuclear weapons test-
ing. Interestingly enough, during their first sailing mission, which was 
intended to protest against a US nuclear test in Alaska, the original 
group of activists became inspired by reading a book of Amerindian 
legends. According to one of these legends, an Indian woman predict-
ed how the white man would destroy the earth and ravage it of its 
resources. Just before it was too late to stop the imminent apocalypse 
arriving, the Indian would regain his spirit and teach the white man to 
worship the earth, and to group together with the Indians to become 
‘Warriors of the Rainbow’. They adopted this prophecy as meaningful 
for their own operations and objectives and, as such, incorporated a 
millenarian element into the organization’s goal (Lee: 1997: 8). Over 
the course of time, Greenpeace adopted more moderate tactics and 
mainstream views on how to prevent environmental degradation, and 
is today one of the largest environmental organizations in the world. 
Greenpeace is the ultimate example of the manifestation of historical-
ly developed discourses that results in collective action; in turn, their 
actions fertilized Ecosystems discourses. 
On the radical side of the spectrum notions like ecocentrism, anti-
humanism (that disvalue humans given their negative impact upon the 
biosphere) and deep ecology (that adheres to a holistic and interde-
pendent belief of human and non-human life) became doctrines of the 
belief systems of the radical movements. A compelling example of a 
radical environmental movement is the foundation of ‘Earth First!’ in 
1980, an American environmental advocacy group that prophetically 
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anticipated an ecological apocalypse and the end of the industrial civi-
lizations (Keller 2008: 221; Lee 1995). Anti-humanism themes 
emerged in Earth First! In the mid-1980s, when Christopher Manes 
(associate journal editor) argued that technology enhances overpopu-
lation and that the practice of medicine should be abandoned. In addi-
tion to this, he controversially stated that AIDS is a welcome balm for 
nature, since overpopulation poses serious risks to the biosphere (Kel-
ler 2008: 221).  
The Ecosystems discourse can, according to Herndl and Brown, al-
so be classified as a scientific discourse. Different scientific disci-
plines became increasingly involved in the relationship between hu-
mans and the ecosystem. A major influential scientific ‘communica-
tive event’ that contributed significantly to expanding the range of 
debates about environmental issues was The Limits To Growth: A 
Report for the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Man-
kind, published in 1972 (by Meadows et al.). This is one of the first 
scientific documents, in which the possible problematic and hazardous 
future scenarios of the planet were raised. The Club of Rome was set 
up by a group of wealthy individuals and European scientists who 
united together to discuss their concerns about the existing trend of 
unlimited resource consumption and exponential population growth. 
One of their main objectives was (and still is) to demonstrate that in 
an increasingly interdependent world several trends and factors – that 
are part of our current world system and values – threaten all human 
societies on our planet.11 The results of the report were fairly stunning. 
The intrinsic significance of the Report for the Club of Rome was 
grounded in the strong critique of prevailing world concepts about the 
ideology of infinite growth, waste disposal, mass production and con-
sumption, and the encompassing depletion of non-renewable natural 
resources. In brief, the members of the Club of Rome wanted to prove 
the limits of the existing world system. The research conducted mod-
elled the relationship between exponential growth, the question of 
whether the environment can allow for such an expansion to occur, 
and how this dimension relates to the fundamental needs and quality 
                                                          
11  http://www.clubofrome.org/eng/about/4/  
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of the lives of all world citizens (Meadows 1972: 193). One of the 
main conclusions was that humankind cannot continue to perceive 
material growth as its primary goal without facing major problems in 
the near future. At this stage of the research it became clear that many 
fundamental changes in our behaviour and in the philosophy of human 
life were needed (ibid: 10). This research was the first scientific at-
tempt to simulate the consequences of human systems upon the envi-
ronment in a computer model, and the results formed a fertile ground 
to criticize the existing capitalist system and ideology.  
Even though the findings presented have been subject to major an-
ti-Malthusian criticisms and were met with great scepticism, the report 
had an influential impact on how people thought about and perceived 
environmental issues at that time. The fierce criticisms stemmed main-
ly from conventional economists who argued that the claims-makers 
of the limits to growth were ‘doomsdayers’ who ignored the human 
capacity to innovate and adapt to scarcity. Since there exists in general 
a negative correlation between wealth and birth rate, they stated that 
economic growth was not the cause of the problem but rather the solu-
tion. In their view, in presence of widespread poverty, growth is a 
moral imperative (Farley 2008: 45-46). Nevertheless, the ideas pre-
sented about the limits to growth gave a serious impetus towards in-
vesting in environmental protections by the wealthier nations. Ac-
knowledging and anticipating an impending environmental crisis, the 
first important steps were taken by governments of the developed 
nations to address these issues. For instance, in the United States, the 
National Policy Act, the Clean Water Act and the Endangered Species 
Act were all passed between 1970 and 1973 (ibid). Although the con-
cerns expressed by environmental movements and the Club of Rome 
were addressing the problematic relationship between human systems 
and their environment, their attention was not yet focused on global 
warming and climate change. A possible explanation for this is that 
environmental problems like air pollution, water pollution and toxic 
waste disposal were more tied to people’s daily life experiences than 
climate change or global warming, which remained rather vague sci-
entific claims. 
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Environmental justice discourses 
Emerging mainstream environmental movements fostered thoughts on 
social justice and created new discourses about what meaningful hu-
man existence is about. As already mentioned in the introduction, 
environmental justice is concerned with the basic human right that all 
world citizens have the right to live and work in a healthy environ-
ment. This ‘discursive field’ has generated (and has been generated 
by) interdisciplinary contributions from scholars in the field of philos-
ophy, social sciences, legal studies and also the ‘hard’ sciences, main-
ly biology (Figueroa 2008: 341). Furthermore citizens and activists 
have made major contributions to promoting environmental justice 
awareness. This fusion of social justice and environmental concerns 
has increasingly amassed influence throughout the world, and it has 
been said that this so-called Environmental Justice Movement (EJM) 
is the largest and fastest-growing social movement in the world (Gibbs 
2003, in ibid 342). The environmental paradigm shift underwent ma-
jor transformations, especially at the grassroots level, both in the de-
veloped and in the developing nations. Environmental justice has been 
embraced by grassroots movements, civil rights movements and in-
digenous people on a large scale. An example of an influential move-
ment – founded by the Nobel Peace Prize winner Wangaari Mathaai in 
1977 in Kenya – that gained widespread support at the grassroots level 
in Africa is the Green Belt Movement (GBM). Mathaai, known as an 
environmental and political activist, a professor of biology and a for-
mer politician, mobilized more than 60,000 women in Kenya to ‘plant 
trees as a symbol for peace’. Since its establishment more than thirty 
million trees have been planted throughout Africa and, as such, has 
played an important role in fighting deforestation. The GBM has be-
come one of the biggest social movements in Africa. By awarding 
Mathaai the Nobel Peace Prize too, as the first African woman laure-
ate, the international community fully embraced her movement and 
stated that ‘her activities oblige us to preserve nature by fighting 
against climate change, the destruction of the environment and the 
exploitation of nature’ (Klaus Töpfer, UNEP, in Ehlert 2005: 10).   
 In the US, the EJM began to pose questions about distributive en-
vironmental justice, as it became clear that a disproportionate amount 
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of environmental burdens was falling on African-Americans, Latino-
Americans, Asian Americans, Native Americans, the working-class 
and the poor. Albeit that environmental justice is concerned with such 
issues as environmental racism, on a global scale it has extended to 
issues of colonialism, global environmental commons and corporate 
globalization (Figueroa 2008: 342-8). Moreover, climate change is 
pre-eminently a symbol of disproportionally distributed environmental 
burdens in particular, and global inequality in general. It has been 
within this discursive frame – enhanced by growing calls from scien-
tific and international organizations – that global warming and climate 
change have entered international political debates and reached multi-
lateral salience. These dilemmas of distributed unfairness faced by the 
South were for the first time formally, internationally addressed in 
1972 during the ‘Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment’ (UNEP 1972), issued in Stockholm. More than 
a decade later, in 1987, the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (WCED) of the UN released the famous ‘Our Common 
Future’ report (which later became known as the so-called Brundtland 
report). The result of its publication was that the idea of basic human 
development fused with the right to live in a healthy environment, and 
entered official international policy spheres. From this point in time 
the intrinsic link between development, human rights and environ-
mental justice gradually became part of mainstream development 
thinking. Within this paradigm, sustainable development – that is, that 
development should meet the needs of present populations without 
compromising the needs of future generations – attained an almost 
sacred status. By picturing ‘our threatened future’ and further empha-
sizing the urgency of the global environmental crisis, the Brundtland 
report explicitly ascertained the existing tension between long-term 
and short-term reasoning that is inherent to modern development 
models, in which uncurbed consumption, wealth, accumulation and 
progress are aspired to. A basic conclusion of the report was that the 
non-sustainable consumption patterns of the developed nations have 
largely contributed to poverty and environmental degradation in the 
developing countries, particularly in Africa. In depicting the global 
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environmental crisis Africa was already predicted to be highly vulner-
able:  
The seriousness of the African crisis cannot be overemphasized and in its 
entirety, it should really engage the whole world. [...] It requires of course 
very little imagination to appreciate the fact that it is not only Africa that 
is in danger. In the long term the entire world economy could be threat-
ened not only because of the indivisibility of human welfare but because 
of Africa’s crucial position in the global economy as a source of a large 
number of vital raw materials (Maxime Ferrari, director UNEP 1986, in 
‘Our Common Future’12). 
This quotation demonstrates how African countries were – and still 
are – considered to be extremely susceptible for environmental prob-
lems. Hence, due to Africa’s depicted vulnerability in relation to the 
global environmental crisis, sustainable development has become 
ingrained with the mission to assist the poor in carrying out environ-
mentally friendly practices. Furthermore, a crucial element is raised, 
namely that Africa is (and will become increasingly) indispensible in 
solving the global crisis that is characterized by the depletion of natu-
ral resources. Africa thus needed not only to be ‘saved’ by the indus-
trialized countries from its own bad environmental practices, but was 
at the same time envisaged as instrumental in playing an essential part 
in surmounting the global crisis. Interestingly enough, as we shall see 
below, this way of reasoning bears outstanding similarities with cur-
rent conceptualizations of the climate crisis and Africa’s perceived 
role herein. 
In brief, the growing awareness and concern for the environmental 
crisis was no longer bound to the industrialized world with its unprec-
edented urbanization, but gradually became a globalized issue and 
embedded within broader human rights and development discourses. 
As a result of the fusion between development and environmental 
justice, developing and applying national and international environ-
mental laws became important pillars of intervention in the develop-
ing world.  
By the mid-1980s most scientists were convinced of the fact that 
global warming was not merely fluctuations caused by nature but was 
                                                          
12  http://www.un-documents.net/ocf-03.htm#II.1  
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in fact caused by humans. It was around this time that there was a 
rapid rise in public awareness. The role of science and the epistemic 
communities increasingly gained more prominence in addressing the 
issue of global climate change. Scientists, operating through the 
World Meteorological Organization (WMO), and the UNEP were 
largely responsible for the ‘framing’ of climate change for political 
debate, and for the fact that a multilateral international response was 
necessary to address the threat (Cass 1996: 27). Many international 
organizations were founded, and a multitude of international confer-
ences, centred on both development and the environment, followed, 
which brought climate change to the fore. In 1988 the WMO and the 
UNEP assembled the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
to review the scientific and technical peer-reviewed literature on glob-
al climate change (GCC). This scientific body became widely known 
as the highest authority concerning human-induced climate change 
knowledge, and in 2007 the organization, together with Al Gore, was 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize ‘for their efforts to build up and dis-
seminate greater knowledge about man-made climate change, and to 
lay the foundations for the measures that are needed to counteract 
such change’.13 
In 1990 the IPCC published its first Assessment Report that un-
veiled the importance of addressing climate change and concluded 
that it deserved a political platform to tackle its consequences. This 
Assessment played a decisive role in the creation of the key interna-
tional treaty to reduce global warming – the UNFCCC (ibid). In 1992, 
during the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio 
de Janeiro, the so-called ‘Earth Summit’ was organized and resulted in 
the international treaty. Virtually all countries in the world signed it 
and pledged to ‘prevent anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system’ (Jamieson 2008: 459). An important theme that was addressed 
during the Summit was to look for alternative sources of energy that 
could replace the use of fossil fuels. However, the FCCC treaty itself 
set no limits on GHG emissions and never had any enforcement 
mechanisms for individual countries. In turn, this legally non-binding 
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treaty paved the way for the Kyoto Protocol that came into existence 
in 1997, in which industrialized countries for the first time agreed 
upon reducing greenhouse gas emissions. While contrary to the former 
– this protocol is a binding treaty – it took until 2005 before the major-
ity of the countries signed it so that it effectively could be brought into 
force. However, the US remains an exception since it is still not a 
signatory, while being responsible for 36.1% of 1990 emission levels 
of Annex I countries.14 
The Protocol expires in 2012 and, up until the time of writing, 
there is no consensus about how a post-Kyoto document will or 
should look like. Remarkably enough, among the richest and most 
industrialized countries there appears to be no intrinsic will to cut 
emissions. Yet the amount of money that is made available to com-
pensate African countries for mitigation and adaptation to climate 
change has been established in the form of global climate funds. 
Moreover, the so-called ‘flexibility mechanisms’ like Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism (CDM), Joint Implementation (JI) and massive tree 
planting undertakings in the form of REDD, are the ultimate proof that 
the international community has given the developing world in gen-
eral and Africa in particular the task to play an important role in 
fighting and overcoming the global climate crisis. Embedded in that 
idea is the discursive construction that it is ‘to save the continent from 
its own detriment’. In other words, instead of tackling the problem at 
its roots, that is, reducing global greenhouse gas emissions, the focus 
has shifted towards finding, once more, the solution ‘in’ (and also 
‘for’) Africa. 
In this section I briefly discussed the history of environmental dis-
courses, and how they are entangled with, and impinge upon, related 
international policy developments. In this context Dryzek’s (2005) 
notes that, even if we believe in progress, it would be a mistake to 
think of the history of environmental affairs as being a clear trajectory 
towards an environmental enlightenment – that humanity is becoming 
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more sensitive and aware, escaping from past misconceptions and 
ignorance. But what we see instead is that these matters are subject to 
an on-going dispute between people who think in sharply different 
ways (Dryzek 2005: 6). An overall observation that can be made is 
that due to the trans-boundary character of climate change, an exten-
sive trans-national norm-building network with a myriad of stakehold-
ers has come to dominate global politics. Civil society movements, 
epistemic communities and lobbying groups are influencing the global 
economy and global politics more than ever before (Jacobeit, Kappel 
& Mückenberger 2010), and as such continue to shape North-South 
relations. Lee (1995) states that ‘during the final decades of the twen-
tieth century profound political changes have occurred. The most crit-
ical of these changes has been the rise to power and prominence of 
environmental ideologies’ (Lee 1995: ix).  
It is indeed highly remarkable to note that the ‘new environmental-
ism’ developed from a modest attempt to protest against pollution into 
something that today is part of mainstream, and global-wide public 
and political ideologies and policies. A final crucial question arises in 
this context, namely, how can we understand the rise of this particular 
movement and ideology? How can we explain the fact that environ-
mentalism especially has spread so rapidly and gained worldwide 
support? Can we discern a recurrent form or content of environmental 
discourses that traverses all different discursive and social realms? In 
other words, is there a life-blood or intrinsic vital force that perseveres 
in each interpretation of environmental threats, in different time 
frames but also in differing sociopolitical and cultural contexts? 
In academia several factors and causes have been pointed out. A 
convincing explanation is given by Lee (1995) and Arendt (1958), 
who state that our relationship with the planet touches upon the es-
sence of the human condition (Arendt 1958, in Lee) and is directly 
linked to our political identity. Lee states that it is therefore not sur-
prising that ‘environmentalism’ permeated traditional left-right di-
chotomies (Lee 1995: ix). Moreover, according to Lee, there is a 
common ground that is shared by all forms of environmentalism. She 
writes in her book Earth First! that: 
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In all its forms, environmentalism is – at least marginally – apocalyptic. It 
is the wellbeing of this planet that most fundamentally supports human 
life; threats to the health of the earth are therefore threats to human life it-
self. It is the power of that connection that drives environmentalism. Con-
fronting pollution and extinction is in a very real way confronting the 
source and limits of power (ix). 
Not coincidentally, environmentalism came to surge right after the 
earth was photographed for the first time from space, and indeed what 
a fragile and beautiful place it looked like (see picture on the next 
page).  
For the first time in history it became possible to conceive of the 
globe as a finite entity and to delimit the geographical boundaries of 
human’s place in this world. This brings us to the crucial relationship 
between the environment, on the one hand, and the limits of human 
existence, on the other. It is therefore not surprising that the relation of 
people with their source of existence not only plays a vital role in oral 
traditions, myths and legends but also in written scriptures (see Van 
Beek 1999; 2000). Van Beek (1999) argues that the meta-message that 
is hidden in the wide fascination with the climate should be under-
stood as a cultural phenomenon, as a way of speaking that belongs to a 
society. This implies that the one who is concerned with the climate 
has concerns about the future of a society. As such, he contends that 
climate discourses can be analysed as a particular end-of-time idea. 
We shall see in the subsequent chapters that the apocalyptic aura of 
climate change – indivisible from notions of fear and moral responsi-
bility – lends itself fairly easily to being appropriated by differing 
ontological and discursive realms, while still impinging a particular 
form upon them. In line with Lee and Van Beek, I wish to demon-
strate that indeed the life-blood of climate-change discourses (and thus 
environmentalism in general) lies in the finitude of the earth and 
touches upon the limits of human existence. From this historical de-
scription and analysis, I will now turn to a more discourse analytical 
approach of contemporary climate change debates. 
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Photo 3.4 This ‘earthrise’ picture was taken by Apollo 8’s crew on 
24 December 1968, and is considered the first colour 
photograph of Earth taken by humans in (deep) space 
 
Source: NASA  
 
 
‘Thinking globally, acting locally’:  
Deconstructing Kyoto 
Over the past few years, climate change has increasingly played a 
prominent role within broader worldwide ‘human security’ challenges 
and natural disaster management. Since it is more and more pointed 
out as being an all-embracing explanation for the already deeply root-
ed problems in Africa, a global ‘environmental consciousness’ has 
made its way into development thinking. Predictions as to the effects 
on African societies are not very hopeful. The main concerns are that 
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climate change will lead to widespread poverty, increase food scarcity, 
and engender diseases, migration, refugees, overpopulation in better-
endowed areas, along with conflicts over natural resources (Second 
Report on Climate Change and Development, IIED 2005). In brief, the 
‘climatic threat’ has been by and large invested with an ‘apocalyptic 
aura’ by leading actors in international climate-change discourses. The 
diagnoses on this matter, as much as the understanding of how it can 
be mitigated, and how people can or should adapt to the changing 
climate, have become the ultimate guidelines for contemporary envi-
ronmental and development policies. Within this paradigm, it is wide-
ly accepted that the industrialized countries in the North have caused 
‘irreversible’ climatic change and that the developing countries in the 
South are the first victims to pay the price. The IPCC describes Africa 
as ‘the world’s poorest region, as the continent most vulnerable to the 
impacts of projected change because widespread poverty limits adap-
tation capabilities. Small-scale farming provides most of the food 
produced in Africa; all this means that Africa is exceptionally vulner-
able to the uncertainties and weather extremes of global warming’ (cf. 
IPCC, in second working report of IIED, 2005: 23). 
As mentioned before, science overwhelmingly shares the opinion 
that over the last century, climate change has been an anthropogenic 
event and, as such, is not merely fluctuating due to nature. A general 
proposal in development thinking and global environmental politics is 
that the industrialized North should compensate for its own overuse by 
decreasing their greenhouse gas emissions. Nicholas Onuf resumes 
common understandings of climate change as follows: ‘We have done 
it to ourselves and we have only begun to pay. For many commenta-
tors this is the Faustian bargain, modernity’s deal with the devil, the 
inevitable consequence of our material excesses, our crimes against 
nature, our willful innocence, our invincible arrogance’ (Onuf 2007: 
xii). 
According to ‘the polluter pays principle’ the answer for the prob-
lems caused by climate change that Africa is facing should ‘once 
again’ come from the North. On the other hand, the environmental 
paradigm shift in development thinking conveys ‘Think Globally and 
Act Locally’, which implies that African farmers should shoulder their 
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responsibility and be part of the global solution. Educating farmers 
should lead to more sustainable agricultural production and, addition-
ally, sensitize farmers in order to fit the dominant discourse. The 
South therefore is first of all seen as merely victims of northern exces-
sive consumption patterns, while secondarily farmers in developing 
countries are similarly considered to be part of the problem and, con-
sequently, should play a part in the global solution.15 
What derives from this very short introduction to trans-nationally 
constructed environmental discourses is the suggestion that climate 
change is a global problem – a universal threat – that requires a global 
solution or a ‘global social contract’.16 To some, the conceptualization 
of this concern as something global might seem unproblematic and, 
foremost, the only rationale to save the planet. Nevertheless, whatever 
this global contract constitutes and proposes, it is a solution that is by 
and large shaped and dominated by northern states and elites as a ‘one 
size fits all solution’ for the developing world, while local perceptions 
in the South and their counter hegemonic discourses are obscured and 
subjugated. Therefore, in line with Heather Smith, who argues that ‘to 
remain deaf to counter hegemonic discourse is to deny the realities of 
climate change’ (Smith 2007: 198), this research aims to show that the 
notion of global is problematic and that local discourses provide a 
necessary alternative (see also Pettenger et al. 2007).  
This global notion encompasses other implications, which will 
briefly be discussed in this section. The understanding of climate 
change as a global issue implies a conception of a shared vulnerabil-
ity, which suggests that it is of equal important to all parties as; in 
other words, a solution is needed, in which all parties should play a 
part and take their responsibility. Smith underpins the fact that this 
problematic global notion is a reflection of the interests of particular 
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16  Term borrowed from Nicholas Onuf (2007: xiii). 
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states and states that ‘it will be seen that there is power in the language 
of global to obfuscate power relations and prevailing social orders, to 
construct ‘others’ and to deny responsibility’ (Smith 2007: 201). To 
plea for a global solution might be used as a justification for Western 
interference and intervention in the affairs of vulnerable regions in the 
South. Furthermore, hazards also provide a useful rationale for blam-
ing poverty and inequitable distribution of material goods on the peo-
ple living in these regions, who are directly living with and depending 
on nature. Smith talks about a denial of historical responsibility for 
emissions: an externalization and detachment from nature. By focus-
ing on global concentrations, states are able to hide behind percent-
ages that do not cover their per capita emissions (ibid: 203). In brief, 
the global notion of environmental problems hides a multitude of po-
litical, economic, social and ethical difficulties. In various ways the 
global notion of the climatic threat is a political term rather than mere-
ly a geographical one, following Shiva, which provides the North with 
a new political space, in which to control the South, thus creating the 
moral base for Green imperialism (Elliott 1998, citing Shiva 1998: 
201).  
While the climate change paradigm bears parallels to earlier narra-
tives on the precariousness of society-environment relations in Africa 
(e.g. desiccation narrative of the 1920s, the tragedy of the commons of 
the 1960s, and the expansion of the Sahel narrative of the 1970s and 
1980s), it can be said that the very size of global funds – flowing to 
INGOs and NGOs – that are made available for adaptation and mitiga-
tion in Africa, marks the beginning of a new era of global environ-
mental governance. Moreover, due to the fact that the climate change 
problematic embraces all aspects of human life and human security, a 
Green paradigm shift has made its way into development thinking. 
This shift has entailed the expansion and re-shaping of adaptation and 
mitigation projects at the local level, and thus setting new norms and 
standards about how to deal with the environment and with develop-
ment. The worldwide recognition of climate change, as a major chal-
lenge facing households and communities in the developing world, 
has led to a ‘mainstreaming’ of adaptation into development policies, 
which in turn inevitably will result in an intense reshaping of envi-
Sara de Wit 
96 
ronment-society related relations in Africa (Cannon & Müller-Mahn 
2010: 3).  
The reshaping of environment-society relations in Africa in them-
selves might seem unproblematic, however, if we take a closer look at 
both the concepts of development in general and adaptation in particu-
lar, several problems arise. Firstly, development is generally under-
stood as the improvement and transformation of the present-day situa-
tion – based on socially constructed indicators like human rights, ideas 
of justice and equality, etc. Adaptation on the other hand does not 
necessarily make life better; rather, it aims at rendering that possible 
as it is more focused on preventing environmental damages from hap-
pening. The paradigm shift from ‘development’ to ‘adaptation’ in this 
regard is what Cannon and Müller-Mahn term ‘the development con-
text’ of climate change. They state that current development policies 
and projects are presumably not equipped to protect people from envi-
ronmental hazards and, as a response to the climate change problemat-
ic, the focus of development policies and NGOs has been on the adap-
tation and mitigation of billions of people in the developing world. 
Therefore, nowadays it is impossible to detach adaptation from devel-
opment, while at the same time the connections are not quite clear. 
Taking on a social constructivist perspective the authors argue that 
adaptation is not just a response to meteorological parameters of a 
changing climate but is primarily driven by discourses about these 
phenomena in a society. In a similar vein, modifications of develop-
ment or climate policy do not simply happen as a reaction of policy-
makers to newly emerging problems, but they are brought about in-
stead because certain types of knowledge and perceptions are negoti-
ated and become powerful in public discourses. As such, the climate 
change problematic and the focus on adaptation goes along with a 
significant shift in discourses used to deal with what is normally 
called development. While acknowledging that climate change adapta-
tion and development are closely related, they similarly point out that 
it would be highly insufficient to subsume the one under the other 
(ibid). 
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The Copenhagen school: Towards a comprehensive notion of human 
security and the risks of securitization 
To securitize an issue means to frame it as a special kind of politics, or 
above politics. It can be seen as an extreme version of politicization 
(Buzan, Weaver & De Wilde, in Emmers 2007: 111). The act of secu-
ritization involves the conceptualization of an issue as an existential 
threat that needs emergency actions. This determination occurs by 
securitizing actors (bureaucracies, pressure groups, etc.) and referent 
objects (things that are threatened: i.e. states, economies, ideologies, 
species, etc.). The actors need to convince relevant audiences that 
extra-ordinary measures are needed (ibid; Frerks 2007: 4). The Co-
penhagen School envisions a broad view of security that includes not 
only military domains but also environmental, societal, economic and 
political spheres. The war-on-terror, climate change, environmental 
degradation, HIV/AIDS and the economic crisis are some obvious 
examples of securitized issues. Interestingly enough, by the same to-
ken, issues can go through a reversed process and become de-
securitized (Emmers 2007: 111).  
Related to the act of securitization of the matter is the idea – which 
is increasingly gaining more prominence within contemporary envi-
ronmental discourse – that climate change causes conflicts and wars. 
This mono-causal, Neo-Malthusian approach has rightfully been criti-
cized by Frerks (2005: 41) who states that ‘we “need” a political dis-
course and “violence entrepreneurs” to mobilize people’. And by 
Richards who states that we do not encounter a Malthus with Guns; 
but there is always a discourse needed to move people to action (Rich-
ards 1996). This does not mean that environmental degradation cannot 
lead to tensions or competition over natural resources; however, it 
more often works in an indirect manner and does not lead on its own 
to wars in the classical sense (ibid). 
In light of the concerns expressed by the Copenhagen School, 
Frerks argues that the ‘over- securitization’ of issues among which 
‘the war-on-terror’ and climate change, involves serious risks. He 
states that by legitimizing extra-ordinary measures to promote human 
security, a clouded vision towards alternative, more peaceful ap-
proaches can be a consequence (Frerks 2007: 4). In contrast to most 
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realist approaches to security studies, which focus is on the material 
nature of threats, The Copenhagen School focuses more on the role of 
discourses, in which two important questions have been addressed. 
The first one is why have some moves of securitization succeeded in 
convincing an audience, while others have not; the second one is why 
some issues are articulated and treated as existential threats, while 
others are not (Hansen 2000, in ibid)? 
The aim of the securitization model is to opt for a more compre-
hensive conceptualization of security that is not just bound to military 
matters that require emergency actions (Emmers 2007). However, 
several limitations of the securitization model have been pointed out. 
An important criticism is that research related to security issues has 
primarily been concerned with theoretical approaches, while little 
empirical research has been involved. For this reason, it is still open to 
debate whether the securitization model can contribute to the study of 
international security (Frerks 2007 & Emmers 2007). 
NGOs seen increasingly as authorities in building  
Green norms and settings global standards 
What can be derived from the discussion above is that global envi-
ronmental politics form an extremely complex web of stakeholders, 
ethical concerns, global-local responsibilities, interests and paradig-
matic politics – all informed by and embedded within particular dis-
courses and a specific time frame. As has been shown by Lee (among 
others), environmentalism in all its forms bears apocalyptic elements, 
for, she argues, threats to the health of the earth are threats to human 
life itself. It is therefore not surprising that within environmental poli-
tics, climate change has reached the status of a securitized issue. The 
perceived urgency of the matter is conceptualized and materialized by 
means of protocols and funding of back-donors such as governments, 
ministries and international organizations. Money flows from back-
donors respectively to INGOs and NGOs, which are again turned into 
projects at the local level. In brief, the problem is conceptualized at 
the global level, ideologically interpreted and translated at the national 
level, and finally played out and mediated in different ‘translation 
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regimes’ at the local level. In other words, where money flows, dis-
courses travel with it.17 Nevertheless, as discussed in chapter two, 
these processes do not follow such a uni-directional and one-
dimensional path; rather, they are subject to continuous flows of 
communication, negotiation and translation, adopted by a multitude of 
programs and actors that constitute the complex field of environmen-
tal global governance. While ideas about climate change adaptation 
and mitigation are conceptualized at the global level, disseminated in 
the South through different actors, within this multi-level and multi-
layered arena we can determine translators who have a more powerful 
mediating position than others. As I will disclose below, in the context 
of the Bamenda Grassfields the mediating power and defining role of 
NGOs is rather special, as they occupy a crucial strategic node be-
tween the global and the local level in the translation process, and I 
will therefore be exploring this further on.  
The World Bank’s definition of NGOs, as ‘private organizations 
that pursue activities to relieve suffering, promote the interest of the 
poor, protect the environment, provide basic social services, or under-
take community development’, is rather unsatisfactory, for it reduces 
these organizations to what they do and not what they stand for. In 
order to understand the power and influence of – especially – envi-
ronmental NGOs (e.g. nature and wildlife conservation, forest com-
munity development, etc.) in sub-Saharan Africa, we have to take into 
account that they are based on politically, economically and ideologi-
cally-informed decisions, and have been influenced by a wide variety 
of environmental ideologies (see Duffy 1997: 442), as discussed in the 
previous section. What we can learn from the extensive body of socio-
logical and political science literature covering international environ-
mental policy is that NGOs and INGOs have profoundly shaped the 
‘politics of the earth’ and, moreover, the development of North-South 
relations (see: Dryzek 2005; Duffy 1997; 2006; Boli & Thomas 1999). 
In this section I want to demonstrate – based on both a literature re-
view and my empirical data – how NGOs and INGOS are among the 
most powerful vehicles in shaping and mediating globally constructed 
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discourses on climate change in the Bamenda Grassfields. Moreover, I 
wish to disclose how Kyoto’s ‘ideology’ of ‘Thinking Globally and 
Acting Locally’ results in many cases in imposing mitigation strate-
gies, rather than providing tools and developing adaptive capacities 
among grassroots farmers in Bamenda. What follows below is, firstly, 
a broader theoretical discussion of how environmental politics and 
NGOs relate to the development of North-South relations. Secondly, I 
will shed light on the discursive processes of how NGOs in Bamenda 
adopt and adapt donor language, on the one hand, to attract external 
funding and, on the other, how this leads to the translation of narra-
tives at the local level that primarily blame farmers for causing cli-
mate change. 
 
Environmental NGOs in broader perspective 
Only by virtue of their numbers – from six thousand before the 1990s, 
to forty thousand worldwide in 2008 – we can conclude that NGOs 
have become significant players on the international stage. Much of 
their growth has been a product of heightened globalization, driven by 
the emergence of the Internet in the 1990s, which invoked a dramatic 
expansion of NGOs (Gunter 2008: 95). Moreover, social movements, 
and intergovernmental agreements and protocols have played a role in 
fostering the growth of these organizations. The structure, in which 
NGOs operate, is clearly different from governments and their role 
has been viewed in that they pluralize world politics by offering mul-
tiple channels of access across traditional nation-state borders. ‘They 
act as both allies and adversaries to states, forming networks that ad-
vocate policy changes and define ethical standards’ (ibid). While it is 
generally accepted that NGOs fulfil an increasingly important role in 
global politics, there is no agreement about how to define them. As 
Gunter notes, they can be in one fundamental sense defined by what 
they are not: ‘they are not governmental but nongovernmental’. This 
is however a rather complicated terminology, since they are predomi-
nantly dependent on government funding. In addition to this, it is 
within the discursive frames and paradigms created at the level of 
states and international governments (informed by all sorts of actors 
like epistemic communities and environmental movements) that 
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NGOs have to operate. The fact that these organizations are not bound 
to states and to the bureaucratic thresholds that many environmental 
laws need to pass makes NGOs more dynamic and flexible, which in 
turn makes them operate within a relatively short time dimension.  
In other words, NGOs are likely to respond faster to changes in 
discursive formations than governments and states. The thematic oc-
cupation of the majority of NGOs has encompassed all forms of so-
cial, political, economic and existential life. But the role of environ-
mental or Green NGOs in global politics has had the greatest impact 
(ibid). This is not so surprising if we take into account that the envi-
ronmental movement today has grown into the largest social move-
ment in the world. Their influence has varied from taking part in glob-
al dialogues (e.g. world summits), to establishing ethical standards, to 
shaping and framing policy formations. The socially constructed im-
age of NGOs, with their social values and results obtained, has been 
appreciated in varying degrees. Michael Gunter defines the power of 
environmental NGOs as follows:  
Environmental NGOs are an alternative power source to nation-states that 
enhance environmental justice around the world by creating new transna-
tional political coalitions through the creation and maintenance of the civ-
il society (Gunter 2008: 96). 
Other scholars have taken more critical stances. For example, in 
much of the mainstream literature the focus has been on processes of 
dominance, in which aid giving and receiving is seen as a reflection of 
power-oriented interstate competition, dominance and the creation of 
new interdependencies. This general emphasis on power processes at 
the global level as adhered to in political sciences and international 
relations (in which power in the narrow understanding of the term is 
viewed as political domination, and as the residing of power in institu-
tions and dominant actors) is, however, not the primary focus of this 
study. In climate change research very little concern has been ex-
pressed for the ideological effects of travelling discourses at the local 
level. Therefore, I am here more concerned with the role of NGOs 
acting as vehicles of discursive mediation, translating and negotiate 
prevailing norms and standards that are conceptualized at the global 
level and translated locally. From this point of view, the assumption 
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derives that power is constituted within the so-called ideological ef-
fects or truth effects as created within (hegemonic) discourses. The 
primary task then becomes to unveil the dominant and taken-for-
granted representations of ‘reality’.  
The complex field of global environmental governance and North-
South relations is thoroughly examined by Rosaleen Duffy (1997; 
2006). Based on several case studies in Madagascar and southern Af-
rica, she argues that the new development in North-South relations 
denotes a move towards the politics of post-conditionality. This is a 
situation, in which states are defined as ‘stakeholders’ and drawn into 
partnerships with global public-private partnerships. Due to the trans-
boundary nature of the climate and the increasing importance of envi-
ronmental issues in global politics, Duffy (2006) argues – and demon-
strates in her study of Madagascar – that new and complex networks 
of interest groups keen to develop particular forms of natural resource 
management have been generated. This can be seen in light of what 
Harrison (2004) has termed the governance state, a new phenomena 
of global networks of governance (including NGOs, donors, private 
companies and international financial institutions) which have become 
indivisible from nation-states (Harrison 2004: 23-26, in Duffy 2006: 
732), and in turn have transformed environmental politics into some-
thing that is neither local nor global. Duffy additionally argues that in 
many ways, environmental issues and policy making in the developing 
world have become intimately intertwined with global actors and have 
produced a new kind of global politics (Duffy 2006). As a result of 
this, national governments’ policies and NGOs’ activities are inextri-
cably bound together, since they (among other actors and institutions) 
constitute the global network of governance. By demonstrating how 
transnational networks deeply affect conservation policy in the devel-
oping world, Duffy similarly underscores the importance of discourses 
and ideologies that inform environmental policymaking. 
The ever-expanding number of actors and interests groups con-
cerned with global governance and environmental issues implies a 
fundamental shift away from state-centric views of global politics. 
Sociologist David Frank (2002) has identified three main stages of 
global institutionalization through which nature protection has passed: 
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changes in world-culture, changes in world organisations and changes 
in nation-state politics (Frank 2002: 49). In a similar vein, John Boli 
and Thomas George demonstrate in their book Constructing world 
culture: international nongovernmental organizations (1999) that in 
the existing analyses and studies of global governance the role and 
influence of INGOs is highly underexposed. In their volume they state 
that the paucity of scholarly attention to INGOs and the ways they 
have been treated as marginal or even epiphenomenal has left them 
puzzled. This led them to advance the existing world-polity perspec-
tive on global change by examining the history, structure and opera-
tions of INGOs. They argue that world polity – like any polity – is 
constituted by a distinct culture, what they define ‘as a set of funda-
mental principles and models, mainly ontological and cognitive in 
character, defining the nature and purpose of social actors and action’. 
According to them, world culture becomes embedded in social organi-
zations, mainly operating at the global level, of which most are IN-
GOs. By studying INGOs’ structures, purposes and operations, they 
claim that we can identify fundamental principles of (a changing) 
world culture. In their study they examine how INGOs promote world 
cultural principles and, as such, demonstrate how these organisations 
play a central role in developing and shaping the frames that orient 
other actors, including states (Boli & Thomas 1999: 14).  
While this assessment of INGOs’ role in shaping ‘world culture’ 
and world organisations is beyond the scope of this study, it gives us a 
tentative idea of the important position that these organisations occupy 
in influencing global governance and, hence, constructing norms and 
setting standards beyond the authority of national governments – par-
ticularly in developing countries. In the case of environmental politics 
in general and climate change in particular, the development of setting 
global standards to preserve the ecosystem and protect the ozone layer 
have become all the more apparent in the day-to-day realities of peo-
ple in the South. As Duffy demonstrates, environmental NGOs have 
had an increasing impact upon global regimes through pressure-group 
politics. Their capacity to disseminate environmental information 
through the media and other campaigning activities have often been 
used to embarrass governments and to raise awareness about globally 
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conceptualized key problems. Following Duffy, global institutions and 
national governments have in many ways transformed their governing 
activities in response to the encounter with the environmental move-
ment (ibid).  
The predictions of the devastating consequences of climate change 
for the developing world in general and Africa in particular, and hence 
the increasing preoccupation at the policy level with enhancing the 
adaptation and mitigation techniques for local populations, has been 
materialized in the creation of new global funds. Financial support for 
African countries is seen as a crucial and indispensible tool for Afri-
can populations to adapt to the consequences of climate change and to 
achieve the agreements as proposed by the UNFCCC in Copenhagen. 
Several proposals to generate new funds (both bilateral and multilat-
eral) have been put forward by the UNDP, World Bank, African De-
velopment Bank, European Commission and many others. The esti-
mated costs of climate change adaptation for the developing countries 
vary between the World Bank’s 10 to 40 billion dollars per year in 
2020, to the UNDP’s (2007) estimate of 86 billion dollars per year in 
2015. The expected costs for climate change mitigation have been 
estimated at 100 to 200 billion dollars.18   
What can be derived from the brief discussion of the governance 
state is that the complex arena of environmental politics in developing 
countries can be seen as a new form of hybrid politics that is neither 
global nor local, and allows external players to have an extraordinary 
degree of influence in the national and local context in developing 
countries. While the useful framework of the governance state, on the 
one hand, enables us to comprehend these dynamics at the policy lev-
el, it similarly shows that it is fruitful and necessary to extend this 
debate to the empirical sphere of local practices and policies, on the 
other. As we shall see below, globally constructed discourses on cli-
                                                          
18  See report ‘Financing Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation in Afri-
ca: Key Issues and Options for Policy-makers and Negotiators’, May 
2009:   
http://www.uneca.org/adfvii/documents/FINALPolicyBrief_FinancingCC
130509.pdf  
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mate change are powerfully represented and reinterpreted in (local) 
NGO policies and expressed by NGO workers in Bamenda. 
Climate change mitigation and adaptation in Bamenda 
 
Bamenda’s Governance State 
Due to its variety of biodiversity, and more importantly, because the 
country shares the Congo Basin – the second largest rainforest in the 
world – Cameroon forms an important target for climate change miti-
gation on the international agenda. The Congo basin represents a car-
bon reserve of global significance for regulating greenhouse gas emis-
sions, and the regeneration and preservation of the forest is considered 
to be a crucial factor in the global fight against environmental degra-
dation and controlling climate change. In addition to the mitigating 
role of the forest, enhancing the adaptation capacities of people who 
depend on the forest is an important policy focus. This is because the 
predicted future changes to the climate expect forests to face signifi-
cant pressure from climate change over the next century. As such, 
Cameroon forms – as do many other forest rich countries in Africa – a 
‘donor darling’ for the international community within the mitigation 
and adaptation to climate-change paradigms. In a similar vein, at the 
national level these issues are by and large embedded in development 
programs. This might be a possible explanation for the large amount 
of projects and NGOs that are active in this field in Bamenda and 
Cameroon at large.  
In climate-change research it has been shown that the institution of 
the state, civil society organisations and the market play a crucial role 
in determining responses to changing environmental and policy condi-
tions and risks. Moreover, it has been found that a significant factor 
that influences the local climate policies is the way in which decision-
makers perceive climate change (Brown, Nkem et al. 2010). Against 
this backdrop, this section sheds light on the responses and percep-
tions of important stakeholders (NGO workers and government offi-
cials) regarding the opportunities and challenges of climate change. 
Part of my analysis – based on several in-depth interviews with NGO 
representatives, policy and sensitization meetings, and policy docu-
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ments – form fifteen (regional, national and international) NGOs that 
over the past few years have all embedded climate change-related 
programs into their policies. Moreover, I conducted interviews with 
delegates (both in Yaoundé as well as in Bamenda) of the Ministry of 
Public Works, Ministry of Scientific Research and Innovation 
(MINSRESI), Ministry of Environment and Nature Protection 
(MINEP), Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MINAD-
ER) and the Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife (MINFOF). The dele-
gates and representatives of the NGOs were selected for the interviews 
because of the decision-making role they fulfil within the organisa-
tions and their involvement in the climate-change debate. 
 
 
Photo 3.5 Signboard with a ‘Green slogan’ hanging at the 
MINOF 
 
Source: photographed at MINFOF 
 
 
It does not require a thorough investigation to realize that Bamenda 
hosts a fairly good number of NGOs. Especially in the city centre, one 
can easily find several international, national and local NGOs along 
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the streets. According to the Northwest Association of Development 
Organisations (NWADO), which functions as an overarching civil 
society organisation, in Bamenda alone there are at least seventy reg-
istered NGOs, and an even larger amount of Common Initiative 
Groups (CIGs). The emergence of civil society in Cameroon dates 
back to the 1980s and 1990s with the deepening economic crises at 
that time, rising unemployment, poor provision of social services and 
the more than 80% devaluation of the FCFA – the national currency. 
Global pressure towards a more democratic and open society resulted 
in the enactment of laws that made it possible for civil-society group-
ings to facilitate their recognition. One of these laws is the 1999 law 
that spells out the provisions to acquire status as an NGO in Came-
roon.19 Taking a closer look at the case of Bamenda, there are at least 
two constituents that make climate-change politics a complex net-
work. In the first place, the role of the government and the role of 
environmental organisations in combating climate change have be-
come very diffuse, and can be seen in line with Harrison’s governance 
state. The government relies on organisations like SHUMAS20 to exe-
cute programs of tree planting since they have the expertise, the means 
and technical supplies. Another organisation called ANAFOR21 is a 
government institution that was specifically created in 2002 to fight 
climate change. However, they are dependent on external funding to 
carry out their activities, which makes them partly a parastatal body. 
One part of the explanation of the diffuse character of climate-change 
politics in this region lies indeed in the global character of the issue, 
and thus the external pressure and funding that has put new organisa-
tions and projects into place. Secondly, a fundamental element that 
explains the prominent role of the donor consortium, in contrast with 
the role of the government, could be viewed in historical perspective, 
that is, the so-called Anglophone problem and the marginalization of 
                                                          
19  ‘Strengthening the civil society’, NWADO September 2009, Vol. 1 issue 
2. 
20  Strategic Humanitarian Services. 
21  Agence National d’Appui au Développement Forestier. 
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Bamenda from national politics.22 NGOs are namely far and foremost 
a fruitful way to create jobs and to find alternative means and channels 
to create opportunities that are not provided for by the government. A 
fundamental difference that became apparent in the interviews with 
NGO workers, in contrast to government officials, was that the latter 
emphasized the lack of means to carry out their activities, as a dele-
gate scrutinized: 
[...] at the government level they give you little means to function. They 
give you very limited means to function. Even the most beautiful woman 
can only give what she has. So you try to work within your means. I can-
not kill myself. But I would want to do a lot. I have to criticize because 
they give limited means to technical services. Very limited, so you cannot 
do a lot (Interview, September 2009, coordinator mountain forest project 
of the MINFOF). 
Interestingly enough, the delegate for livestock and animal hus-
bandries in Bafut saw the responsibility to combat climate change in 
his sector to be dependent on the support of NGOs: 
My sector is badly hit by climate-change heat. Streams are drying off 
when the first rains have not yet even come. Pastures are scarce, humans 
and animals have no more water to drink. It’s terrible and something seri-
ous needs to be done. At mile 4 a full river has gone [...]. The ministry 
tells us to plant trees. Everybody is involved in tree planting but who are 
those that are planting? We bring the component on how to protect the 
ozone layer, we sensitize them to mitigate climate change. But, we are 
still in Africa and we have no NGOs that can assist us (Interview, 8 Feb-
ruary 2010, Ambe Samuel Ngwankaa). 
Another factor that underlines the influential role of NGOs in the 
Bamenda Grassfields in shaping both society-environment relations 
and creating climate-change awareness can be found at the grassroots 
level. Namely, the majority of the farmers who had heard about cli-
mate change stated that they became aware of this through sensitiza-
tion by a particular NGO. This brief discussion about the diffuse char-
acter of the environmental politics in Bamenda enables us to compre-
                                                          
22  For an elaborate discussion about the role of civil society in Cameroon 
and the Anglophone problem see: Konings, P. (2009) Neoliberal band-
wagonism: Civil society and the politics of belonging in Anglophone 
Cameroon. Langaa & African Studies Centre. 
Talking climate change into existence 
109 
hend the prevalence of a complex multi-level governance framework – 
something that is neither global nor local – while allowing global dis-
courses to have a significant amount of influence on the local context. 
Even though it is difficult to detach one discursive or institutional 
realm from the other, this chapter takes as its point of departure the 
institutional level and aims at demonstrating how globally constructed 
discourses inform interactions between different levels and policies in 
this field. Brown et al. (2010) have visualized the institutional links 
between different decision-making bodies in Cameroon that are deal-
ing with climate change in the following figure: 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Current and future inter-institutional linkages on climate 
change in Cameroon 
 
Brown et al. 2010: 274. 
 
 
While the authors have focused here solely on the inter-
institutional linkages, we can imagine that at the discursive level a 
rather different and more complex picture emerges. As it is impossible 
to disconnect and isolate these translation regimes from one another, it 
is very likely that the engagement between NGOs, international organ-
isations, the government and communities is more connected and 
blurred than this figure shows. However, it gives an idea of what con-
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stitutes the complexity of the governance state in Cameroon, and the 
role of international organisations therein. 
 
 
Photo 3.6 Signboard with a ‘Green slogan’ hanging at the MINFOF 
 
Source: photographed at MINFOF 
 
 
Towards a Green paradigm shift 
The issues of concern of the majority of the wide variety of organisa-
tions vary from rather broad topics like sustainable development to 
ensuring gender equality, nature conservation, HIV/Aids, to enhancing 
agricultural practices and environmental protection. An important 
observation has been made concerning the prominent role of globally 
constructed discourses, namely that many NGOs have undergone a 
Green paradigm shift, since their initial policies were centred on dif-
ferent issues. An organisation like COMINSUD,23 that originally fo-
cused on HIV/Aids prevention and gender issues created an environ-
mental department in 1992 – the year of the Rio Conventions. Within 
the Earth Summit’s framework their motto became ‘Think Globally, 
                                                          
23  Community Initiative for Sustainable Development. 
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Act Locally’, and climate change, environmental education and natu-
ral resource management are currently at the heart of the organisa-
tions’ guidelines. Another example that illustrates this paradigm shift 
is SHUMAS, an NGO that was founded in 1993 and started as an 
informal initiative to help educate deprived children and orphans. In 
1996 their focus shifted towards promoting sustainable agricultural 
activities, and nowadays a major axe of intervention is environmental 
protection and climate change. For an organisation like CIPCRE24 – a 
Christian based NGO that was from the outset founded to integrate 
ecological issues and development rooted in evangelical values – the 
incorporation of climate change as a major axis of intervention was a 
rather obvious move within what they call a ‘global ecology para-
digm’. CIPCRE considers that ‘tackling its task in the perspective of a 
global ecology, the environmental, political, economical and socio-
cultural dimensions of human life should be fed by the spiritual sap of 
faith in God and openness to the spirit of the Gospel’.25 In this so-
called eco-theological vision the idea of preserving the environment 
and ecosystem (that are divinely created) should automatically pro-
mote human development, and the other way around. Following this 
perspective – that seamlessly lends itself to embrace climate-change 
discourses – fighting climate change is indeed subsumed under gen-
eral ideas about development.  
All NGOs that I visited (including SNV, FAO and farmers’ associ-
ations) have in the course of time established climate change-related 
programs. These policy changes can simply be explained by the in-
creasing concern about climate change by international leading actors, 
and consequently by the impact of earth summits on international 
donor flows. Since NGOs are highly dependent on this external fund-
ing, adapting and reshaping their policies within the international de-
velopment framework is the most likely way to safeguard their exist-
ence. Most representatives of NGOs that encouraged this Green para-
digm shift stated that this was due to the urgency and importance of 
the matter, whilst others said that since there is a lot of international 
                                                          
24  Cercle International pour la Promotion de la Création.  
25  http://www.cipcre.org/en/pages/aboutus.html#top.  
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money available this was an issue to embark on, because in the end it 
will serve the poor who will be the most affected. However, some 
informants expressed their concerns about the constraints that they 
foresaw in terms of the high level of corruption in Cameroon. Their 
main worry was whether the newly available international funds that 
partly will be dispersed at the government level will at the end of the 
day meet the needs of the poor.  
 
 
Photo 3.7 Signboard with a ‘Green slogan’ 
hanging at the MINFOF 
 
Source: photographed at MINFOF 
 
 
Also at the national level we can find an increasing concern with 
climate change, especially ever since Cameroon ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol in 2002. Together with other Congo Basin countries, Came-
roon has joined post-Kyoto negotiations in REDD- and CDM-related 
activities. In the course of time, a national office was created in the 
MINEP as the national focal point to the UNFCCC. And, most recent-
ly, president Paul Biya announced putting in place a national climate-
change observatory that will provide on-going monitoring of climate 
data. The idea is that this observatory will fulfil two roles. First, it will 
serve as a tool to support and facilitate decision-makers in all sectors 
vis-à-vis climate change, and second, it will serve as a permanent 
monitor of the carbon stock in Cameroon (Brown, Nkem, Sonwa & 
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Bele 2010: 271). In brief, the Green paradigm shift is not only visible 
at the regional and NGO level but also all the more so at the govern-
mental level. International organisations are particularly heavily in-
volved in working with the government as far as climate change is 
concerned. The UNDP, FAO and the World Bank have actively been 
building government capacity on the issue, especially at the MINEF 
and the MINFOF (ibid). As mentioned in chapter two, this interna-
tional involvement and pressure has, in 2004, resulted in the division 
of the Ministry of Environment and Forestry into two separate minis-
tries, both of which are engaged in the same goal: that is, the planting 
of trees. The activities of ANAFOR, an organisation that is responsi-
ble for reforestation in Cameroon, show that they feel that the tree 
planting projects are a key part of responding to climate change. A 
major observation that was made during my fieldwork is that, not only 
at the national level but also at the local level in Bamenda, tree plant-
ing was perceived to be the most crucial and indispensible strategy to 
combat the negative consequences of climate change, the imperative 
for adapting to and mitigating climate change. Moreover, preventing 
people from cutting trees and the complete eradication of slash and 
burn are considered to be part and parcel of the ‘collective fight 
against climate change’. 
This so-called ankara method consists of collecting grass and cov-
ering it with soil before burning it. Ankara is a relatively fast and easy 
practice for clearing one’s farm and making it fertile for the growth of 
particular crops like cassava and cocoyam. Although this burning 
practice gives a higher yield the following year, a major problem is 
that it destroys important nutrients in the soil. Harvests for the years 
thereafter are never substantial as a result of decreased soil fertility. 
With time the farm will be abandoned to give space for vegetation to 
cover the land again. The smoke that is released into the air while 
burning the soil, is considered – by the government and the interna-
tional community – to be a substantial factor in terms of its contribu-
tion to climate change. The government’s attempt to eradicate slash 
and burn is not new, as it was part and parcel of older paradigms like 
biodiversity conservation and sustainable development. Nevertheless, 
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within the adaptation and mitigation paradigm related to climate 
change this effort is given further impetus.  
Despite the fact that most farmers in the Northwest region experi-
ence the negative long-term consequences of burning the soil them-
selves, the ankara practice continues. This demonstrates that the 
short-term revenues (and the short-term horizon wherein most subsist-
ence farmers operate) outweigh the long-term effects. In the inter-
views conducted it became clear that there was a general consensus 
amongst farmers that the ankara method was born out of the inacces-
sibility to alternative means of agricultural production. Most com-
plaints were related to the cost of expenses for manure and fertilizers. 
Other problems involved lack of labour (or money to pay for labour), 
no farming tools, and furthermore the absence of appropriate 
knowledge of alternative farming methods. Wendy, president of a 
rural women’s association against climate change (ACTWID), ex-
plains: ‘ankara is not sustainable, but if you don’t have anybody to 
work on the land you have to burn it; it is a shortcut born out of pov-
erty’. 
In their article ‘Institutional adaptive capacity and climate-change 
response in the Congo Basin Forests of Cameroon’ Brown et al. 
(2010) have shown that forest dependent communities are not only 
vulnerable to the direct effects of climate change but that people are 
also vulnerable to changing environmental policy that might affect 
their access to forest resources. Results of their study indicate that 
decision-makers’ awareness in terms of climate change is high, but 
that a concrete institutional response is still at a very early stage. Fur-
thermore, the authors point out that civil society – among which (in-
ternational) NGOs – plays a decisive role in enhancing the capacity of 
the government to respond to new policies on climate change (Brown, 
Nkem et al. 2010: 263). While the government’s capacity to deal with 
climate-change policies might be at an early stage, there are many 
indicators that both the government as well as the broader institutional 
arena (i.e. NGOs, civil society organisations and the private sector) 
are at the dawn of undergoing a significant ‘Green paradigm shift’, 
informed by globally constructed discourses on climate change. This 
is in line with the aforementioned idea that adaptation to climate 
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change goes along with a significant shift in the discourses used to 
deal with what is normally called development (Cannon & Müller-
Mahn 2010). As will become clear in the following section, climate-
change adaptation and mitigation found in the perceptions of policy-
makers and NGO workers do indeed embrace all aspects of human 




Photo 3.8 Signboard with a ‘Green slogan’ hanging at the MINFOF 
 
Source: photographed at MINFOF 
 
 
The ethics of tree planting 
Development models have preached that the less trees you have the more 
developed you are. When you look at the pro’s and con’s we might say let 
the South plant more trees and try to balance up the CO2 emissions, that’s 
one way. The other way: what becomes of those in the South who will 
plant those trees? Are they not going to develop, build their own roads 
and the skyscrapers? No, it is a global issue and if we just follow the flow, 
before long the South will be like the North if we make the very mistakes 
the West has made. It is a war between us and the environment. The envi-
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ronment is saying now: you people have abused me; you have to pay me 
back (Interview with FAO representative). 
Because the North wanted development so they chopped down all 
their trees. While they are the principle contributors (to climate change) 
the South has the potential to preserve the trees. But we should look for 
alternative ways of production (Interview, divisional delegate of Public 
Works, September 2009, Wum). 
While the mere idea of tree planting and abandoning slash and 
burn might appear to be rather innocent and necessary, a myriad of 
ethical but also socio-economic considerations that have been raised 
by the Grassfielders need to be taken into account. In the organisa-
tions’ policies, climate-change mitigation and adaptation take centre 
stage – all funded by external donors – and similarly resonate with 
representatives’ personal experiences and perspectives about a sup-
posedly changing environment. In other words, discourses on climate 
change are linked up with a visible experiential focus. As one NGO 
worker explained:  
It is realized that the climate is changing and as a result there are many ef-
fects of it. Today we hear of hurricanes, desertification, landslides etc. all 
as a result of climate change. It’s a call for concern that people must talk 
about. Everybody can testify that the climate is changing in Bamenda. I 
will point out to you that the water that flew [sic] from the station hill 
when I was a kid is not [sic] more there. The landslides in town today 
were unheard of. Why should they be happening now? It means some-
thing has changed. A lot of water is coming out, where is it coming from? 
All these led us to an answer, which implies that there is climate change 
(focus group discussion natural resource management department SIRD-
EP). 
Based on the interviews conducted with representatives of NGOs 
and delegates of different ministries, one predominantly discursive 
pattern could be determined, namely that global warming and the cli-
matic threat are very ‘real’. The urgency of the matter, as much as the 
need to come into action on very short notice, was underscored by all 
respondents. Moreover, there was a general consensus that African 
communities in general and the poor would be the most effected: 
The most vulnerable are the poor families. One of the effects is failing 
crop production, and the crop to a poor family is what they live on, since 
they farm just for subsistence. If that fails they won’t be able to feed 
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themselves. [Other consequences are] the emergence of diseases, famine, 
and even conflicts over the little natural resources [...] there will be a 
scramble over them, tribal conflicts (Interview, coordinator climate-
change project COMINSUD). 
Other delegates and NGO representatives pointed out that particu-
larly women and children will be most affected: 
These that will be mostly affected will be women and children. [...] The 
food is cultivated and sold by women and with the income they can buy 
other substitutes. So you can run down their incomes completely, not only 
at the level of health but income and nutrition (Interview, project manag-
er COMINSUD). 
While it was by and large agreed upon that Africans in general and 
the poor in particular are and will be the most vulnerable to climate 
change, there was a higher level of disagreement among the inform-
ants about what (and who) have caused it and, hence, who is going to 
pay the price for averting its effects. In other words, the general para-
dox that ‘Africans contribute least and will be mostly affected’ does 
not appear to fully resonate with NGO workers. On the contrary, 
many respondents emphasized during interviews the significant con-
tribution of the local population in contributing to climate change, a 
message that was also communicated to the local population (see 
chapter five).  
Local people have the tendency of burning their bushes, set wild fires, 
which destroy their vegetation, and the rate of regeneration may not be 
proportionate to the destruction. People cut down watershed to get better 
lands for farming. The water is coming out but the water level is drop-
ping. So these are significant contributions (to climate change). These el-
ements of the local people contribute with big dynamics. I would want to 
think of it in terms of representation of a pie chart and what percentage is 
the result of the local actions. [...] The contribution of local people in Af-
rica to climate change is very significant (Interview, COMINSUD).  
In a similar way, some informants applied the causes of climate 
change only locally to the case of Bamenda and Cameroon and, as 
such, saw a direct link between the changing weather patterns in the 
Grassfields and environmentally unfriendly practices. While acknowl-
edging that climate change is a global issue, they did not see the pollu-
tion like greenhouse gas emissions in the North to be the primary 
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cause of a changing climate in the South but rather attributed the caus-
es primarily to the Grassfielders: 
Cameroon is an underdeveloped country, so we will not look at industrial-
ization as the main cause. We look at agricultural activities because we 
are agriculturally based. The increase in population more of agric land is 
being converted into inhabited land. Wood is being chopped off as fire-
wood. The wood is burned and it brings a lot of carbon dioxide into the 
atmosphere. That is the main cause of climate change in the underdevel-
oped world (focus group discussion resource management department 
SIRDEP). 
For climatic change you see, I want to apply it very locally. The cli-
mate has changed. It is no longer alike before. [...] There is a serious 
problem that the environment is facing through the massive burning of 
bushes. When you come around Bamenda, around the month of Decem-
ber/January [...], just look at the atmosphere. It is so cloudy. Because of 
the burning of bushes. Bush fires in preparation for farming. Which is a 
matter that we are really trying to tell people not to, not to practice. We 
try to let them change from those practices. Imagine burning one hectare 
of land like that! The amount of carbon that is emitted into the atmos-
phere (Interview, SHUMAS). 
We have issues of pollution that is not the major issue. But we look at 
issues that are touching the world globally like climate change. And when 
you look at issues like that and we look at the enormous deforestation 
here, like areas that were purely forested areas are all being cleared now, 
and people are moving in and building houses. [...] You see you have this 
contributing to the global climate change the whole world is facing. The 
major cause for this, if we look at it as a microclimate we look at the pop-
ulation. We look at the different activities people are engaging in. [...] 
That is why we tell people please don’t slash and burn the soil because it 
is causing more radiation (Interview, NWADO). 
The fact that farmers often were blamed for being the cause of cli-
mate change themselves was further underlined during my attendance 
at sensitization meetings, in which I gained some insight into commu-
nication strategies of NGOs. For example, one day in December I was 
invited by CIPCRE to come along with them on one of their fieldtrips 
to Bafoussam. In between their activities I seized the opportunity to 
speak with several farmers, which resulted in the following remarka-
ble situation: 
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(R = respondent who is a farmer engaged in medicinal plants; I: in-
terviewer; NGO = representative of CIPCRE) 
I: What are the main causes of this climate change you just men-
tioned? 
R: As the radio has said, those big industries that produce cars, 
planes and all that. The smoke that rises to block the ozone layer 
and prevents the sun from reaching the earth. That is what I know. 
NGO: She is trying to ask you what your own contribution is to the 
climatic changes, since the population here is contributing a lot too. 
R: Yes, the population. I know we also contribute to the changes in 
the ozone layer. If the trees were there the gas would not have 
come out. [...] The forest that was first of all here does not [sic] 
more exist. It’s the people around that have cut it, and when they 
have been asked to plant they are refusing. 
(Interview at a tree nursery, December 2009, Bafoussam). 
The NGO representative’s intervention during the interview 
demonstrates his perception of farmers’ contribution and responsibil-
ity. I remember another sensitization meeting that was held in January 
2010, in Nkambe. The meeting was jointly organised by multiple 
NGOs/INGOs and a group of traditional rulers of the Northwest re-
gion. During one of the presentations given that day, a policy maker 
gave a scientific explanation of climate change, in which he empha-
sized how the industrialized countries are polluting the world, and that 
in order to fight this pollution – that is mostly affecting Africa – eve-
rybody must take action and stop burning the bushes, and abandon the 
cutting down of trees. After this speech a critical farmer took the 
chance to ask him the following question: ‘So you are telling us that it 
is the “white men’s country” [sic] who are causing it, but why don’t 
they stop this CO2 if that is the enemy for the climate?’ (A traditional 
ruler interrupted and exclaimed: ‘It is just like the old fridges that are 
dumped by white men here with us, because they have understood the 
danger of it’). Consequently, the policy maker elaborated upon the 
local responsibilities and contributions to environmental degradation, 
but that the most important thing is that the world, and mainly Africa, 
was in danger. ‘If we refuse to fight we will soon face our own de-
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struction.’ From a policy standpoint it appears that there are at least 
two crucial ‘discursive tools’ needed and used to make people act. The 
first one is to make people feel guilty and appeal to one’s sense of 
moral responsibility, and the second one relates to notions of fear. 
Another example that illustrates this point was the following conver-
sation that took place in a taxi while on my way to a climate-change 
meeting. By coincidence we encountered an agric technician who is 
engaged in assisting farmers and sensitizing them about the issue. Mr. 
George, one of my respondents and a farmer who is involved in or-
ganic agriculture and active in climate-change projects, was also pre-
sent, together with another older woman who became the subject of 
the discussion. 
 
(G=Mr George, A= agric technician) 
A: For us it is a song. We sing about climate change to our farmers. 
G: But do they believe in climate change? 
A: Yes, they do. They see it happening. They see it on TV but also 
here in our own localities. If mami asks me what is causing all of 
this I tell them: you are the cause! Because you burn the soil. You 
are the cause because you cut down the trees. And mami tells me 
that if she doesn’t burn the soil her potatoes and cocoyams will not 
do fine and that she has no means for fertilizer. And I tell mami 
that is she burns her soil she has a low yield and she will say that it 
is witchcraft. Isn’t that true mami? And then I will tell her that it is 
climate change and that it is her own cause (discussion in a taxi, 
Nkambe, February 2010).      
Without discarding the local contributions to environmental degra-
dation by practices like slash and burn, and deforestation, on a global 
scale we know that African countries are emitting less than 4% of 
CO2. With this knowledge in mind, the idea of ‘Thinking Globally and 
Acting Locally’ seems to entail a rather ironic situation. Respondents 
pointed out that while global warming is a global issue and thus in-
deed a globally shared concern, they emphasized that in the South 
people are as much part of the problem as in the North, and should 
therefore take similar responsibility. The discursive construction of 
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‘thinking globally’, as reproduced by the respondents, thus implies 
that indeed – due to the perceived urgency of climate change – the 
global interest is of more importance than the local. Within environ-
mental sociology the tendency to downplay local perceptions and def-
inition of problems, and the blaming of poor people in underdevel-
oped countries for causing environmental degradation is termed the 
‘global managerialist paradigm’ (see Hannigan 2002: 74). It may be 
superfluous to say that this idea of ‘blaming the victims’ is rather op-
pressive, as it reduces the poor to being the sole polluters of their envi-
ronment. This perspective does not do justice to the broader picture, in 
which people are often struggling for survival and do not have any 
alternative means to provide themselves in their subsistence way of 
life than, for example, by cutting trees for fire wood or by burning 
their land – due to a lack of fertilizers – in order to harvest a yield on a 
short-term basis. Moreover, they are used to fit the dominant discourse 
in order to serve the global interest. 
Interestingly enough, the importance of trees was by many NGO 
workers considered as primarily to fulfil the role of a carbon sink ra-
ther than to serve the interests of the farmers. As exemplified in the 
following quote: 
They are cutting trees which are supposed to be sinks for CO2, but in-
creasing CO2 in the atmosphere through their burning. We know the issue 
of climate change is global but it needs local initiative, local actions for us 
to succeed. Though somebody may wonder why it concerns Africa when 
it contributes very little to climate change. But they are the biggest poten-
tials in stopping the situation. They still have the largest remaining forest. 
And we cannot say we are not a great cause to the problem so we can go 
on living our own way. It is a trans-frontier problem (Interview, SIRDEP, 
October 2009). 
A widely shared stance among NGO workers, which touches upon 
another discursive dynamic, is that, if Africans are the most vulnerable 
to the effects of climate change and if it requires indeed such urgent 
action to reverse these effects, African farmers are also fighting 
against climate change in their own interest. This can be illustrated by 
quotes like: ‘we are in the same boat so we have to put all hands on 
deck’, and ‘there is no time for blame game, we need to act fast’. Both 
citations can, however, once again be assigned respectively to the 
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socially constructed ideas of the ‘globality’ and the ‘urgency’ of the 
problem. In a similar way, another delegate stressed the importance 
for Africans to stand on their own two feet: 
European nations, you know the industrial development in European na-
tions has come with its own strings. It has caused quite a lot. But the Eu-
ropean nations are up on their feet now, trying to moderate it by pumping 
money to African nations that still have something like forests and so on 
(Interview, delegate of MINEP, Bamenda). 
Paradoxically enough, all NGO workers agreed upon the fact that 
on a global scale climate change is caused by the industrialized coun-
tries, who are the biggest emitters of greenhouse gas emissions. This 
was mainly expressed in terms of the need for money to compensate 
the developing countries for preserving the environment, the idea that 
is generally termed ‘climate justice’. Like the delegate of MINFOF in 
Bamenda stated: ‘We’ll plant those trees don’t worry. We will do that. 
But let Them pay for it.’ The ethics of tree planting was often raised 
by NGOs and government workers, but notions of a shared responsi-
bility remained: 
So we know that it is them (the industrialized world) who cause it. But it 
is an issue that everybody needs to hold onto his own side of the blanket. 
So you cannot say that I am doing little I am going to stay out of it and 
just watch it. Because at the end of the day, Africa is going to suffer the 
most. At the end of the day. It is going to suffer in terms of: people don’t 
know how to plant, rains come at any time, temperatures are changing, 
and crops don’t grow well under certain changes in temperatures and 
things like that. 
Even though perceived as a global concern that should be fought 
collectively, the need for compensation and extra support from the 
industrialized world was affirmed by all respondents. 
We know that the causes are more from the developed world, and that is 
the reason that we advocate, I think most African head of states are advo-
cating, that the developed world should sponsor or maybe provide some 
assistance with the developing world to fight the climate change. Because 
we don’t have enough resources. We don’t have enough resources, and if 
we have to leave and conserve the forest, we should have some sort of 
compensation because our livelihood depends on the forest that we have 
now. So if we have to leave the forest intact we have to have something 
that can sustain the population, and have something to eat. It is impossible 
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for us to tell the population to not go into the forests without replacing 
their needs (Interview, NOWEFOR, September 2009). 
Only a handful of policy makers took a much more critical stance 
towards assigning responsibility to African farmers. The following 
citation touches upon one of the many perversities that are entailed in 
climate change (discourses).   
There is no fairness. There is absolutely no fairness. The Kyoto protocol 
has been on great talks. Was it meant considering the African farmer? Did 
they take that into context? It is still within the European context. [...] 
You see Africa is coming very strong into this big talk. We have to adapt 
everything to fit the small-scale farmers, if not the small-scale farmer is 
dying of hunger and poverty. He will continue chopping down that forest 
for agricultural purposes to look for fertile land. The land is fast degrad-
ing no matter how much talk you talk. If you come and impose a forest 
reserve there, you are wasting your time. He has to go in there to get food. 
If there’s hunger it is going to kill him. Take him to the prison where he 
doesn’t have to work but where he gets food. So we have to place those 
things into the local context. [...] apply it to African realities (Interview 
with associate scientist World Agro-forestry Centre/ICRAF, November 
2009, Bamenda).  
 
 
Photo 3.9 Members of a CIG going ‘Green’ and fighting against 
climate change 
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In this section I highlighted some of the main recurrent themes that 
play an important role in the perception of decision-makers, NGO 
workers, and government officials as far as the climate-change prob-
lematic – and North/South relations is concerned. What has become 
clear is how globally constructed climate-change discourses impinge a 
particular adaptation and mitigation development model upon the 
institutional level and, in so doing, shaping national and local devel-
opment policies. Moreover, within the institutional translation regime 
policy makers view the role of African farmers as indispensable in 
fighting climate change, for it is both a global responsibility and a 
serious threat. The two recurrent ‘discursive devices’ (i.e. the globali-
ty and gravity of the issue) play an important role in communicating 
the Green message to the population. 
 
 







Translating the climate back  
and forth – traditional rulers in the  
fight against climate change 
 
Part I  
 
Introduction 
In the end of November last year, when usually the rains have already 
ceased, a raging storm destroyed plants and crops in the kingdom of 
Kom. A week earlier a landslide in Belo-Subdivision killed eleven 
people, and a twelve-year-old boy was swept away by a river that 
overflowed its banks. This sequence of environmental catastrophes 
gripped the people, and left them in panic and confusion. According to 
the highest traditional body in the palaces, the so-called Kwi’foin, the 
incidents were the handwork of people from the metaphysical world. 
The day after the storm, the Kwi’foin spokesman, followed by other 
Kwi’foin members, was meanding across the market square, when all 
of a sudden he started to preach his message: 
Oooooh Kom! Oooooh Kom! The Kwi’foin asked me to salute you three 
good times and tell you not to panic. We will soon grip the demons, the 
people of muso (transworld) that are responsible for these disasters that 
breed melancholy, suffering and death (The Post newspaper, 30 Novem-
ber 2009). 
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To confirm their spiritual and moral authority, the Kwi’foin ex-
claimed that they had uncovered the people who caused the floods and 
tornadoes, and that they had been warned to stop causing the disasters 
before the next market day arrived. Individuals were held responsible 
for the extreme climatic occurrences, and the people of Kom had put 
trust in the hands of the Kwi’foin to re-establish socio-cosmic harmo-
ny. A woman at the market place approved of the Kwi’foin’s declara-
tion using these words: ‘Kwi’foin must come to our rescue because I 
can’t understand why rain falls when we expect sun.’ At the same 
time on the radio, government delegates informed the population that 
the floods were ‘simply’ the cause of climate change, and the message 
was that people should stop burning their bushes and abandon the 
practice of ankara. Whereas the traditional authorities pointed their 
finger to particular individuals, or ‘climate-change demons’ as The 
Post newspaper framed it, government delegates appealed to a collec-
tive responsibility, and turned the message into a call for a radical 
behavioural transformation. Although the initial focus of my study 
was not so much on the role of traditional rulers, it soon became clear 
that, to do justice to the ‘ethnographic realities’, they could not be left 
out of the analysis. Several remarkable observations and incidents 
drove my curiosity and convinced me to broaden my focus. 
In the beginning of February this year, heavy lightening struck a 
primary school in Bamali and eight children lost their lives. The next 
day, the Fon of that village proclaimed that this rare event could only 
be attributed to witchcraft (The Standard Tribune, 13 February 2010). 
Another incidence that illustrates the essential role and moral grip that 
remains with the traditional rulers in society is the case of a heavy 
earth tremor that destroyed almost a whole neighbourhood in 
Bamenda’s old town in 2006. It was explained by the traditional rulers 
with the fact that the ancestors were not well addressed before the 
construction of that neighbourhood. What the Fons consequently did 
was to worship at the shrines and offer sacrifices to the gods. Particu-
larly for those traditional rulers who are not (yet) aware of climate 
change as a Western discourse, irregular weather events and natural 
disasters tend to be explained as a form of witchcraft or in the belief 
that society has neglected the ancestors. Both type of explanations 
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signify the existence of a moral relationship between people and the 
environment, with the Fons as important ritual authorities and media-
tors of this connection. There are many indicators and examples that 
show how, in present-day Bamenda, the Fons’ solid spiritual control 
over their people finds its expression in exceptional weather events 
and natural disasters. This will be described in further detail in section 
4.3. 
What can be derived from abovementioned examples is that the 
weather and the climate are associated with the metaphysical world. 
Hence, those who are given the right to translate, or even control the 
climate, have a spiritual and powerful role within society. For exam-
ple, if we take belief in the gift or power of rainmaking into considera-
tion – that is still today a common practice in many African societies – 
this shows that rain is closely connected to power. Van Beek even 
states in this context that rain is the obsession of Africa. He emphasiz-
es that rain is a matter to be dealt with only by the powerful ones in 
society, which is underlined and becomes visible in the actual moment 
of rainfall. He furthermore states that in all cultures specific weather 
events are considered to be the proof of the special relationship with 
the transcendental. The weather is often seen as the result of a connec-
tion between heaven and earth (Van Beek 1999: 175). Discourses 
about the weather and the climate are thus inevitably discourses about 
power. In this chapter it will become clear that the translation and 
mediation of ‘physical’ weather events and natural disasters in 
Bamenda demonstrate how power is structured within society, and is 
strongly reflected in the spiritual and moral role of the Fons.  
In November 2009, on very short notice due to the ‘urgency of the 
matter’, a group of influential traditional rulers of the Northwest re-
gion jointly formed an organisation, which they called Cameroon Tra-
ditional Rulers Against Climate Change (CAMTRACC). During the 
meeting, in which the body was launched, the Fon of Guzang – as the 
president of CAMTRACC – held an introductory speech, which will 
be discussed in detail in section 4.5. It became clear to me that this 
speech was a fairly influential ‘communicating event’, as it was taken 
over by several other traditional rulers and could be marked as the 
beginning of a sequence of locally appropriated, global climate-
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change discourses. This initiative epitomizes the argument that the 
power of the Fons is not only limited to the mediation of tangible 
weather events but that it also attempts to be in control of the (novel) 
discourse. This type of power comes close to what Bourdieu (1989) 
has called symbolic power, that is, the power to produce and impose a 
legitimate vision of the world. Power, in its broad understanding, lies 
with the authorities – that is, the Fons – who have a certain amount of 
control over the translation and creation of discourses. The aim of this 
chapter is two-fold. The first part offers a concise historical overview 
of the Grassfields, in which will be discussed how the spiritual and 
moral power of the Fons have developed over the years, from days of 
the early settlements until the post-colonial state today. It will become 
clear that a central element in the religious and political belief system 
of the Grassfielders, is explaining misfortune (e.g. natural disasters) 
and malice, which forms the fundament of the Fons’ social control. 
The second part will examine how the exploitation of global discours-
es on climate change enables the Fons to both re-appropriate local 
discourses, and to redefine their symbolic power. Furthermore, this 
section will serve as a contextualization for chapter five, which is an 
attempt to demonstrate how climate-change discourses are being em-
bedded in local cosmologies, and moreover, provide an alternative 
framework for understanding misfortune. Abovementioned speech, 
and other ‘communicative events’ produced by the Fons that followed, 
will be used as a focal point in the (discourse) analysis that follows. 
A brief historical overview of the settlements  
of chiefdoms in the Grassfields 
For a better understanding of the socio-cultural and political develop-
ment of the chiefdoms, and to get an idea of how local cosmologies 
form the fundament for present day translations of climate-change 
discourses, a brief historical overview is needed. Although I was 
based in Bamenda during my fieldwork, the geographical scope of my 
study could rather be seen as an ethnography of discourses, in which 
Bamenda is located at the centre of ‘discursive mediation’, with the 
surrounding Grassfields villages and chiefdoms as satellites. The area 
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under consideration stretches from Wum and Bafut to the North, Baba 
I and Ndop to the east, the city of Bafoussam to the South and Bali in 
the West (see Map 4.1), which fall under the geographical nominator 
of the Western Grassfields, also called the Western highlands. A first 
essential characteristic of the history of chiefdoms of the Western 
Grassfields is that they have many economic, social, political and 
religious features in common. The chiefdoms maintained close contact 
amongst each other, which was driven by intensive trading, intermar-
riages and diplomatic relationships (Warnier 1982: 38). This long-
term relationship of social- and political organisations and common 
beliefs therefore legitimizes the following discussion of the develop-
ment of different chiefdoms as a whole.1 We should keep in mind that 
each chiefdom was to a certain extent a sovereign unit, but that they 
did not exist in a vacuum: quite the contrary. What follows in this 
section is a regional approach, in which the common stock of beliefs, 
and political and social institutions will be highlighted, with a particu-
lar focus on the environment. After visiting different palaces in this 
area and attending a number of ceremonies, I found the name Grass-
fields rather confusing, since it appeared to me that strong symbolic 
references to the forest could be observed in all the palace-related 
practices. Several historical dynamics can be pointed out for this ap-
parent discrepancy. Part of the answer can be found in the ways peo-
ple related to and shaped their environment. In the following section a 
brief historical overview will be given of human- and nature-related 
developments. 
                                                          
1  For a detailed overview of the history of the development of chiefdom 
settlements, see for example: Traditional Bamenda (Chilver and Kaberry 
1967), and Échanges, développement et hiérarchies dans le Bamenda pré-
colonial (Warnier 1985). 
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Map 4.1 Western Grassfields 
Source: Nel de Vink 
 
While the Grassfields nowadays are part of the grass savannah area 
of West and Central Africa, archaeological evidence shows that this 
has not always been the case. Before Neolithic times, which basically 
form the transition period from hunting and gathering to agriculture 
and animal rearing, this area was completely covered with forests very 
high into the mountains (Chilver 1967: 2). Warnier stresses in his 
book, A history of the western Grassfields, that the ancestors of the 
present-day Grassfielders were forest people, and that contemporary 
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societies still share many features that indicate a close relationship 
with the forest people to the south. The fact that rituals and symbols 
always incorporate elements of the environment and the forest is for 
him a reason to argue that it was not the Grassfields people who mi-
grated away from the forest but rather the forest that moved away 
from them (Warnier 1982: 24). If one pays a visit to the palaces in the 
Grassfields today, it immediately becomes apparent that the forest and 
forest elements are omnipresent in the local cosmologies and in how 
the political institutions are structured. An obvious example is the 
cultural and spiritual importance of the secret and sacred forests that 
surround the palaces. The palace-based secret societies worship at the 
shrines of the preceding Fons, which can be found there, and the sa-
cred forests are inhabited by the ancestral gods. The role of the jujus 
during death celebrations of the Fons, and in annual dances, incorpo-
rates elements that symbolically refer to the forest (see pictures). 
 
 
Photo 4.1 Jujus dancing during the death celebration of the late Fon 
of Bambalang.  
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Photo 4.2 The Fon of Bafut blesses village members with camwood 
(forest tree).  
 Even though this has completely disappeared from the 





Photo 4.3 Jujus performing during the annual dance in Baba I 
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There are other related, but less obvious, characteristics that show 
the attachment and connection to the forest areas. The first one is the 
role that forest crops and plants like camwood, banana leaves and 
palm oil play in rituals. The second one is the importance of men’s 
societies in the political, social and religious life of people, which 
exhibit striking similarities with all forest people south of the high-
lands (Warnier 1982: 25). From the outset it needs to be said that the 
western highlands, due to their relatively fertile soils and cool climate, 
have early on and continuously been populated. The population densi-
ty at that time was unusually high by African standards. Other possi-
ble factors are that, because of the altitude and healthy environment, 
endemic diseases could be kept out. Furthermore, until the seven-
teenth century the Grassfields were remote from coastal slave-trade 
networks and, until the nineteenth century from empires such as Soko-
to and Borno that depopulated societies through intense slave-raiding 
(ibid). This centuries-old continuous population also density shows 
that this area climatologically has always been prosperous and rela-
tively stable for agricultural practices. 
Around 3000 BC, the first major changes began that affected the 
landscape and the people. Two important developments can be denot-
ed for the enduring and massive deforestation of the highlands during 
that time. The first change was the introduction of food production by 
means of agriculture and animal husbandry. For these activities, peo-
ple needed to clear the forest by using slash and burn methods, which 
slowly turned the area into savannah. A second major development 
that accelerated the deforestation process was the introduction of iron 
technology about 2000 years ago. For the smelting and smithing in-
dustries that most probably endured for more than 1500 years, high 
amounts of charcoal were needed (ibid: 30). The development of agri-
culture and the introduction of iron technology entailed at least two 
big social changes. The first one was the formation of sedentary life 
and settlement of permanent villages. The second one was the increas-
ing population density. For the social stratification of the Grassfield-
ers, the shift from hunting and gathering – which basically was a way 
of living without hardly any social ranking – to agriculture and seden-
tary life, provided more necessary grounds for chiefs to emerge. Of 
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significant importance for the growing hierarchies was the develop-
ment of unequal statuses between titleholders and low-ranking people, 
and, with this, growing male dominance (Warnier 1982: 39).  
 In Bamenda, if we walk around different markets it is easy to see 
that each locality developed its own specialization of commodities. At 
the Bafut market, large quantities of good quality palm wine and pigs 
can be found, in Ndop excellent rice can be bought, and Njinikom and 
Oku are famous for their honey. These dispersed commodities echo 
the history of large-scale, inter-chiefdom trade and economic speciali-
zation, which accompanied the introduction of agriculture. For each 
chiefdom, it was important to be well known for a specific commodity 
so as to be able to accumulate wealth. The trading of food crops over 
short and long distances was also good for compensating for perma-
nent imbalances in food resources, crop-failure and to survive the 
‘hunger time’, which was at the beginning of the rainy season. People 
always tried to grow more crops than needed in case natural disasters 
happened (Warnier 1982: 43).  
It is worth mentioning that both the current differentiation and spe-
cialization of commodities in different localities, and the incorporation 
of forest symbols in cultural practices, are the result of long-term his-
torical patterns. The aim of this very brief historical contextualization 
is, however, not so much concerned with economic developments but 
should lead instead to a broader understanding of how and whether the 
power of present-day traditional rulers can be found in long-term dy-
namics. It is difficult to speak about the Grassfields chiefs in the 
longue durée of history, because some chiefdoms underwent major 
transformations during colonial rule. But important elements of the 
historical dynamics that formed the foundation of the Fons’ power 
were long-distance trade and the accumulation of wealth, which were 
under the strict control of the Fons (Geschiere 1996: 316). Apart from 
the material function of the Fons’ power, which was expressed in eco-
nomic capital and the maintenance of external relations, his power 
was by and large rooted in sociocultural and spiritual significance, and 
will be discussed in the following section. 
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The ritual, moral and legal patterns of power in the 
chiefdoms 
Each chiefdom consisted of a group of exogamous lineages. This 
means that there were continuous inter-lineage and inter-chiefdom 
population exchanges, and this explains why lineages often over-
lapped chiefdom boundaries. It happened regularly that entire lineages 
left one chiefdom to join another, which gave the Grassfielders a 
‘floating character’. A basic problem that was shared by each chief-
dom was how to integrate different lineages within one political unit 
(Warnier 1982: 56). Other responsibilities of the palace at this level 
were organising labour, dealing with crimes and governing the coun-
try. Albeit that among the notables the Fons were far above the others 
in the hierarchy, the sociopolitical power was not just limited to the 
Fons. These roles were also fulfilled by the territorial quarter heads, 
the council and regulatory societies. An example of a regulatory socie-
ty is the Kwi’foin (or Kwi’fo), as mentioned in the first section. These 
societies, which nowadays are being referred to as ‘secret societies’, 
were the most important bodies and exerted significant power in the 
chiefdoms (ibid). A peculiar feature of both the Fons and the regulato-
ry societies is that, besides the political role they fulfilled, they also 
possessed ritual and moral power. The association of sacred kinship, 
together with the closed societies and governmental functions, was 
unique in the sense that it could only be found elsewhere in central 
Cameroon and Benin (Chilver 1967: 47).  
The nature and role of regulatory societies were based on beliefs 
shared by all Fondoms. The belief in animal affinities, or that spiritual 
beings and dead kings were residing in waterfalls and deep pools, and 
the belief in ‘sending’ lightening were widespread across the Grass-
fields (ibid). According to Warnier we can analyse Grassfields’ beliefs 
by arguing that the encroachment of nature on the human or cultural 
world is seen as dangerous and polluting. Morally bad behaviour, like 
fighting or assaulting people, was perceived to be ‘polluting’ and, 
hence, the cause of misfortune. Accidental death by drowning or 
lightening, fire destroying property, or destructive natural events, in 
general, were equally seen as pollution. This is not to say that nature 
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itself was dangerous, but only the impingement of nature on humans 
that was seen as such (Warnier 1982: 57). In addition to this, I would 
argue that destructive natural events in themselves were not so much 
seen as pollution but rather as a ‘transcendental sign’ – an expression 
of morally bad, or polluting behaviour. Taking the belief into account 
that the deities and ancestors are residing in the forests and streams, 
the importance of the gods of the land, and the sacredness of particular 
animals like the leopard (it was believed that the chiefs could trans-
form themselves into leopards), there are good reasons to argue that 
divinities are embodied in nature, and that nature is thus strongly as-
sociated with the divine. In other words, I would argue that it is rather 
the encroachment of humans on nature (and violence between hu-
mans) that was considered polluting and dangerous, and that destruc-
tive natural events were seen as an expression thereof. How this moral 
relationship between humans and nature is expressed in society will be 
described in further detail in the following chapter. 
The ‘traditional’ political and religious belief systems, which were 
fully intertwined, were strongly centred on the moral question of how 
to eradicate misfortune or malevolence (Chilver & Kaberry 1967: 53). 
Bringing back the socio-cosmic harmony could only be achieved by 
removing the polluting or dangerous forces. To be able to remove 
pollution from society required a ritual power that was constituted by 
a special corps in the chiefdom. Misfortune was like a substance that 
entered the ground at the place where a bad event took place and that 
needed to be removed (Warnier 1982: 57). For the chiefs – who were 
in the position to identify and monitor misfortune and malice – the 
occurrence of extreme natural events can therefore be seen as mo-
ments par excellence, in which they could execute their power. This 
particular ritual power was – and is to a certain extent the case today – 
limited to agents of supernatural forces, who execute their ceremonial 
duties to remove the polluted forces from society. Fisiy discerns three 
different patterns of authority in the ‘traditional’ kingdoms of the 
Grassfields, which are executed by three different classes of notables. 
The first class comprises the spokesman of tradition, those who com-
mand moral authority to maintain the unity and morality in a commu-
nity. The second class is made up of people who possess ritual author-
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ity, such as traditional healers, rainmakers and priests of traditional 
cults. The proclamations of these agents of supernatural forces are 
believed to be derived from supernaturally supported traditions (Fisiy 
1988: 265). An example is the communication between the ancestors 
and the gods of the land to assure the sanctity of the community, as 
illustrated with the case of an earth tremor in the introduction of this 
chapter. The third class consists of the ones who execute legal authori-
ty and were employed in the use of force.  
Among the various authoritative bodies of the palace, the Fon had 
a separate and supreme status. The rulers could execute the various 
moral, ritual and legal powers but always relied on the mythical and 
ritual support of the gods to maintain their political supremacy. These 
core beliefs that underpinned the concept of justice in the Grassfields 
were aimed at enhancing human solidarity and peaceful co-existence 
between community members (ibid: 264). The importance of eradicat-
ing pollution and explaining misfortune was therefore an efficient 
means of social control. Nevertheless, the different classes cannot 
strictly be divided along the lines of these categories, because in reali-
ty they were much more blurred. In fact, in the eighteenth century – 
even though the Fons ranked highest – their judicial powers were very 
limited. The removal of pollution, settling of disputes or repression in 
the village were often vested in the regulatory societies. The Fon was 
never directly involved in matters concerning pollution, because he 
belonged to the opposite pole of the human society, namely that of 
regeneration and blessing. The Fon embodied society because he 
formed the alliance between lineages and clans, the social rules and 
norms, and he was in contact with the ancestors (Warnier 1982: 62). 
Whereas natural disasters were associated with pollution, the Fon 
warranted the prosperity of the community. This indicates that the 
power of the Fon was by and large invested in his spiritual signifi-
cance and divine status. However, it should be emphasized that pat-
terns of authority were a complex web of power relationships that 
blurred the distinctions of moral, ritual and legal authority (Fisiy 
1988). Firiy writes about the sanctity and spirituality of the institution 
of the Fon:  
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The founding of most of the chiefdoms (in the Bamenda Grassfields) is 
based on a myth of origin that tended to confer temporal power on those 
repositories of traditional authority. For the Fon, the source of legitimacy 
is shrouded in myth and ritual orderings, which give a spiritual content to 
the exercise of his authority. This is because the lineage through which 
the myth was initially transmitted had contact with the deities and ances-
tors (Fisiy 1992: 212).  
This discussion of the role of the chiefs, and the ‘rootedness’ of 
their power in historical perspective, is presented here to gain a better 
insight into how we should look at certain continuities and discontinu-
ities in the patterns of power that are characteristic for the Grassfields. 
It is, however, very difficult to speak of pre-colonial versus post-
colonial chiefdoms in a dichotomist way, because the chiefdoms have 
always been developing and adapting to changes in a dynamic way. 
By several scholars it has been stressed that the stock of institutions 
and beliefs are probably very old (from several centuries to a couple 
of millennia), considering the fact that they are widely shared amongst 
Grassfields chiefdoms. Nevertheless, the most drastic and far-reaching 
transformation that had an impact upon the power and institution of 
the Fon happened in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries during 
colonial rule. In the following section, some of these deep transfor-
mations will be highlighted in order to come to a better understanding 
of how and to what extent the present-day power of the Fons is an-
chored in society. 
The Fons in the colonial state 
As is well known in the field of African Studies, all colonial powers 
made use of chiefs or ‘traditional’ rulers to govern their subjects. In 
Africa, the interaction of local patterns of organisation and new rela-
tions of authority, imposed by the colonial and post-colonial state, 
defined if and to what extent ‘traditional’ chiefs could maintain their 
authority at the local level (Van Binsbergen & Geschiere 1985, in 
Geschiere 1996: 308). This means that the colonial encounter had 
different impacts upon the (political) structure of societies across dif-
ferent regions because both parties played a role in the development 
and establishment of new patterns of power. According to Deschamps, 
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the colonial division between the former British ideology of indirect 
rule and French idea of ‘assimilation’ is of limited value in the under-
standing of the differences between regions and should therefore be 
analysed in a longer historical perspective (Deschamps 1963, in Ges-
chiere 1996: 307). The influence of the European invasion in African 
countries entailed major changes concerning the role of chiefs and the 
extent to which they can be considered ‘real traditional’ chiefs. With 
the rising awareness in academia that in Africa a large part of ‘tradi-
tional practices’ was in fact an ‘invention of tradition’, the notion of 
tradition underwent major paradigm shifts. The concept of tradition 
for a long time implied a pre-colonial and static character, while more 
recent studies clearly adhere to a more flexible and evolutionary ap-
proach. On the other side of the spectrum, the idea can be found that 
everything that is traditional was in fact an invention that became a 
creation of the colonial encounter (see Ranger 1993).  
Cameroon inhabits interesting variations between different regions. 
In the Northwest province, which was consequently former German 
and British territory, chieftaincy has a long history. In the West and 
Northwest province, chiefs were successful in consolidating their 
power and position during colonial times. In the coastal areas several 
chiefs took advantage of the European trade and competed among 
themselves for expansion. Early colonial administrators saw African 
societies as tribal units that were held together by ‘primitive’ and im-
mutable traditions. In the Grassfields, as happened in other African 
countries, the Germans and the British tried to regroup different chief-
doms into larger administrative units. One of the strategies to rule over 
their subjects was to create new hierarchies amongst the Fons and to 
enforce paramountcy upon the powerful ones. In practice, some Fons 
embraced the new opportunities to expand their power. Many Fons 
responded by claiming long-standing supremacy over their neigh-
bours, which evoked counter-claims by other Fondoms. These new 
rivalries contributed for a large part in obscuring the nature of pre-
colonial inter-chiefdom relations (Warnier 1982: 71). These hierar-
chies of different ranks among the Fons are still present in Bamenda. 
There exist five so-called first-class rulers, or paramount chiefs 
(Mankon, Bafut, Bali, Nso and Kom), and a dozen of secondary and 
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tertiary ranking chiefs. During ceremonial events, where all the Fons 
group together, the hierarchies are strongly felt and become visible in 
social interaction and ritual moments. 
In Cameroon, it was both the German and British colonial adminis-
trators who made use of the traditional rulers for administrative terri-
torial purposes (Talla 1997: 69). The colonial administrators parti-
tioned the Grassfields into different ‘tribes’ that were all supposed to 
have perpetuated distinct language, specific customs and traditions of 
origins in a timeless and immutable environment. Economic and soci-
opolitical interdependencies between different groups were disregard-
ed by the Europeans to a great extent. Even though from the 1930s 
onwards, scholars and colonial administrators adapted a more subtle 
approach to such phenomena, nowadays there are clear reminiscences 
of notions of a ‘tribal myth’ (ibid). Another important change that 
came along with the colonial influence, and which had an impact upon 
the constitution of the power of the Fons in the Grassfields, was that 
they were forced into a judicial role. The British created native courts, 
the Fons had to act as judges: a role that previously was fulfilled by 
lineage heads or councillors. Warnier and Nkwi stress that before the 
colonial conquest the Fons had little, if any judicial role. The Fons 
were only consulted in case of serious conflicts, or crimes that threat-
ened the whole community that could not be solved by the lower-
ranking ‘conflict-settlement’ assemblies (Warnier & Nwki 1982: 68). 
The judicial role that was attributed to the Fons definitely gave their 
power a different character, but there were other events in the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries that enhanced institutional changes in 
the Fondoms. The most significant changes were influenced by the 
penetration of northern people into the Grassfields and the increasing 
involvement in coastal trade networks. 
Climate change and its discursive ‘compatibility’ 
with Grassfields’ cosmologies 
Considering the drastic institutional changes that happened in the 
twentieth century, an important question arises in this context, namely 
whether chiefs still have a role to play in recent political changes on 
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the African continent. Geschiere et al. argue that there is no unambig-
uous answer to this question, since the evolution of chieftaincies, and 
their relation and reactions to the colonial and post-colonial state have 
followed varying trajectories (Geschiere 1996: 307). With varying 
trajectories Geschiere refers to the above-mentioned ‘traditionality’ of 
chieftaincies, which in many cases in Africa was in fact a colonial 
construct. There are clear examples that make the sharp opposition of, 
on the one hand, ‘real’ traditional chieftaincies as firmly rooted in 
society and, on the other, chieftaincies as colonial constructs and thus 
more transitory, ungrounded. He suggests that a good indication of 
how firm rulers’ authority is anchored in society is the degree to 
which rulers have some sort of control over the occult forces or, in 
other words, over witchcraft and sorcery (ibid: 308). Especially in the 
case of Cameroon, this is not an arbitrary indicator. Considering peo-
ples’ general interpretations of misfortune, and the way radio and TV 
shows and newspapers in Bamenda play a part in disseminating mes-
sages about witchcraft and malice, there are good reasons to believe 
that there is a strong obsession with controlling witchcraft. It is omni-
present in people’s understanding of events with an indeterminate 
meaning, as was most often the case with the occurrence of natural 
disasters. Each unique and unusual occasion – either fortunate or un-
fortunate – seems most likely to be ascribed to witchcraft. In those 
instances the Fons are expected to remove the polluting forces in order 
to regenerate society and to act as ‘moral mediators’.  
Even though this suggests that the ritual authority of the Fons 
comprises considerable power in society, this does not necessarily 
mean that traditional authorities have ‘traditional’ roots, because the 
‘traditionality’ of authorities in Africa is highly variable. Put different-
ly, it is not so much the traditionality of the chiefs’ power that is at 
stake here, since there are many historical pitfalls that have distorted 
this image, but rather the way their power has developed and adapted 
to sociopolitical changes. Most chieftaincies in the Northwestern 
Grassfields were successful in incorporating the new politico-
economic changes that encompassed colonial rule. There exists in 
general a consensus amongst scholars that the institution of the Fon 
still holds a considerable spiritual and political power in the present 
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day societies of the Grassfields, though certain elements are weaken-
ing their grip on the people (see for example Talla 1997; Geschiere 
1996). Although the power of the Fons is engrained in religious belief 
and traditions, the chiefs’ authority has always been subject to various 
checks and balances. The chief is both responsible for and accountable 
to his people (Fisiy 1992). During my fieldwork it appeared to me that 
the Fondoms today still fulfil an important moral function as a means 
of social control, an observation which was underlined by Talla 
(1997) and Geschiere (1996). But there were also clear examples and 
indicators that the political authority of some of the Fons is being 
questioned by the population, especially when it comes down to the 
position they occupy in national politics.2 Chiefly power has recently 
been challenged by at least two important developments: first, the 
emergence of a wealthy and knowledgeable elite who wanted to have 
a greater say in local community affairs. To cope with these compet-
ing sources of power the Fons have incorporated this elite into local 
authority structures, which has resulted in a marginalization of mem-
bers of ‘traditional’ authorities. A second influential development was 
that in 1977 the Fons were promulgated to be auxiliaries of the admin-
istration. This reduced them to the lower ranks of the local bureaucra-
cy (Fisiy 1992). The political authority of the Fon has thus been sub-
ject to major changes and has eroded to a large extent in the wake of 
the post-colonial state. However, as stated before, whereas at the ad-
ministrative level the chiefs were left with very little influence, much 
of their moral and spiritual power has remained. 
In the previous sections it was argued that witchcraft can possibly 
serve as a fruitful indicator in understanding how the power of the 
chiefs is rooted in society, and how they succeed in maintaining their 
power. In this context Geschiere (1990, 1996, 1998) and the Co-
maroffs (1993) emphasize that the occupation with witchcraft in many 
parts of present-day Africa (and also in parts of East Asia) is not to be 
seen as some sort of traditional residue but rather as something that is 
                                                          
2  For a detailed description of Bamenda’s position in national politics and 
the Anglophone problem, see Neoliberal bandwagonism: Civil society 
and the politics of belonging in Anglophone Cameroon’ (Piet Konings 
2009). 
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particularly present in modern spheres of society (Geschiere 1998: 
811). Throughout the whole continent there seems to be a growing 
panic concerning the thriving obsession with witchcraft. Rowlands 
and Warnier even state that sorcery lies at the heart of the state-
building process in Cameroon (Rowlands & Warnier 1988: 119). In an 
increasingly globalized world, in which the ‘global’ and the ‘local’ are 
becoming more and more entangled, new challenges of ‘indeterminate 
meaning’ (Weller 1994) at the local level seem to go hand in hand 
with new forms of witchcraft (and thus new forms of power). While 
scholars approached witchcraft for a long time as something to be 
‘traditional’, since the 1990s an increasing interest in the modern dy-
namics of witchcraft in relation to politics, new forms of wealth and 
the enchantments of modernity can be observed.3 Geschiere links mo-
dernity and novel forms of witchcraft in the case of South and West 
Cameroon in the following way: 
The power of such discourses on occult forces is that they relate people’s 
fascination with the open-endedness of global flows to the search for 
fixed orientation points and identities. Both witchcraft and spirit cults ex-
hibit a surprising capacity for combining the local and the global. Both al-
so have specific implications for the ways in which people try to deal with 
modernity’s challenge (Geschiere 1998: 811). 
We should be careful here to see new forms of witchcraft as merely 
a continuation of ‘traditional’ discourses that make sense of changes 
that are encompassed in modernity’s challenges. This would imply 
static and systematic local conceptualizations about witchcraft and 
malice, which are in reality much more fluid, dynamic and open to re-
interpretation (ibid). What is interesting here is to question what these 
challenges and new forms of fear entail at the local level, and how 
these lead to a search for new forms of protection. It has become clear 
that the Fon and the secret societies are in charge of accusing the 
witches and removing the polluted forces from society. A new, more 
modern and often aggressive type of witchcraft can be observed that 
has led, in some parts of Cameroon, to condemn ‘witches’ to heavy 
sentences in jail (Fisiy & Geschiere 1990). This study however, is not 
                                                          
3  See for example: Comaroff & Comaroff 1993, 1998; Fisiy 1990, and 
Geschiere 1990, 1996, 1998; Niehaus 2005. 
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about witchcraft per se, but it deals with broader issues surrounding 
the notions of threat, misfortune and disaster. The aim of elaborating 
briefly on witchcraft, modernity and globalization is to demonstrate 
how the proliferation of local discourses has been reinforced by the 
encounter of global and local discourses. A leading question here is 
how to relate global change to the daily realities of people in the 
Bamenda Grassfields. In the next chapter, I wish to demonstrate that 
at a deeper level, parallel dynamics with the ‘witchcraft craze’ – here 
understood as a re-interpretation of local discourses on the occult – 
can be observed with the ‘arrival’ and construction of a new threat, 
namely climate change and global warming. In other words, global 
climate-change discourses possibly create new spaces for reinterpreta-
tion (or reinvention) of local discourses. 
In this section I showed how the ritual, moral and political power 
of the Fons have been subject to long-term and short-term historical 
changes. For most Grassfields chiefdoms we can state that they were 
successful in consolidating their power during the European invasion 
and colonial conquest. Even though the chiefdoms have been subject 
to drastic institutional changes, the Fons have retained much of their 
ritual and moral authority. This is not to say that their power was en-
grained in a fixed and timeless set of beliefs, but rather the contrary. 
General principles of morality were constituted in an ideological 
framework that was amendable to changing times. A basic feature that 
was shared by all Fondoms is the core belief that pollution is danger-
ous and should be removed from society by holders of spiritual power. 
Whereas the ‘traditionality’ of chiefs is somewhat misleading in terms 
of how their power is rooted in society, an alternative indicator has 
been proposed by Geschiere and Fisiy, namely the degree to which 
they have control over witchcraft. In the first part of this chapter a 
brief outline has been provided to shed light on how certain continui-
ties and discontinuities can be observed over the years, and which 
have shaped present-day patterns of power in the Bamenda Grass-
fields. It has been shown that witchcraft, as an allegedly traditional 
discourse, has modernizing capacities, for it allows for many different 
interpretations, a phenomenon that Weller has called ‘the power of 
indeterminate meaning’. In chapter five, we will see that a similar 
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dynamic can be discerned concerning climate-change discourses. Part 
two of this chapter will build upon the historical contextualization to 
demonstrate how the Fons currently exploit global climate-change 
discourses – as being part and parcel of modernity’s challenge – to 




Climate change as a possible new framework 
to redefine local discourses and symbolic power 
My first encounter with a Fon was fairly fascinating. Sitting in a bank 
office with an authoritative, French-speaking account manager, the 
transaction promptly was interrupted when a crew of five people en-
tered the room. Before I realized what was happening, two other cus-
tomers and the bank representative lifted themselves up and clapped 
their hands twice. A young man, carrying a thick carpet under his arm, 
placed it on the chair next to me. An older and seemingly powerful 
man, dressed in a traditional gown, then occupied the seat. The older 
man gave me an imposing but friendly look, which I responded to 
with a smile. The bank representative requested me to wait, because, 
as he stated, ‘this is something of more importance’. The younger 
man, who turned out to be his son, clarified that the older man sitting 
next to me, was the Fon of Mendankwe. As it is uncommon and most-
ly inappropriate for a man of his status to speak directly to a common-
er like me, he commanded his son to invite me to his palace. I an-
swered his hospitality by visiting him and his family on a frequent 
basis, which enabled me to become more familiar with the lives of a 
royal family. Moreover, I gained insight into his understanding of 
climate change and his proposed solutions to combat it.  
This encounter took place before the ‘climate-change craze’ that 
followed when the Fons jointly engaged themselves in the fight 
against climate change in the organisation, which they called 
CAMTRACC. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, this 
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organisation was founded on 13 November 2009, and has its seat in 
Bamenda. From November onwards, I started to follow the pathways 
of those traditional rulers who were mostly engaged in the organisa-
tion of CAMTRACC.4 In the media this event received much atten-
tion. In the newspapers, on the radio and on national TV, ‘global 
warming and cultural heritage’ soon became a hot topic for discus-
sion. Although CAMTRACC was set up as a unity with general solu-
tions, and common rules to surmount ‘one of the toughest challenges 
facing humankind today’, during individual interviews with the Fons 
it appeared to me that each Fon had his own idea about the implemen-
tation. This meant that in different palaces, other (traditional) injunc-
tions and sanctions were set up in view of this ‘global fight’. This 
chapter is concerned with the main and common objectives of 
CAMTRACC. Inspired by Philips and Jorgensen (2004) I will use 
three focal points as a tool in the following analysis, namely a) what is 
being said about climate change, or the claims themselves; b) what is 
the (collective) identity and interests of the Fons and/or NGOs, or 
claims-makers; and c) the arenas of public discourse, or the claims-
making process. Important questions to be addressed here are: How is 
climate change communicated? What is the rhetoric of claim-making? 
How is climate change presented so to persuade the audience? Who 
has been addressed? And how do the nature of the claim (e.g. the 
gravity of the threat of climate change) and the identity of the claims-
makers (e.g. the supernatural authority of the Fon) affect the audi-
ence’s response? The following analysis is grounded upon Foucault’s 
idea (1972) that ‘truth’ is embedded in, and produced by systems of 
power. 
Cameroon traditional rulers against climate change 
The main objective of CAMTRACC, according to the Fon of Guzang 
(His Royal Highness Fon Gwan Mbanyamsig III), is ‘to call on all 
traditional rulers, who are beholders of indigenous knowledge and are 
                                                          
4  Among the Fons who played a crucial role in the organisation of 
CAMTRACC were the Fon of Guzang, Baba I, Mankon, Nsohngwa and 
Bali.   
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proven to be custodians of ecological heritage, to stop the constant 
destruction of the climate’. The Fon emphasized that the whole idea 
behind it is to strengthen and consolidate indigenous knowledge in the 
fight against climate change (The Pilot Newspaper, 15-12-2009). As a 
non-profit organisation, the Fons of the Northwest region – who were 
pioneers in engaging themselves actively in climate-change matters – 
wish to make it a nationwide and even continent-wide union. The first 
contacts with the paramount ruler of Tamale (Northern Ghana) at this 
point in the launching had already been made. The Fon of Guzang 
stated: ‘The voices of the Fons, the natural rulers, have not yet been 
heard. All the traditional rulers throughout the African continent have 
to put their hands on deck to rescue the situation’.5 From the outset 
there were about five traditional rulers involved in the organisation – 
amongst whom the paramount rulers of Mankon and Bali – under the 
presidency of the Fon of Guzang.6 At the second meeting that was 
held in the palace of Bali in January 2010, there were more than twen-
ty rulers of the Northwest region engaged, and in February during the 
meeting in Nkambe more than fifty Fons were present. An increasing 
number of NGOs, government institutions and researchers like myself 
showed interest, and the event reached national television and was 
broadcasted on CRTV and STV. 
The joint fight against climate change by the traditional rulers in 
the formation of CAMTRACC has resulted in a whole range of new 
discursive practices and, inevitably, in new forms of authoritative 
struggle. In the aftermath of the launching of this organisation, ru-
mours spread in the media that CAMTRACC was in fact set up to 
replace the Northwest Fons Union (NOWEFU). This union presuma-
bly had lost much of its credibility and political power since the intro-
duction of multiparty politics by Paul Biya’s regime in the 1990s, 
which resulted in growing internal tensions among the rulers.7 In fact, 
                                                          
5  Interview with the Fon of Guzang. 
6  Other rulers who were involved from the beginning were the Fon of Baba 
I, Aghem, Nkor and Nsohngwa. 
7  In 2008 the elections of NOWEFU caused irreparable damage to the or-
ganisations’ image, when the results of the Fons, who were to be chosen 
to occupy particular positions, were already announced before the elec-
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the initial idea to engage the traditional rulers in this global issue came 
from a representative of the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) 
of the United Nations, who has been trained in indigenous knowledge. 
In view of the upcoming Copenhagen summit on climate change in 
December 2009, and with his strong conviction of the importance of 
indigenous knowledge in tackling this global environmental problem, 
the idea of CAMTRACC was born. After the launching, the organisa-
tion was left in the hands of the Fon of Guzang. It is at least remarka-
ble that the Fon of Guzang – who was one of the opponents of the first 
vice-president of NOWEFU at that time – declared himself president 
of CAMTRACC. This could be a possible reason for the rumours that 
CAMTRACC was set up to replace NOWEFU, and thus a means for 
other Fons to strengthen their power. 
As representatives of the ‘local’ within the ‘global’ – here again 
used as analytical constructs rather than empirical realities – the tradi-
tional rulers have a special role to play as translators and intermediar-
ies of two worlds. As described in section 4.4, the Fons have a history 
of serving as intermediaries for the Europeans to administer newly 
conquered territories in the colonial state and of being auxiliaries of 
the administration in the post-colonial state up to the present day.  
Although the Fons do not have much political power (in its narrow 
understanding of the term) it is their moral and spiritual power that 
enables them to keep their grip over their people, and to deal with 
external influences. Since the Fon is considered to be of divine status, 
he is respected and listened to by his people. Over the last decennia 
the traditional rulers for this reason have formed an important target 
group for international donors to communicate seemingly urgent mes-
sages at the local level. For example, in the 1990s INGOs and NGOs 
targeted the rulers in order to sensitize the broader population about 
the HIV/AIDS pandemic. In a similar vein, the Fons currently play an 
essential role in making people aware of climate change in order to 
participate in this ‘global fight’, or to ‘think globally and act locally’. 
                                                          
tions were held. It was said that the majority of the Fons had been manip-
ulated to support the chosen few (The Post newspaper, 23 November 
2008. See:  
http://allafrica.com/stories/200811241411.html).   
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This is not to say that the Fons are merely recipients of global dis-
courses who disseminate the message and inform the population; they 
are also interlocutors. They have their own messages to relay back to 
the government and the international organisations. The Fons are 
aware of their historical role as ‘instruments’ of the administration, 
and the Fon of Guzang takes a clear stance in this regard. Speaking to 
the press he lamented that: 
‘The Fons, who used to be at the forefront of whatever happened in the 
past, were later on relegated to the back seats. This time around the tradi-
tional rulers have decided not to stay back anymore, especially with this 
issue of climate change.’ It is therefore that he promised to preach the 
gospel of climate change to their colleagues and subjects (Life Time 
Newspaper, 14 December 2009).   
This statement demonstrates that the rulers have something to say, 
and they insist that their voice be heard. What I will attempt to show 
in the following section is that global discourses lead to a reinterpreta-
tion and novel appreciation of local discourses, that it is not just a top-
down movement, but that in fact the climate is also being translated 
‘back’. The question here is not so much to what extent their voices 
are being heard in international circles but rather how the rulers’ trans-
lation of the climate leads to new challenges at the local level. In order 
to gain a more profound insight into how discourses on climate 
change are manifested in the Grassfields’ society through the rulers, 
the CAMTRACC meeting, and the inaugural speech that was present-
ed by the Fon of Guzang, will now be examined. 
The meeting began with fragments of the documentary called 
Home, by Yann Arthus-Bertrand. The beginning of the documentary 
shows breath-taking images of our planet, Mother Earth and her un-
touched landscapes with pristine nature, which is presented as our 
home. In the field of environmental sociology this portrait could be 
classified as a poetic discourse (Herndl & Brown 1996), that is, a nar-
rative about nature, which emphasizes the beauty and spirituality of 
Mother Earth. From showing untamed nature, the documentary drasti-
cally shifts to showing the development of mankind from the inven-
tion of agriculture, to pictures of oil, cars, urbanization and mass con-
sumption. The industrialized era that in the West entailed the external-
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ization of man from nature is depicted as the era (and area) that en-
gendered global warming. Next, we see pictures of Dubai, typified as 
the ‘culmination of modernity’: 
(Dubai) It is the totem to total modernity that never fails to amaze the 
world. Dubai is the beacon for all the world’s money. Nothing seems fur-
ther removed from nature than Dubai, although nothing depends on nature 
more than Dubai. Dubai is the sort of culmination of the Western model. 
We haven’t understood that we are depleting what nature provides 
(Fragment from the documentary Home). 
While the images of Dubai pass by on the screen, I notice the ex-
pression of the traditional ruler sitting next to me who seems to be 
highly impressed. He asks me if the place where I come from is like 
Dubai: ‘There are no trees over there? I would not like to live in a 
place without trees, I wouldn’t. Is that development? Aren’t that mod-
el houses?’ The documentary set the tone for the discourse that then 
follows. The first speaker that afternoon was the Fon of Guzang. His 
inaugural speech will now be discussed. 
Bamenda, 13 November 2009 
HRH Fon Gwan Mbayamsig II  
Your royal highnesses, honourable members of parliament, queens for 
peace, ladies and gentlemen. I will start with this saying: ‘Only a madman 
will sleep with his roof on fire’. We are here today because the world is at 
risk of extinction. We are here today because our forefathers are not at 
rest in the world beyond. We are here today because the future of our 
children and our children’s children is bleak. We are here today because 
of the fear of the unknown. We are here today because we know the 
world is not an inheritance from our parents, but a borrowed good from 
our children that one day we have to refund. My dear people, my chil-
dren, your royal highnesses present; thank you for being present and for 
answering our call on a very short notice. That shows the importance you 
attach to the topical issue of today: global warming, climate change.  
The reason for this gathering is to look into one of the toughest chal-
lenges facing human kind today. In yesteryears, mankind has surmounted 
many challenges; from small pox, chicken pox, mad cow disease, the 
Ebola virus and what have you. Today, we are conquering terrorism, 
weapons of mass destruction, H1N1 and HIV-Aids. We conquered the 
cold war, and this week we are celebrating the fall of the Berlin wall that 
marked the end of the cold war 20 years ago. But none of those challeng-
es have put the world at risk like the phenomenon of climate change to-
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day. Climate change – which is caused by land use and land use changes 
– is our greatest preoccupation today. Nobody worth the ‘salt’ on this 
world can be indifferent to this global quagmire. Global warming is on 
the lips of all politicians, academics, development experts, journalists, en-
vironmentalists, diplomats, in fact anybody that matters to a society. We 
have not yet heard the voice of the traditional rulers. 
A first observation that can be made is the accentuated urgency and 
gravity of the matter. Climate change is on the list of all the so-called 
‘securitized’ issues, like the war on terrorism and HIV/Aids. The em-
phasis on both the urgency and the gravity, with terms such as ‘the 
world is at risk of extinction’ or ‘fear of the unknown’, suggest an 
apocalypse. This is however, not much different from Western dis-
courses about global warming. We can think of many speech acts – 
for instance, Al Gore’s movie An Inconvenient Truth, or Leonardo 
DiCaprio’s 11th Hour – in which similar fear-evoking techniques to 
convince the audience have been used. More remarkable is the hybrid-
ism of the discourse. The Fon began with a more ‘traditional’ dis-
course, speaking about the inheritance of the earth from our forefa-
thers, while he is at the same time ‘agreeing’ with the Western (scien-
tific) construction of the problem. Whereas the international commu-
nity is asking the rulers and the population to accept their responsibil-
ity, in their turn, the Fons embrace the opportunity to strengthen their 
power by referring to the importance of their traditions. It becomes 
clear the Fon is attempting to convince the audience that the tradition-
al rulers should be put on the agenda too. The CAMTRACC initiative 
is a clear example of how the rulers assume they have a part to play in 
the call for a global social transformation. The increasing prominence 
of global climate-change discourses in Bamenda has triggered them to 
assert their voices, or in more powerful terms, to grab a piece of the 
‘hegemonic pie’. The inherited symbolic power they have within soci-
ety – which is anchored in the socio-cosmic view that the Fons are the 
centre of social life – enables them to create a legitimate vision of the 
world in the Grassfields. In other words, the Fons are to a large extent 
in possession of the truth. We should keep in mind that truth is here 
understood as a discursive construction, which is constituted by dif-
ferent regimes of knowledge that determine what is true and false 
(Foucault 1972). In the following fragment we can see that the foun-
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dation for the construction of truth and reality is derived from the past, 
and that references to traditional values are made:  
When I look at all this, people, and there is a chance of a better tomorrow, 
it brings to me a lot of mixed feelings. In the days of our forefathers, we 
applied our indigenous and traditional knowledge and know-how to sur-
mount many natural disasters. With the advice, culture and leadership of 
the traditional rulers we adapted our life style to suit the demands of na-
ture. We implored with the rainmakers to bring forth rain in times of se-
vere dryness, we called on the traditional healers to act in terms of health 
crisis and pleaded with mother nature when our general weather condi-
tions frowned on us. You will agree with me that traditional rulers played 
a very vital role in the conservation of our natural ecosystems. You will 
agree with me equally that our culture and tradition is directly linked to 
nature and the soul of our culture is our natural environment. 
[This is the] reason why most of our traditional sacrifices are done not 
in the house but in nature. Our culture and indigenous knowledge – inher-
ited from our ancestors – who taught us that our natural environment with 
all the trees and bushes and animals is not a resource that we should use at 
our will to satisfy our needs at all costs, but the environment is part of us. 
We, our relationship is symbiotic and complementary, one cannot survive 
without the other. Because of this complementary relation we are not to 
use our natural environment abusively. We should apply our sustainabil-
ity instinct whenever we have to cut down a tree, or use an animal as a re-
source for whatever purpose. Example: our culture taught us that we are 
not to cut down any young tree – no matter the size, we are not to kill fe-
male animals with the capacity to reproduce for any reason. We should 
not harvest the young little plants’ leaves for it is that one to regenerate. 
And we can go on, and on and on and on, to portray the indigenous 
knowledge that protects the environment.   
My dear children, your royal highnesses, my dear people, we are here 
today to look back, undertake checks and balances at the way the world 
has been using this nature that our very existence depends on, to ask our-
selves whether we have followed the rules of our forefathers. It is said by 
the wise and I quote: ‘when a man loses his culture he is a lost man’. We 
are here today because of the fear of losing our culture and indigenous 
knowledge in protecting this precious gift of life and nature left to us by 
our parents, to pass to our children and our children’s children. Tradition-
al rulers are the custodians of our culture, and natural heritage, the guar-
antors of our traditional knowledge and the fathers of our land. That is 
why the Cameroon traditional rulers have gathered to join this challeng-
ing fight against climate change. 
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In between the lines a strong societal critique aimed at the industri-
alized countries, who caused climate change to happen, can be read. 
The meta-message here speaks about the fact that modernity has come 
with its own strings. By emphasizing the eroding culture, the im-
portance of reinstalling traditional values, and connecting this to the 
fight against climate change, the text is a way of saying to the West: 
We were right and You were wrong, look what you have done to the 
world! I remember a comment made by the Fon of Guzang during the 
meeting that illustrates his critique of modernity: ‘Modernity has mis-
used the planet, therefore we should go back to our traditions’. More-
over, the Fon lashed out at the western world for being responsible for 
high carbon emissions while innocent Africans suffer. He said that 
‘the effects of climate change are devastating to Africa, though the 
continent is paying a price for a crime it did not commit’. He therefore 
demanded ‘climate justice’, or adequate payments to compensate the 
African countries (Eden Newspaper, 25 November 2009). This cri-
tique provides the rulers with good grounds to plea for going ‘back’ to 
traditions and using indigenous knowledge and ancestral wisdom. 
Thus, apart from the fact that the rulers have a message for their own 
localities, they similarly address the international community and the 
western world. On the one hand, the rulers appropriate the message, 
and, on the other, they have to find their own ways to make sense of 
something that is perceived to be ‘one of the biggest challenges ever 
occurred to man, a life threatening monster’ (Life Time Newspaper, 14 
December 2009).  
Since the Fons lost much of their power during the colonial period, 
in their eyes modernity is tantamount to the degeneration of their tra-
ditional values and culture. The threat of climate change – as a tangi-
ble expression of this – is all the more confirmation of the rulers’ cri-
tique of the West. During the second meeting of CAMTRACC the 
Fon of Guzang exclaimed that with modern society the Fons have 
been having it difficult, as some of their traditional roles have been 
taken up by local administrators, such as the police and the gen-
darmes. He disclosed that the Fons have been dragged to court by 
their subjects for placing injunctions on their land. With the problem 
of climate change, the Fon of Guzang said it is time that the local ad-
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ministrators collaborate with the traditional rulers (The Chronicle, 18 
January 2010). It should be mentioned that the new political struggle 
to be in power of the discourse on climate change, does not necessari-
ly discard the actual belief behind their action. In other words, the 
rulers’ opportunistic motive to embrace climate-change discourses, 
and strengthen their traditional belief system and their role herein, 
could very well be entrenched in a sincere conviction of their role as 
being noble defenders of nature. It is, however, very difficult to an-
swer this question. Yet to understand the dynamics of power, the rul-
ers’ participation should be viewed in historical perspective. 
An essential element that is pointed out in this text is the comple-
mentary relationship between man and nature that is characteristic of 
the Grassfielders’ culture, in which man has a subordinate position 
vis-à-vis nature. In previous times, it was the traditional rulers with 
their cultural leadership who guided society to adapt to nature’s de-
mands. It was (and to some extent still is) the rulers who mediated the 
transcendental, explained deviant natural events, and who are assumed 
to be capable of stabilizing the environmental tumult. Natural disasters 
in the Grassfields have always been interpreted as a sign of malevo-
lence and misfortune. In the same way, global warming and climate 
change are here perceived to be a clear sign of misfortune: the world 
has failed to listen to their forefathers, and hence, to the traditional 
rulers. Interestingly enough, in the view of the rulers, if one loses his 
culture he is a lost man, a nobody. Global warming is in this sense 
being equated with globalization, and to losing one’s culture and val-
ues. That is why the Grassfielders have to go back to their traditions, 
obey the rules as prescribed by the ancestors and mediated by the rul-
ers. A clear message here is that the role of traditional rulers is pre-
sented as being indispensible in this new challenge of climate change. 
The suggestion is made again that if the world wants to surmount this 
unprecedented threat, the rulers must be listened to: 
The traditional rulers were supposed to be the first to be consulted when 
the world realized that things were going wrong, and that mother earth 
was against her own children. But behold in a world where moral values 
are fast disappearing, where the culture of people is considered archaic, 
where the wisdom of our ancestors is considered useless, when a foreign 
culture takes precedence of our own, we will not expect any better. No 
Translating back and forth the climate  
155 
doubt mother earth has turned against her own off springs. Or how else 
can we explain that we have thunderstorms and heavy rainfall in Novem-
ber, when we [are] supposed to prepare the soil for tilling. How can we 
explain that on one day we have two seasons? Thunderstorms in the 
morning and sharp dryness in the evening? How can we explain that tem-
peratures vary like never before, how can we explain that landslides and 
floods are killing and damaging property and even our governor can no 
longer live in a house constructed to last forever8?  
How can we explain the drop in honey, and vegetables, and lack of 
natural potable water in our streams? Mother earth is unbalanced and an-
gry, and we all need to act and fast. Traditional rulers have been acting in 
their various localities as individuals, but today we have decided to come 
together to look for a shared vision and a common goal to surmount this 
challenge. CAMTRACC is born out of a necessity to act, it is time we, the 
national leaders of our land, we, the custodians of culture, and carriers of 
indigenous knowledge act and fast. We must act because the world is in 
danger. The streams are drying up, the children lack food, the waters lack 
animals, the rain patterns are changing, plants and animals are confused 
and gestation periods are not longer obeying. CAMTRACC is not a polit-
ical party, it is not a religion and it does not discriminate. This is a group 
set up to support the global fight against climate change and global warm-
ing. It is set up to take the fight back to the people, from the smallest 
hamlets to the biggest cities. CAMTRACC has as a main objective pro-
moting the local initiatives through the use of indigenous knowledge, to 
combat climate change and related challenges. We intend to join our ef-
forts without the restraint of the civil society, international development 
organs and individuals to conquer the challenges of climate change.  
We intend to do this by reviewing the world of indigenous knowledge 
inherited from our forefathers, looking at how we can apply it today and 
we’ll use it. Educate and sensitize our people on good practices and habits 
that will mitigate the effects of climate change. Introduce activities that 
will bring back our natural environment, promoting the use of eco friend-
ly methods in cultivation, and install checks and balances measures the 
alert of any drastic changes. We will use measures like protecting and ex-
tending our sacred groves and sacred forests. Abolition of hunting certain 
species and in certain sites. Intensifying community participation climate 
                                                          
8  In the month of August 2009 the governor’s residence collapsed due to a 
heavy landslide. Immediately in the media it was stated as being caused 
by climate change. Other explanations, based on scientific research, de-
clared that it was caused partly by climate change and partly by infra-
structural works that destabilized the highly saturated soil (report regional 
delegation of environment and nature protection 20 August 2009). At the 
same time, among the population it was said to be caused by witchcraft.  
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change-related activities as a matter of law. Installation of local climate 
change-control committees and observation post around the palaces. De-
signing particular notables in charge of climate change. Recognizing ac-
tive participation in the fight against climate change through traditional ti-
tles and favours. The immediate next step from here will be to educate 
and sensitize the other traditional rulers nationwide and launch the pro-
gram at the national scale. From there we will work with Alhadji Dr Ou-
marou Salifou the paramount ruler of Tamale, Northern Ghana – who is 
spokesman of the sacred groves to combat climate change. You all know 
the status that Ghana occupies now in Africa.  
My dear people, your royal highnesses, the fight against climate 
change is a collective responsibility. No one man or group of people can 
succeed. I call for all of us here present to take it as a personal duty to win 
this battle. Of course, as rulers we have to serve and see our people 
through sensitization. In line with professor Francis Tjema of blessed 
memory, initiator of Saboga (botanical garden) I say: ‘climate change, a 
war we must win’. 
Ladies and gentleman, thank you for your kind attention. 
HRH Fon Gwan Mbayamsig II, President of Cameroon traditional 
rulers against climate change 
From this fragment it can be derived that in the Fon’s understand-
ing climate change is clearly a morally loaded sign. It is seen as a 
message of misfortune that is about the degeneration of traditional 
values and, with this, also about the eroding power of the rulers in 
society. The last part of this speech shows a different discursive dy-
namic that has not been discussed before, namely the practical conse-
quences of discourses, or discourses as a social practice. As stated in 
chapter three, dealing with climate change is as much a matter of per-
ception and discourses as it has to do with the so-called ‘objective’ 
facts. This means that the construction of the problem of climate 
change is as much a reality as the biophysical aspects of global warm-
ing and climate change. What is important in the analysis of this text 
is, therefore, to gain more insight into how a globally constructed 
problem has ‘real’ consequences at the local level in the Bamenda 
Grassfields. This is not to say that discourses are not real, quite the 
contrary, but that the power of discourses lies also in the action or 
social practice that follows. The main aim of critical discourse analy-
sis is to explore the relationship between language use and social prac-
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tice, which are assumed to be inherently linked. The proposed solu-
tions by the Fons are a clear example of how the so called truth effects 
of global climate-change discourses lead to rather far-reaching meth-
ods at the local level to fight the degradation of the planet.  
In brief, the suggested ideas are to abandon the practice of ankara, 
shift to eco-friendly agricultural practices and prohibit the cutting 
down of trees. In order to achieve these goals the population needs to 
be sensitized. Apart from this awareness campaign, the traditional 
injunctions will be invigorated. This means that the palaces, and pal-
ace-related power will become more prominent in society. More con-
cretely, around the palaces newly created ‘climate-change control 
committees’ are going to be installed, which are to be given the power 
to fine the perpetrators of the novel laws that are to be set up to miti-
gate climate change. A remarkable example is the approach of the Fon 
of Mendankwe, who holds a rather radical view upon the issue.  
If the people cut down one tree they need permission and they must re-
plant ten trees. Everybody should plant trees on their farm. If they don’t 
do it I take their land and give it to somebody else who will plant. I work 
for the government and sensitize the population. Climate change is hap-
pening due to us human beings, because there are no trees left. The sacred 
forest has a traditional value and environmental protection. We save cer-
tain species and we worship there. Our ancestors are there that is why it is 
sacred (Interview, Fon of Mendankwe, November 2009). 
Whereas for the international community the solutions proposed by 
the Fons – suggested by international organisations and NGOs – might 
sound like a fruitful and necessary way to combat the effects of global 
warming, one could wonder what this entails for an ordinary farmer 
who has no alternative methods at hand to cultivate his land. In chap-
ter five, another dimension of the translation process will be exam-
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Photo 4.4 Traditional rulers performing a ritual dance to honour the 
traditional ruler of Baba I during the annual palace cele-




















Photo 4.5 The paramount chief HRH Fon of Mankon and HRH Fon 
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Photo 4.6 Bafut palace 
 
 












Believing in climate change –  
a grassroots perspective 
 
Introduction: How access to discourses changes the 
weather 
At the very moment I started writing this chapter, I received a phone 
call from Bamenda. It was Nadine. During the 6 months of my field-
work we became close friends, and I found myself hanging around her 
marketplace on a daily basis. At her marketplace – which is located at 
the junction near my former house – she sells credit, oranges, some 
cigarettes and groundnuts. Every time I passed by her place, she or-
dered me to take a rest under her umbrella: ‘Come and sit down with 
me; you need to rest.’ This custom enabled me to meet friends, learn 
‘small small’ Pidgin, observe what was happening on the street and 
talk to people who wanted to make a phone call, hide from the sun for 
a while, or who just passed by for a chat. These encounters gradually 
gave me insight into one’s concerns, sense of humour, enjoyments, 
but, foremost, into people’s daily talks. Here, just as in the Nether-
lands, the weather and the climate are regularly a popular entry point 
for a discussion. Complaints about excessive heat during the day or 
extreme cold during the night were prominent in the conversations. 
Nadine was speaking to me now on the phone in a very enthusias-
tic tone of voice, ‘I just wanted to greet you. How is the Netherlands? 
How are your friends and family?’ After some time on the phone I ask 
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her how Bamenda was, and suddenly her voice took on a more con-
cerned tone. She started telling me: 
Bamenda is fine, except for the fact that the whole town is covered in 
white powder. It is this climate change we people have over here. We 
don’t know what this is because we have never experienced this before. 
Have you ever seen something like this? It must be this climate change, 
this thing you and everybody is talking about. They tell us over the news 
that we should rub our noses with Vaseline, and that no rain can touch our 
body because it is dangerous. We can no longer use the corn that we 
planted. I am staying home; even today I cannot go to my marketplace 
because the white powder is falling everywhere. My children cannot go to 
school. They tell us that we have to protect our skin and should stay in-
doors as much as possible. But we don’t know what is really happening, 
nobody knows (Phone conversation, April 2010). 
Talking to Nadine brings back memories of being at the market-
place: an ordinary space for people to express and negotiate ideas and 
exchange thoughts; a place where worldviews meet and visions are 
shaped. ‘Bamenda nowadays is too hot’ is a recurrently expressed 
phrase. To most passers-by at this street corner global warming seems 
to be more familiar than the notion of climate change. I remember one 
of the conversations I had with two boys, not older than sixteen, who 
were selling apples. After they greeted me, I asked them how they 
were doing, and they started to speak about the climate: ‘It is just that 
this dry season is becoming too harsh. This place is too hot, it was not 
like this before.’ Considering their age, this idea of a longstanding 
before demonstrates how the past is a construct of the present, thus 
how ‘history is present politics’. In this context, Van Beek argues that 
stories about the climate are some sort of cultural archive that forms 
part of the collective memory, like a collective reminiscence from the 
past (Van Beek 1999). To the question of whether they had an idea 
about a possible cause for this supposedly increasing heat, one of them 
replied: ‘It is this global crisis, they call it global warming. This thing 
that warms up the whole earth. It is not only in Cameroon, it is every-
where. We don’t know what will happen to us.’ Despite the boy seem-
ing satisfied with his explanation for the rising temperatures, what this 
global crisis was actually about remained unclear to both of them.  
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On the phone Nadine continued to speak about the heat, that there 
was too much sun and there were no rains yet: ‘After you left, the 
rains started to fall already early this year, but after the 15th of March 
[when the rainy season is suppose to start] we didn’t see any rain 
again, there is only too much sun. And now we have this white pow-
der which makes us to be afraid.’ The Vanguard Cameroon, an inde-
pendent news source, reported about this white dust as ‘a strange phe-
nomenon of a hazy atmosphere that invades the whole town. [...] 
Bamenda is waking up to the realities of a strange phenomenon that is 
yet to be explained by environmentalists and scientists’.1 In the begin-
ning of March this year, this rare event was witnessed in the extreme 
North of Cameroon, to the extent that flights were cancelled because 
the visibility was highly impaired. Hypothesis from environmental 
scientists range from ‘the collapse of a meteorite from the moon’, to 
‘industrial smog’, to ‘desert storm deposits’. People in Bamenda com-
plain about the irritating effect this ‘white snow’ has on their eyes and 
respiratory tract. According to scientists this substance is therefore 
most likely to be acidic (The Vanguard). Unlike some scientists’ as-
sumptions about outer atmospheric causes, Nadine, and other people 
who gather at her marketplace, explained this mysterious and uniden-
tified happening through the notion of climate change, which for most 
people remained a relatively incomprehensible and abstract claim. 
In his article ‘The end of the climate’ (1999), Van Beek aims to un-
ravel a hidden meta-message in the present-day concerns and fascina-
tions with the climate. According to him, talking about the climate is a 
cultural phenomenon, a discourse that inherently belongs to a society 
and could therefore be analysed as a social discourse. The climate 
forms part and parcel of our group identity: ‘we are the climate’, not 
because the climate has shaped us, but because we see the climate as 
part of our collective identity. We compare our climate discourses 
with the way people speak about the weather and the climate in other 
cultures. Two crucial elements are being raised. First, in terms of the 
comparison to climate-change discourses across different cultures, 
                                                          
1  http://news.vanguardcameroon.com/2010/03/serious-health-problems-
caused-by.html. 
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there is a strong identification between society and the climate: talking 
about the climate is a critique of one’s own society. Secondly, Van 
Beek states that the one who is concerned with the climate has doubts 
about their society’s future, which enables us to analyse current cli-
mate-change discourses in light of a special, end-of-time idea (Van 
Beek 1999). Climate change, while from the outset being a secular 
discourse that derives its authority from scientific claims, in dealing 
with environmental degradation and the earth’s finitude we shall see 
below that such a discourse lends itself fairly easily to incorporation 
into religious language and narratives about endings, including those 
with an apocalyptic character. Important questions arise such as: What 
happens when a society is confronted with rather complicated and 
vigorous notions about a changing climate that are initially construct-
ed outside and imposed upon that society? Does this encounter with 
new climate-change discourses lead to a new form of societal critique? 
How do people make sense of new discourses through their existing 
ones? More specifically, how does a secularized and essentially an-
thropogenic explanation of a changing climate (constructed in the 
West), fuse with predominantly sacred orientations towards climate 
trajectories that are locally constructed? 
This chapter will explore how climate-change discourses manifest 
themselves and are translated by subsistence farmers at the so-called 
grassroots level in Bamenda. The analysis follows local climate-
change discourses along a geographically defined dimension, with, on 
the one hand, farmers who are relatively far away from high profile 
climate-change forums and, on the other, farmers who are part and 
parcel of the global climate-change debate. Besides the geographical 
categorization of grassroots farmers that is adhered to in this chapter, 
there are obviously other related elements that play a role in the way 
people relate to and perceive the climate. Educational background, 
social or political position within society, and profession all play a 
decisive role in understanding and knowing about climate change. 
Among these elements, educational background is a very crucial one, 
as schools are amongst the primary sources that disseminate more 
profound knowledge about geography and the climate. Since levels of 
education are generally higher in urban areas, the categorization along 
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the physical geographical lines of remoteness from access to discours-
es naturally follows the lines of access to levels of education and 
knowledge.  
However, the role of the media should not be disregarded. A 
farmer with a radio has quite a bit more knowledge about climate 
change than a farmer who has no radio or access to other media chan-
nels and, hence, shares a different view about the weather and the 
climate. For example, farmers who have (access to) a radio or other 
types of media are more likely to know about the existence of the 
ozone layer and CO2 emissions than farmers without access to similar 
media channels. The following fragment of a conversation that I had 
with my neighbour – a town dweller and fairly passionate (part-time) 
farmer – illustrates her relative accessibility to climate-change dis-
courses and knowledge: 
 
(R=respondent; I=interviewer) 
R: There was no Christmas-rain this year and we had to wait until 
January or February until the first rains fell. That is why it is only 
now that I am planting. You can feel that there is a lot of moist in 
the air and that before the end of this month we will have rains. 
You know, you always have to follow the climate. 
I: Are the seasons changing? 
R: Yes, it is this global warming, the place is getting too hot and 
everybody is getting sick. My eyes are worse this year and the dust 
is increasing. The dry season is too harsh. 
I: What is causing this global warming? 
R: To my knowledge it is this thing… how do you call it again? 
That thing that protects us? 
I: The ozone layer? 
R: Yes, the ozone layer. And because we in Cameroon have cut 
down all our trees this ozone layer cannot protect us, because trees 
catch the sunlight. But since I am not a geographer I don’t know. 
But if I go to the cybercafé I can get more information. 
I: Does this global warming affect your crops? 
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R: Yes because it is too dry and too hot. I don’t farm because of the 
food; I just love it. It is always a miracle to put something in the 
ground and then you see that it grows. I follow my crops; it is just 
wonderful. But we don’t know what this global warming will do to 
them (Interview, February 2010, Bamenda). 
However, farmers who live in relatively more remote areas like the 
outskirts of the Bamenda Grassfields are mainly dependent on the 
information that is provided on the radio, as far as the media channels 
are concerned. For a large group of farmers the radio therefore forms 
an important source of knowledge. The focus of this chapter will be 
on the local actors and their understanding and interpretation of cli-
mate change rather than on the mere vehicles of transmission, like the 
media. However, apart from the media, NGOs, churches and other 
authoritative bodies, who play an indispensable role in the translation 
and recreation of the discourse, farmers are just as much part of this 
translation process. The aim of exploring the grassroots approach is, 
therefore, to highlight elements of climate-change discourses that are 
distillated, negotiated, and finally lead farmers to ‘believe’ in and 
contribute to the collective fight against climate change. Since ‘the 
grassroots’ is a rather vague and ambiguous concept, it needs to be 
refined. Three main groups will be discerned, namely: farmers who 
know (or are cognizant) about climate change, farmers who do not 
know, and farmers who have heard about it but are not cognizant of 
it.2 A disadvantage of categorizing people is the encompassing risk of 
treating them, within a defined group, as a homogenous entity. Never-
theless, this does not obviate the fact that there are shared characteris-
tics and dynamics that can be discerned within each group. Particular-
ly in the group of farmers who have (some) knowledge about (dis-
courses on) climate change, there is a broad range of what knowing 
means. Therefore, in order to do justice to the heterogeneity of a de-
fined group, different farmers will be portrayed. 
                                                          
2 By knowing I do not refer to local understandings or experiences of changes 
in the climate derived from mere empirical observations but to a certain 
level of having the knowledge of climate change as a scientific regime of 
truths constructed in the West.   
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The main objective here is to examine the dialectical relationship 
between climate change as an experienced biophysical reality, and the 
reception and construction of climate-change discourses. Farmers’ 
perceptions and experiences of (changing) weather patterns will be 
described, and, furthermore, I will look into how having access to 
discourses shapes and creates and recreates people’s perception of the 
climate. In chapter four I have tried to demonstrate that explaining 
misfortune lies at the heart of the Grassfielders’ belief system and 
cosmology. It became clear that new challenges are often explained 
and dealt with by forms of witchcraft, a dynamic that Weller (1994) 
has called ‘the power of indeterminate meaning’. In this chapter I 
propose that global climate discourses provide a new framework to 
comprehend and explain misfortune, such as diseases, poverty, social 
change, death and, more obvious, natural disasters. Finally, and fore-
most, this chapter will point out how the encounter with a new truth 
regime affects farmers’ existential security. Existential security refers 
to non-materialistic components that principally concern individual 
perceptions of and psychological factors about how people relate to 
each other and the world. A useful approach within human security 
studies is formulated by the department of cultural anthropology of the 
Free University of Amsterdam and is here used as an analytic tool for 
studying the impact of climate-change discourses upon counter-
hegemonic discourses. ‘Existential security is the human attempt to 
make sense of this world and of human beings place in it, in relation 
to family, community, society and the wider cosmos, through process-
es of signification in connection to belief, trust, belonging, and mental 
and spiritual fulfilment’ (Free University Amsterdam: Annual report 
2005, Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology: 2). The basic 
assumption here is, that the notion of global in climate-change dis-
courses, constructed by leading international actors and imposed upon 
other actors, leads to a universalization of threats and responsibilities. 
As such, climate-change discourses are inevitably discourses about 
power and are an important matter to explore.  
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‘We are the climate’ – climate trajectories as a societal 
critique 
During my first weeks in town, in which I gained some preliminary 
insights into the extent to which people know and talk about climate 
change, I decided to pay a visit to a rural village called Babanki, situ-
ated in the mountainous outskirts of Bamenda. The choice for going to 
a rural area was born out of the assumption that a distinct geographical 
location, in terms of accessibility to global discourses, would give a 
different picture of farmers’ ‘climate-change realities’. From the out-
set it needs to be said that even though farmers might not be familiar 
with climate change as a Western discourse, this does not mean that 
they do not speak about it, nor to say that climate change is not actual-
ly happening. Farmers have their own indicators for ‘following the 
climate’ and to know when something unusual is happening. The fo-
cus here is, however, more concerned with the power that constitutes 
the messages coming from the West. 
It was in the middle of November, the time, in which the rainy sea-
son was supposed to come to an end in order to pave the way for the 
dry season. While usually the rainy season ends around the middle of 
October, the rains were still present, and there were no signs of an 
approaching dry season yet. After an exhausting four-hour walk 
through a thick forest that was located on a steep mountain, I met 
three subsistence farmers. They were busy clearing the grass that sur-
rounds the community forest to protect it from wild bushfires, the so-
called fire-tracing method. In the course of our conversation it became 
clear that climate change is not a reality for them. They had never 
heard of global warming, nor had they heard of climate change. Eric, 
the youngest of the three, grows beans, cassava, Irish potatoes, corn 
and huckleberry. Since the age of ten he has also kept a garden where 
he cultivates onions, carrots and leaks. He explains about the farming 
conditions: ‘You know, here the environment is very, very good to us. 
I can say that all kinds of things that we grow here do very well. We 
have fresh air and all kinds of vegetation. It is not too hot and not so 
much cold. It is just a balance.’ When I asked him if they were experi-
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encing any kind of environmental problems he replied: ‘We don’t face 
any climate problems. It is just that we have two seasons here, a dry 
season and a rainy season.’  
Here, Eric calls our attention to a crucial point, namely that climate 
change as such is an empty notion. The climate changes every year, 
every season. Moreover, the climate has always been changing and it 
is generally accepted that the climate is inherently variable on all time 
scales, (especially in the so-called high-risk environments), a trend 
that scholars refer to as climate variability. This immanent void in the 
term climate change inevitably creates a space for multiple under-
standings and to attach a myriad of meanings. All of a sudden Eric 
recalls the fact that there used to be many more trees in the past and 
that the air used to be much cooler. ‘At first when there was a lot of 
forest, the climate was so cool. That is what I have observed. And then 
things like groundnuts cannot grow, and things like plantain cannot 
grow. But now like this the climate is hot and we work groundnut here 
and harvest.’ To Eric, the rising temperatures are not evoking any 
threat but are rather perceived as the natural course of things. He and 
other farmers in Babanki are even very content with the current bal-
anced state of the climate, because it enables them to grow a wider 
variety of crops. The main difference for them with the past is that 
there is less forest and more heat, because they have observed that 
there are more people living in this area nowadays than before. Rising 
temperatures are a more tangible and long-term characteristic of a 
changing climate than climate change as such. This could be a possi-
ble explanation for the fact that global warming is easier to understand 
and, moreover, more likely to be understood as a form of change that 
is visibly different from the past . 
In an environment where heavy rains form part of the variable 
character of the climate and where droughts have regularly been oc-
curring, the threat of the climate (or the normality of threat) is more 
the rule than the exception. Climate change has always been part of 
people’s daily lives in vulnerable regions. Ordinary farmers share 
different views on the environment, essentially based on past experi-
ences (De Bruijn et al. 2005). While degradation might indeed be on 
the rise, for people who always have been directly dependent on na-
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ture, environmental problems are not a new phenomenon. Depletion 
of natural resources has been an integral factor in many ecosystems of 
the past, as well as in many of the world’s climate zones (Van Beek 
2000). A widely heard expression amongst farmers who do not know 
about climate change is, ‘as the world is changing, the climate is 
changing’. Of course the climate is changing; it has always been 
changing. Whereas climate-change discourses evoke a threat of ab-
normality in the West – and can be seen as a secularized end-of-time 
idea – in environments where climate variability is more significant in 
terms of long-term seasonal changes and extreme weather events, the 
notion of a changing climate ironically enough leads to a construction 
of ‘normality’. Put differently, with the construction and presentation 
of climate change as an anomaly or threat, the norm of a constant cli-
mate is born. To find an answer to the question of why the climate 
does not appear to be viewed as a threat for above-mentioned farmers, 
we might take a closer look at how nature, and thus the climate, are 
embedded in local worldviews and cosmo-politics. By cosmo-politics 
I refer to the inclusive weave of the world, in which political systems 
and cultural patterns define people’s place in the wider cosmos and 
how they relate to the cosmic elements, like the climate and the natu-
ral environment. 
Many groups with a non-Western interpretation of climate issues 
have a distinct conception of community. Elements like the soil, plants 
and climate actively form part of a world which is essentially a social 
one, held together by reciprocity, communication channels and rights 
and obligations (Allen 1988; Kuletz 1998 & Descola 1996, in Smith 
2009). The same holds true for Bamenda where the environment is 
perceived to be the soul of the Grassfielders’ culture. Notwithstanding 
the fact that something as a local cosmology or belief system does not 
exist – that is, each kingdom in the Grassfields has its own distinctive 
culture – the traditional rulers have always been in close contact with 
each other and have a shared history, and in many respects also a 
shared culture. In the last chapter I demonstrated the important role of 
the palaces within society and how the traditional rulers in this region 
are emphasizing the importance of nature as part and parcel of their 
culture. As described in the previous chapter, the symbiotic relation 
Sara de Wit 
170 
between man and nature finds its expression (amongst others) in the 
spiritual role of the Fons and the sacred and secret forests that sur-
round the palaces. Moreover, as the environment is always used as a 
symbol or sacred icon in rituals, the cultural connection to nature be-
comes visible in the material culture. The relationship with the natural 
world is thus embedded within political structures and at the same 
time cannot be detached from its religious context. 
 
 
Photo 5.1 Farmers in Babanki 
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Photo 5.2 Bamenda’s landscape in the rainy season, on the road 















Photo 5.3 A focus-group discussion with members of a CIG in-
volved in climate change mitigation activities, on their 
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The execution of the (spiritual and symbolic) power is functional to 
preserve the harmony between society and the cosmic elements. This 
power is not only maintained by the Fons themselves but is also rein-
forced by the populations who put their faith in their hands in order to 
clarify and solve the problems. The symbiotic relationship between 
man and nature explains and demonstrates why there is no inherently 
embedded fear of the climate – as a catastrophic end-of-time idea – in 
local cosmologies. This statement is valid to the extent that man obeys 
the rules and laws of mother nature formulated by the ancestors and 
transmitted by traditional rulers. Because of the interdependent char-
acter of the relationship between man and nature, adapting their life 
styles to the demands of nature has always been an imperative. In the 
past, the Fons applied indigenous and traditional knowledge and 
know-how to surmount many natural disasters. ‘We implored with the 
rainmakers to bring forth rain in times of severe dryness, we called on 
the traditional healers to act in terms of health crisis and pleaded with 
Mother Nature when our general weather conditions frowned on us’ 
(Inauguration speech of CAMTRACC, Fon of Guzang 2009). 
Most of the traditional rulers explain climate change by the fact 
that they have failed to live like their forefathers, and that they have 
failed to follow the rules prescribed by the ancestors. Following this, 
every (extreme) weather event refers directly to the people. The cli-
mate tells something about society itself, and therefore justifications 
should not be found in an outer societal source. Part of the explanation 
lies in exactly this: if ‘we are the climate’, to fear the climate is to fear 
ourselves. An externalization of us from the cosmos and the environ-
ment, as if we are being threatened by something that we ourselves are 
part of. The existence of the possibility of the regeneration of the so-
cio-cosmic harmony in Bamenda, can be characterized as a positive 
discourse about the climate. Here lies a crucial difference with the 
externalization of man from nature, and the fear of losing control over 
nature, which are fundamental pessimistic elements of current West-
ern climate-change discourses. 
In the field of environmental sociology, scholars characterize 
Western ways of knowing and relating to the environment as the de-
tachment from and subordination of nature. This separation from the 
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environment is guided by economic progress that presumes domina-
tion over natural resources (see Smith 2007; Fogel 2004, Hannigan 
1995). Smith argues that a fundamental element of counter hegemonic 
discourses (i.e. non-Western or indigenous peoples’ discourses) is that 
it functions with a sense of attachment where nature is concerned. It is 
not a discourse of dominance over nature, but rather a spiritual and 
cultural connection to nature (Smith 2007: 208). Many groups with a 
non-Western interpretation of climate issues have a distinct concep-
tion of community. Elements like the soil, plants and climate actively 
form part of a world, which is essentially a social one, held together 
by reciprocity, communication channels and rights and obligations 
(Allen 1988; Kuletz 1998 & Descola 1996, in Smith 2009). As 
demonstrated above, in local cosmologies in the Bamenda Grassfields, 
the palaces, practices prescribed by traditions and the traditional rulers 
all actively participate in complying with the ways of an essentially 
mutually dependent world. This doesn’t mean that farmers’ daily prac-
tices are fully in line with these local visions embedded in political 
structures, with slash and burn agriculture, and wild bush fires as the 
primary examples of environmentally unfriendly practices. These are, 
however, not ‘traditional’ practices as such, but, as argued by most 
farmers, born out of poverty and thus due to a lack of alternatives. 
This is not to legitimize local practices, nor to state that the local pop-
ulation in Bamenda are convinced ‘noble defenders of nature’ but 
rather an explanation for it.3 So much for my short recapitalization of 
the Grassfields sociopolitical and cosmo-political context; my concern 
here is, however, not so much to explore the institutional level but 
rather how this ‘translation regime’ provides grassroots farmers with a 
particular framework to understand and make sense of certain changes 
in society. We shall turn now to how environmental degradation and 
climate change are viewed and understood by farmers.  
If speaking about the environment is a commentary about the self, 
how do people – for whom environmental degradation is not some-
thing new – speak about those changes in a rapidly changing world? 
                                                          
3  For a more detailed discussion about North-South relations and studies of 
people interacting with their environment, I refer to Hannigan’s Environ-
mental Sociology 1995. 
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What I observed during many of the conversations that I had with 
farmers is that, whenever I asked about environmental changes, we 
often ended up talking about general changes in their lives and in the 
world. As if the environment was seen as some sort of mirror of socie-
tal changes. Moreover, it appeared to me that – especially among old-
er people – every form of change, and thus rupture from the past, was 
evaluated necessarily in negative terms. A commonly held view 
amongst farmers was that the world was changing too fast, that there 
were too many people, and that traditions were no longer respected. 
Elisabeth, a 74-year-old subsistence farmer, framed it as follows, ‘The 
world is changing. I don’t know the cause but the world is changing in 
a terrible way. Even the child that you put to the world will abuse you. 
Nobody looks you into the eyes.’ 
A recurrent dynamic that can be discerned from common interpre-
tations of ‘non-cognizant’ farmers is the way, in which the present 
seems to be a deterioration of the past. The world is changing too fast, 
traditions are no longer respected, the ancestors are no longer obeyed, 
and, the environment is degrading. As such, environmental degrada-
tion – and climate change – is seen in the light of a degrading world 
that resonates with the sociocultural and existential realm. Now, if 
tales about the past are a significant part of meta-commentaries on the 
present (see Henige 1974 & Jansen 1995, in Van Beek 2000: 33), 
what does the deterioration of the present in comparison with the past 
entail for a ‘projected future’? Van Beek writes in his article ‘Echoes 
of the Future, Degradation and Eschatology’ that if the future is a re-
flection of today, one could expect political, social and ecological 
problems to generate tales about endings, including those of an apoca-
lyptic nature. By exploring the mythology of both oral traditions and 
written scriptures in different world cultures, it becomes clear that 
there exist major differences about ‘endings’ or ‘projected futures’ 
across a distance and between different cultures. It turns out that only 
a small minority of cultures – that seem to be concentrated in three 
major regions of the world: that is, Scandinavia, the Judeo-Christian 
Middle East and Meso-America – are fascinated by projections of the 
future, guided by apocalyptic fervour (Van Beek 2000: 33). What is 
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then the more common idea of a projected future, and how can we 
understand the case of Bamenda? 
For most farmers, increasing temperatures, overpopulation and the 
cutting down of trees are all perceived as a sign of a rapidly changing 
and degrading world. The list of changes that was raised by the Grass-
fielders is endless: unpredictable seasons and distorted rainfall pat-
terns; rising temperatures; increasing floods and landslides; stronger 
winds; decline in the taste and the quality of food; higher poverty lev-
els; drying up of streams and waterfalls; high prevalence of diseases 
like malaria, HIV and typhoid; loss of trees; soil erosion; loss of plant 
species and animals, etc. Interestingly enough, the majority of ‘cogni-
zant’ farmers by and large blame climate change to be the major cause 
for all this. Among ‘non-cognizant’ farmers there is a widely shared 
belief that it is either because of overpopulation, because people have 
cut down their trees (which is against tradition and thus has made the 
ancestors or the small gods of the forest angry), that witchcraft has 
been involved, or that it is God’s plan. Other common explanations 
that were pointed out were related to the belief that people have vio-
lated traditions, like going to the farm on ‘native’ holidays (called 
‘country Sunday’) and as such have desecrated the land. Other causes 
that were raised were poor agricultural practices, rampant bush fires, 
overexploitation of the forest, and the use of chemicals. In a few cases 
people explained that they heard on the radio that it was the white men 
who have caused it, and hence they shared the opinion that they were 
the ones who have to come up with a solution. One older woman 
blamed climate change on the power executed by man over nature. 
According to her:  
Man has been trying to be more powerful than God, so that is why He is 
reacting like this. It is a warning. Too much interference is not good. You 
have to listen to nature and God’s laws. 
In a similar way, the local discourse was reflected in the statement 
of another female farmer who said that climate change started to hap-
pen when man decided to land on the moon: 
[...] You know it has come as a result of man’s interference with the 
moon. The astronauts have been going to the moon so that is the cause of 
climate change. People should have stayed off the moon because it has an 
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important value for the shrines. In our culture we only visit the shrines 
when the moon is out there. You cannot just say let’s interfere with the 
moon.   
During many of my interviews with respondents I soon realized 
that, while fear was a recurrent theme, the extent to which people 
spoke about the future – and climate change’s possible consequences 
– differed widely between different individuals. My attempts to speak 
about people’s idea of the future and to explore people’s imagination 
of it often resulted in incomprehension. In some cases (especially 
among ‘non-cognizant’) informants just reacted surprised and asked 
me how I could possibly think that they would have the answer if it is 
only God who knows. Others, who had heard about climate change, 
emphasized that they were in fact afraid of this global warming since 
they understood from the radio that Africans were going to be the first 
ones to suffer from its effects. Finally, a considerable portion of the 
‘cognizant’ farmers in fact did mention the possibility that the world 
was going to end in their answers. In general, what people told me 
was that, when they heard about global warming for the first time, it 
evidently evoked fear in them, as the following comment illustrates: 
When we heard about this thing global warming we thought ‘this could be 
the end of the world’. We were very scared. If this is going to continue 
like this, this is going to be the end of the world. It is all because of evolu-
tion and modernity. Here in the village the air is still clean and healthy. 
But in the city you breathe all the gas of the cars. It is all due to moderni-
ty. Before there was no problem (Focus group discussion ‘mixed farming 
group’, February 2010, Bawock market). 
It also turned out to be that, in the perceived intensity of future 
changes and in end of the world ideas, there seems to be a geograph-
ically defined dimension. The more people know about global warm-
ing, the more likely it is that they have an apocalyptic horizon (see 
section 5.5). Despite these differences, one vision appeared to be 
commonly shared: that is, that the world is changing in a negative 
way, and as much as the present is different from the past the future 
will be different from the present. Related to this, Van Beek explains 
that the majority of the world’s cultures do not envisage violent, cata-
clysmic endings of the world; instead, in most visions the notion of 
Believing in climate change 
177 
the future is one of a gradual fading away. Like a gradual decrease and 
slow degradation of life that will not end with a bang but with a 
whimper (Van Beek 2000: 37). This perspective indeed reflects to a 
large extent how particularly the older generation of Grassfielders 
speaks about the past, the world and the projected future. The glorifi-
cation of the past also finds expression in the diminishing power of the 
Fon. Grassfielders view that the (symbolic) power of the Fon is erod-
ing. Before, the Fons used to be much more powerful, more respected 
and better capable of expelling misfortune from society. Furthermore, 
the rainmakers are no longer functional in society, since they are no 
longer appointed as possessors of this form of power. This vision that 
the world of today is less than the world of yesterday stems for a con-
siderable part from the dynamics of orality, from the ways oral 
knowledge is transferred. What is expected is a process of decay, a 
diminished existence, loss of power, and loss of knowledge (ibid: 11-
13). 
Apart from being a mirror of societal changes and an explanation 
for the general degradation of the world and thus its future, discourses 
about the climate are, at least for a considerable part, also a platform 
to call the existing world order into question. Talking about the cli-
mate often turned into critical discussions about the role of the indus-
trialized countries, either in positive or negative terms. On a few occa-
sions I encountered farmers with a critical stance towards the West, 
who stated that, since they have caused all this change, they were the 
ones who should come up with the solution. However, remarkably 
enough, conversations also often ended up self-criticizing and blaming 
Africans for their own underdevelopment. During my 6 months of 
fieldwork I listened to several different (local) radio stations for many 
hours. I found it once again remarkable to note that global warming 
was such a ‘hot’ topic. The general tendency of speaking about envi-
ronmental degradation and global warming always seemed directed 
towards blaming farmers for the existing situation. For example, a 
local radio station Foundation Radio has a program called ‘S.O.S. 
Environment’ fully devoted to sensitize the population on environ-
mental issues. This program, which is an initiative of the NGO ‘Para-
dise on Earth’, is meant to reach the grassroots farmers in rural com-
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munities and has as its aim to enlighten the population about urgent 
environmental issues, such as waste disposal, the negative conse-
quences of slash and burn, and climate change. The following frag-
ment of this program, in which a panel starts speaking about climate 
change, illustrates how the effects are communicated at the grassroots 
level. The explanation that was given by a bee 
farmer/environmentalist resulted in a highly remarkable discussion: 
 
(S= station manager; R=respondent; J=journalist) 
S: ‘Could you explain us why the bee population all over the world 
is drastically decreasing? For America, Europe and other places? 
There must be something going on that has made the population 
very small.’ 
R: ‘The reason why the bee population has actually reduced nowa-
days is because of what is called climate change. The climate is 
changing for all angles. For politics, climate changes. For farming, 
climate changes. Everything changes. Even man, the population 
actually goes down. Everything goes down because of man’s ac-
tions. Because when I say that God created man and other animals 
like bees, and He said, may they live together. But man turned out 
to be a wicked creature who does not take care of the other crea-
tures. Even water, we put chemicals inside and fishes die. Thus the 
climate is suffering everywhere. [...] All the smoke that we produce 
with our bush fires, the carbon dioxide disturbs the ozone layer. All 
the heat and smoke in the air suffocates and affects a lot things and 
bees too. [...] So we need to grow more plants.’ 
J: ‘I want to ask you something. You go out a lot to Holland, Ger-
many, you study a lot about the environment. And now we hear 
about this thing global warming, global warming. Even our own 
president was at the UN, United Nations. They gave him the op-
portunity to talk about this problem. But we, black people, do not 
contribute to this problem, but we will be the first one to suffer 
from the impacts of climate change. You as environmentalist who 
has reached a high level of education and has given this climate 
change day at the international level, what have you done with the 
knowledge that you have accumulated from all this travels and 
speak in big countries like Germany and Holland to fight this prob-
lem, while it affects African countries the most?’ 
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R: ‘[...] You will be surprised but the white man is developing be-
cause he is kind. You will be surprised to hear that in white men’s 
country there are bees but they do not sting people. Even when you 
step on a snake it will not bite you. The burning plants that we 
have here, they burn your skin, but in Europe they don’t harm you. 
I just want to say that everything in Africa is wounded. Everything 
has been wounded; bees are wounded. Even this house is wounded. 
If you touch, it is just going to hurt you. I don’t know how people 
do things here; I cannot give an explanation why everything is 
wounded here. Even if you see the way they build houses in Eu-
rope, the prisons looks like our Ayaba Hotel. I cannot understand 
why the big people go over there, and see these things like good 
roads; they come back and do not build good roads for us when 
they come back here. I have concluded that we have been cursed; 
maybe our forefathers have been cursed. I have seen the white 
men’s country, and it is just like heaven. I am doubting the fact if 
heaven can be somewhere else again, because that place is just 
heaven. Those who have travelled abroad will confirm what I am 
saying. Because if you cannot see, you cannot believe. When they 
say do not destroy the forest, the black man is headstrong, is very 
stubborn. In Germany and Holland I saw lots of forest. I used to 
think that white man’s country is all tarred, but I saw in fact lots of 
forest. Forests are big as Bamenda. They go to another area and 
make a forest where nobody touches it. While it is well planned, 
there people live in harmony with the environment. But here, there 
is no plan and effort to create this balance in the ecosystem. They 
grow a lot of forest and plant a lot of trees. I can conclude that if 
white men make something they make it very well. Even water 
they will respect it. They respect everything: grass is respected; 
bees are respected. For us, we need time to develop that, to be 
more committed. Even the houses that were built in up-station by 
the white man you can still find them today. I don’t know what our 
forefathers were doing when Europe was developing.  
S: You are a man who has committed himself to new ideas and you 
want people to change their ideas or you want people to change 
their consciousness? Since you say that you are a practical man, 
now the time has come to put your ideas forward. Can you give us 
practical ideas for the short-term and long-term future? 
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R: Everything is a process, and we need a start. Our problem in Af-
rica is that we only complain a lot and we don’t want to work. 
White men work during the day and throughout the night. Even the 
churches that we have in Africa only pray and do not work. If you 
only sit at home and pray, and you come back and sit at home, it 
does not make you a religious person, it does not bring you any-
where. You have to pray but you also have to work [...] We need to 
organise ourselves and sacrifice. If the white men want to help you, 
and you are not in a group, they do not want to help you. Some 
people say that they want help, but they cannot tell you what their 
needs are. If we want the white men to help us, we need to group 
ourselves.’ 
(Fragment from the radio show ‘S.O.S. Environment’, Foundation 
Radio, September 2009, translated from pidgin) 
In his speech about global warming, the bee farmer created a sharp 
dichotomy between the industrialized and well-developed ‘heaven’ of 
the West, and the ‘curse’ of Africa’s backwardness. Apart from his 
personal drive to distinguish himself from the ‘common man’ – as he 
has travelled to the West – in order to elevate his status, we can also 
read a meta-commentary upon his own society. Ironically enough, he 
equals modernity – and thus the idea that nature can be shaped and 
modified according to man’s desire – with protecting and respecting 
the environment. While Africans, on the contrary, are depicted as lazy 
and disrespectful of nature, animals and their environment. Yet cli-
mate change tells us exactly the contrary. The way, in which he is 
‘enlightening’ farmers about global warming makes us think that Af-
ricans themselves should be blamed for their detrimental and vulnera-
ble position. This fragment shows how an ordinary discussion about 
global warming seamless encompasses broad notions related to devel-
opment vis-à-vis underdevelopment, modernity’s utopia, human 
rights, inequality, notions of inferiority and racism, guilt, responsibili-
ties and power. In this case climate change is reinforcing the idea of 
‘Africa’s backwardness’, as the white man’s countries are able to pro-
tect themselves, while Africa finds itself again dependent on their aid. 
In brief, climate-change discourses form a platform to talk about soci-
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ety, to negotiate a collective identity, and to establish new models for 
development. 
What I aimed to demonstrate in this section is that speaking about 
the climate in Bamenda is speaking about the self, like a meta-
commentary upon society and the world at large that serves to explain 
societal changes related to ideas of a projected future. Therefore, in 
order to understand how people relate to the climate and to what ex-
tent climate change is a ‘reality’, views of climate trajectories should 
be placed in the local context. Nonetheless, it would be utmost too 
simplistic to understand Grassfielders’ worldviews solely in terms of 
local cosmologies and ‘traditional’ political and cultural systems. In 
Cameroon, 53% of the population is Christian, about 25% is Muslim 
and 23% adheres to so-called indigenous religions. Similarly, to de-
fine oneself as a Christian doesn’t necessarily exclude the existence of 
a parallel local cosmology that is oriented towards the ancestors or 
locally defined deities. Moreover, local narratives, traditions and cos-
mologies are far from being static and unchangeable; rather, they se-
lect and adopt new elements that fairly easily merge with existing 
patterns. This is reflected in the hybrid character of discourses, which 
are more the rule than the exception. In practice, there is a high level 
of inter-discursive explanations of climate trajectories, which – with 
the encounter of Western climate-change discourses – becomes even 
more multifaceted. The unquestioned trust in God, discontented ances-
tors, witchcraft, local gods and the damaged ozone layer regularly 
crossed the table during one interview. Considering the complexity 
and broad scope of my field of study, I decided to limit myself to sed-
entary subsistence farmers and not so much to grazers. This choice 
implicitly resulted in a research population that predominantly defines 
itself as Christian, since most grazers belong to the Muslim Fulbe.4 In 
                                                          
4  Notwithstanding the fact that this sharp agriculturalist-grazers dichotomy 
along ethnic and religious lines nowadays no longer exists, I deliberately 
chose to focus on agriculturalists. This choice was partly made because 
(Fulbe) grazers have a distinct local cosmology, political structure and 
ways to deal with climatic issues. This, however, doesn’t mean that the 
Muslim population have been fully left out of my research. I had several 
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the following section I will explore how discourses about a changing 
climate are incorporated into local narratives and cosmologies to ex-
plain misfortune and inexplicable events. 
The power of indeterminate meaning 
The second group of farmers that are distinguished are the farmers 
who have heard about climate change or global warming but in fact 
don’t know it as a scientific problem, what has possibly caused it, and 
what the possible consequences will be. A first remarkable difference 
between the above-mentioned farmers and the farmers who have heard 
about climate change or global warming is that climate change is 
much more a ‘reality’. As it is very difficult to draw a clear-cut 
boundary between farmers who know and farmers who have heard 
about climate change, I decided to use the following indicators. The 
farmers who have heard about climate change or global warming are 
familiar with the notions but have a low-key understanding of both the 
scientific as well as the public discourse. Knowledge about climate 
change can, on the one hand, mean being able to reproduce the public 
discourse and speak about greenhouse gas emissions and the ozone 
layer, while, at the same time, being unable to comprehend the bio-
physical characteristics of the problem. And finally, there is a select 
group of farmers who possess a more profound understanding of the 
scientific discourse. 
The mysterious white dust that recently appeared in Bamenda 
evoked different sentiments and attitudes across different groups of 
people. Some people were terrified, others were supposedly indiffer-
ent towards it, while still others were explaining it by global warming 
or climate change. Messages that are disseminated on the radio, in 
other media, by NGO workers and government officials are generally 
less detailed and often leave farmers confused. The role of the media 
plays in providing farmers with knowledge concerning climate change 
especially leaves them in fear and confusion. Slogans and metaphors 
that characterize the public discourse on global warming are repro-
                                                          
focus group discussions and interviews with Muslim Fulbe who used to 
be grazers and shifted partly to sedentary forms of agriculture.    
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duced on the radio and echoed by farmers. Part of the language used 
that trickles down to the grassroots level and is filtered out – as a pro-
nounced form of intertextuality – are terms like ‘global crisis’, ‘a 
global war’, ‘a collective fight’ and ‘think globally and act locally’, 
which become part of the shared access to climate-change realities. I 
remember a farmer who shared his understanding of global warming 
with me: ‘They tell us over the radio that there is a global war coming 
up, and that we in Africa are the first victims. We have seen the first 
signs already. We are terrified because we don’t know what will hap-
pen to all of us and when this war arrives or how to protect ourselves.’ 
While sharing his fear about this global war with me, he looked into 
the sky to see if he could see it coming. This gesture occurred more 
often when people were speaking about climate change to me, as if 
they were looking or waiting for some sort of immediate arrival of a 
phenomenon visible to the naked eye. This farmer’s words sharply 
reflect in a nutshell how the popular discourse on climate change is 
framed, namely a global war, in which Africans are depicted as the 
first victims. Besides the fact that this farmer is waiting for the arrival 
of an ‘enemy’, the metaphors used and the constructed language that 
shape the discourse arouse confusion and persistently call upon a 
sense of shared responsibility. 
I often tried to imagine how it must be for a subsistence farmer in 
Bamenda, or anywhere else in Africa and the developing world, to 
hear about a new phenomenon like global warming. I personally re-
member when I heard about it for the first time. It must have been 
when I was five or six years old, when my brother and I arrived at 
school on an ordinary day in Santiago in Chile, where we grew up. 
Our teachers called us together and announced that from now on we 
could no longer stay out in the sun, because there was a hole in the 
ozone layer right above the city, which was very dangerous for our 
skin. It certainly evoked a terrifying sensation, all the more because 
we had never heard of anything like that before. In the same way, I 
imagined that for farmers to be confronted with this message is like 
being exposed to a new, or at least different, ontological framework. 
Having access to a radio or television can indeed make the difference 
between knowing about the existence of a (damaged) ozone layer, the 
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importance of protecting it, and one’s own related contribution and 
responsibility. The following citation from a farmer, who recalled the 
first moment, in which he was informed about global warming, illus-
trates the dynamics of his moments of ‘conversion’: 
When I heard about global warming for the first time I was frightened. If 
the planet will change the way they tell us on the radio it will not be fine. 
It is going to be very difficult to adapt. I heard that the climate was some-
thing coming from the South to the hinterlands. We are experiencing it. 
Those who tap the palm wine are affected because they don’t produce 
again. If the palm wine is going to be finished our society will not do well 
because we live with it. I think it is still going to come because this is not 
yet really the big. It is not really the change yet but it is coming very 
soon. Places will be dry and affect us, the trees and the animals. That is 
why we are planting fruit trees. It is just that we lack the seeds (Focus 
group discussion Bali, February 2010). 
For many people the first encounter with the notion of climate 
change in Bamenda is almost always attached to fear and responsibili-
ties. Notwithstanding the general understanding of a threatened earth, 
what global warming constitutes remains in many cases vague and 
unclear. Part of the confusion that climate-change discourses entail is 
that they are open to an extremely wide variety of interpretative 
claims. As I briefly touched upon in chapter four, this is a dynamic 
that Weller (1994) has called ‘the power of indeterminate meaning’. 
Weller describes how in the 1980s the Eighteen Kings temple in 
northern Taiwan in less than a decade grew from a simple roadside 
shrine to one of Taiwan’s major temples, that is linked to impressive 
economic progress of the country. The temple plays a wild variation 
on the standard themes of popular religion: gods, ancestors and ghosts, 
while at the same time feeding individualistic, profit-oriented morals. 
According to him, this cult can be seen as a free space full of ambiva-
lence, or ‘indeterminate meaning’ that is the real secret of its power 
and broad appeal. It allows the cult to integrate effortlessly with the 
rapid processes of social and economic change that are partly entailed 
by modernity’s enticements (Weller 1994: 154). Nevertheless, in 
Weller’s interpretation the free space of indeterminate meaning simi-
larly has an emphasis on ambivalence. This ‘messy exuberance’ 
makes the struggle for ‘interpretative control’ by those who try to get 
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a grip on it so difficult (Weller 1994, in Geschiere 1998: 214). While 
acknowledging that the economic situation in present-day Africa is 
quite different from that of Taiwan, Geschiere draws an interesting 
parallel with the modernity of witchcraft in Africa. He writes: 
The parallels with the modernity of witchcraft in Africa are indeed strik-
ing. Here, too, there is a staggering production of meaning, highly unsys-
tematic and contradictory but, precisely because of this, extremely power-
ful: witchcraft discourses – like the Taiwanese spirit cults – allow for so 
many interpretations that they can explain any course of events and are, 
therefore, impossible to falsify (Geschiere 1998: 214).  
Building upon Weller and Geschiere’s arguments, respectively, I 
contend that climate-change discourses in a similar way allow for a 
myriad of interpretations, and a ‘messy exuberant’ production of 
meaning and contestation. If we replace the term witchcraft by climate 
change in the above-mentioned citation, the argument still stands. This 
is not to say that they are identical phenomena, but the parallel resides 
rather in the general power dynamics of their indeterminacy. Both 
discourses have the adaptive capacity to interpret and to give meaning 
to modernity’s challenges, and the ability to fuse the local and global. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, explaining misfortune in terms 
of witchcraft has formed an important part of the Grassfielders socio-
political structure, and has served – for ritual and symbolic power-
holders – as an important source to derive their power from. In addi-
tion to this, we can view a clear reinforcement of existing power rela-
tions: a continuation of the (palace-related) power-holders who have 
taken up the initiative to fight this form of ‘misfortune’ called climate 
change.   
With a similar structure I observed that many of the ‘enigmatic’ or 
seemingly inexplicable events that denote misfortune can seamlessly 
be explained by the indeterminacy of the issue of climate change. For 
example: 
Because of the effects of climate change people will see it as witchcraft. 
This was the case in Bamali where lightning struck school children. If you 
don’t talk to them they will never believe. When it affects people and they 
die, they take it for witchcraft. We now know that it is climate change that 
is behind the incident in Bamali when the lightening stroke and all those 
children died. The same is the case with malaria, typhoid, many people 
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suffer from it. Climate change affects people a lot (Focus group discus-
sion with CIG ACTWID, January 2010, Bamenda). 
If you visit a group (of farmers), immediately they start telling you 
about their problems. These are problems of climate change but they 
don’t know what it is. They don’t know how to call it. There are many 
changes that never used to take place before, so the question is now: what 
is happening? All this is resulting from climate change. We tell them that 
it is not something brought from elsewhere, it is right here in the house 
(ibid). 
A striking example is the story of Philip, 75 years old and an hon-
ourable member of the palace of Mendankwe – the Fondom that geo-
graphically lies at the heart of Bamenda. It was a Sunday morning and 
I had arranged an interview with the Fon to speak about his participa-
tion in the campaign for the fight against climate change. The Fon of 
Mendankwe, Philip and me were sitting in front of the palace. Both of 
them blamed climate change for all the possible existing troubles. 
Philip is a subsistence farmer who owns a compound next to the pal-
ace, where he grows cola-nut trees, bananas, coffee and avocados. 
Since the year 2000 Philip has been sick, and goes regularly to the 
hospital because of high blood pressure and other health-related prob-
lems. He explained how climate change was affecting his life: 
I cannot eat because of climate change. I lost 8 children in 2 years be-
cause of climate change. I am 75 years and I don’t have the strength to 
change the climate change. I have no power left. I have two wives and 
had 12 children and now there are only four left. (The Fon cannot walk by 
himself because he suffers from a muscular disability. While his son helps 
him to enter his car, Philip states:) Do you see the condition of the Fon? 
This is also caused by climate change (Interview at the palace of 
Mendankwe, December 2009). 
The Fon adds to the conversation: ‘Our skin gets darker and darker. 
People who have a light skin become even dark like me. If you stay 
here in Bamenda for a while you will see that you also become dark.’ 
For people who have heard about climate change but do not really 
know what it entails, misfortune seems likely to be understood to be 
caused by climate change. Even though God is vividly ‘present’ 
amongst this group of farmers, poverty, diseases, bad luck, death, 
irregular weather events and, in some cases, even AIDS are consid-
ered to be caused by climate change or global warming. During a 
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global warming sensitization meeting the traditional ruler of Bali (a 
highly educated man) stated in a speech that all the bad roads in 
Bamenda are caused by climate change. If climate change was not 
happening, the roads would have been much more accessible and in 
better shape. (It might be worth mentioning that he is a member of the 
ruling CPDM party, who can be held responsible for the bad condition 
of the roads in Bamenda. Climate change is then again the ultimate 
scapegoat for blaming existing troubles in the Anglophone Northwest 
region). 
Another distinction of this group is that the global phenomenon is 
described as something tangible that will cause serious devastation to 
all layers of their existence. A women’s group in Bafut explained the 
consequences of the issue: 
 
A: ‘We also have it here. This year there was no dry season rain. 
There is so much illness, heat; people don’t look healthy. We have 
hunger, too much hunger. In the rainy season we eat less. We have 
heard about climate change; it is all over.’ 
B: ‘In some countries people die, and now we see it also happening 
here. People are dying and have hunger. The message is that, when 
we cut one stick (tree), we should plant five. First, we only heard 
it, but now we also see it. AIDS, orphans, malaria, cough, to us we 
feel that it is climate change that is causing all these problems.’  
C: ‘We were scared to miss our families and that all of us will die. 
We bury two corpses every week.’ 
A: ‘I thought that everybody will die. You don’t get the power 
again to work. It causes laziness. The sun brings us cancer and 
headaches.’ 
C: ‘We are not God who can tell how climate change will be. He 
might stop it if He sees that we are suffering; He might stop it one 
day.’ 
A: ‘But if you pray do you think God is going to carry us to our 
farms? No! We must start fighting it ourselves. Those who are lazy 
are those who suffer a lot.’ 
(Focus group discussion with a women’s CIG, Bafut, February 
2010). 
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In comparison to non-cognizant farmers, climate change is clearly 
an increasing reality and receives a visible experiential focus. One day 
in January, I was walking at a marketplace in Bali, a rural town 19 
kilometres from Bamenda. At a certain point I engaged with a group 
of farmers, as I was invited to drink palm wine with them. I sat down 
for a while, and we started talking about ordinary things like soccer 
and the weather. The conversation turned into an informal group dis-
cussion, in which the climate quickly became a topic for discussion. 
An older man asked me: ‘This climate change, is it better over there in 
Europe?’ Five women who were selling huckleberry and coco yams at 
their marketplace were part of the talk. It was clear from the outset 
that some of them had heard about climate change from the govern-
ment delegation, but that it remained a rather vague notion and was 
clearly linked up with their experienced realities.  
We heard about it, but we didn’t understand. From our crops we know it, 
the way it is changing. But some of them don’t know. We have heard 
about it because in July (2009) we had too much rain up to November, 
and too much heat. The government demonstrated that we should plant 
many trees. 2010 is much colder than before. 
Interestingly enough, this woman’s statement is contradicting the 
rising temperatures emphasized by most farmers. In the discussion the 
participating women revealed a whole range of irregular weather 
events that had occurred in the past. A long time ago, they had also 
experienced prolonged drought and excessive rains, but those occur-
rences were not placed in a climate-change framework. Some years 
they had just enough food, and other years they had to deal with poor 
yields. What happened last year, however, clearly was interpreted as a 
sign of climate change. When I asked them whether they were afraid 
and had any idea about the future, I received the following answer:  
We don’t know. We believe in God, so it is God’s plans. We are not 
afraid because we depend on God. We are in His hands. We don’t know 
why He does it. God is somebody to command; He does what He desires. 
For these women climate change remains a vague and incompre-
hensible notion, but at the same time they ‘see’ it happening. Whereas 
they stated that they can see the climate changing in their crops, they 
similarly spoke about unforeseeable weather events that had occurred 
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in the past. While those occurrences are explained as an act of God, 
the phenomenon of climate change opens the doors to a new way of 
speaking about society, oneself and their relation with the transcen-
dental. 
‘We are not God oh!’ How a secular  
discourse fuses with the sacred 
The story of Muchoh Laurence certainly represents one of the most 
vivid manifestations of the hybridity of climate-change discourses, 
and how they have the capacity to be seamlessly adopted within a 
wide variety of ontological narratives. Laurence, a middle-aged wom-
an, is a vegetarian by faith for eight years and is a convinced believer 
in the ‘world-renowned spiritual teacher’ Supreme Master Ching Hai.5 
This spiritual path holds that the world will see its destruction, caused 
by global warming, in the year 2012 (based on the Maya calendar), 
unless every individual on earth is willing to save the planet by be-
coming a vegan (among other things). While Muchoh is not repre-
sentative of Cameroon (there are only ten members of this cult in 
Bamenda, and in Douala approximately 150 members who gather on a 
monthly basis), it is a proof of climate change’s powerful discursive 
capacity. I came to know about the Supreme Master when a friend of 
mine in Bamenda told me to watch her live program on Supreme Mas-
ter Television. I was certainly stunned by the amalgamation of dis-
courses, and combination of different religious traditions. Supreme 
Master is a Vietnamese prophet representing a belief system that com-
bines Buddhism, Islam, Christianity, Judaism and Hinduism, and 
merges them into an all-inclusive, ‘newer’ religious framework that 
bases itself on a (primary) scientific discourse: climate change. Soon 
after seeing this program, I met Muchoh. I learned that it is an interna-
tionally known religion that basically connects all its members 
through the Internet and TV. In Muchoh’s house we find a prominent 
                                                          
5  For a full description of Supreme Master Ching Hai and Her ‘spiritual 
way to the truth’, see the website: http://www.godsdirectcontact.org/ and 
http://suprememastertv.com/.   
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picture of The Master. She begins to tell me about her vegetarian 
faith: 
I am a vegetarian by faith. We belief that the vegetarian diet has 80% cure 
of climate change, and that is what the world does not understand. We 
don’t keep animals because it contributes to climate change, as methane is 
produced by animals used for agriculture. It is a school of thought, a faith 
that teaches about the truth, spirituality. It is beyond Christianity, a path, a 
religious truth. [...] We do yoga meditation. You have to do certain things 
that are in line with the Bible. Refrain from lies telling and stealing. [...] 
When Buddha was alive he had Christian followers. When Mohammed 
was alive the whole world only knew about Jesus. Christians are fighting 
Muslims, but they are one and the same. Mohammed is a Master like 
Buddha and Jesus. Jesus is a Master like Mohammed. Krishna, there are 
so many Masters. They die and go. A God cannot be only with one Mas-
ter. When the Master is alive the true religion can be preached. Supreme 
Master is the present Master. We keep on living on Christ, Christ, but 
when your soul is ready, you will believe Her. As I am sitting here like 
this I am Her disciple. Jesus saw the light and heard the voice; it is the 
same with us. She is Jesus in another body. The Master says that when 
everybody in the whole world becomes a vegetarian, climate change will 
be eradicated. [...] So we have just two years and some months to save the 
planet, or else everybody on earth will disappear. The world is sitting on a 
ticking timing bomb, which can explode within two years and something. 
If you look at the world today, people are talking about climate change 
too much. Two years ago when I was sharing those pamphlets, people 
were never interested. But now we realize that it is important because we 
only have two years to save the planet. And the ice all melts, the gas will 
be released and it will poison the whole world. And we need to pray (In-
terview, Muchoh Laurence, Bamenda, November 2009). 
The most interesting part of her explanation is that this spiritual 
path calls upon individual responsibility. The world is at risk due to 
human sin and – and while calling upon a feeling of guilt – the prom-
ise is that the world can be saved only if everybody takes his or her 
own responsibility by showing morally good behaviour, like ‘going 
Green’. In fact, this message bears striking similarities with the Green 
message as preached by the NGOs. The direct link between the cli-
mate and society’s stewardship has been framed by sociologists under 
the nominator of eco-theology. A similar viewpoint was shared and 
preached by different churches. A reverend of the Presbyterian church 
in Bamenda explained the concerns of his church with climate change: 
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We are preaching about climate change in church because it is affecting 
our farmers, and the church is concerned with alleviating poverty. We use 
the Bible. When God created the world, He saw that it was good, and He 
wanted it to stay like this. Humans who are violating the environment are 
violating God. When we cut down trees, it is not good. We dry our water 
sources; we do bush fires. Not to burn bushes should be taught. Grow 
flowers and plant trees. We know that we have a good background on 
climate change all over the country. We can reach the whole country. The 
world was created good, but the world has turned bad due to human sin. 
Exploitation is greediness because it means that you are depriving some-
body else. The world is for all of us and not for one set of people. The 
children who went to Israel: God told them to collect only enough food 
for each day. In prayer we ask for daily bread to not let other people go 
hungry. [...] Climate change is a warning of God that proves human sin. 
The only way to correct it is to repent it, to correct what has gone wrong. 
Responsibility is not to waste our resources through greed, that is a moral 
responsibility. The obedience to God’s will (interview with the develop-
ment secretary of the Presbyterian Church Bamenda, December 2010). 
The feature that has the capacity to fuse discourses about climate 
change and religious traditions like Christianity (and Supreme Master 
Ching Hai, but also witchcraft) is the idea of sinful nature of humans. 
The message of a changing climate thus calls upon the deeply embed-
ded sense of moral responsibility, but individual and general. Climate 
change or just the weather are seen as the ultimate tangible manifesta-
tion of the relationship between society’s constructed idea of morality 
and the transcendental: the moment, in which God speaks to His peo-
ple, either as a punishment or blessing.     
Van Beek typifies climate-change discourses and their function 
within society in three ways, namely the climate as catastrophe, as 
power or as judgment (Van Beek 1999). This section is limited to 
describing how climate change is understood as a moral judgment, 
while in fact these three functions are strongly inter-related and have 
the capacity to reinforce each another. The other part of the explana-
tion for the unquestionable nature of the climate can be found in the 
sacred realm that constitutes the connection between man and nature. 
He argues that in all cultures specific weather events are indeed con-
sidered to be proof of the special relationship with the transcendental. 
The weather is often seen as the result of a connection between heaven 
and earth (ibid). An outstanding difference between the three groups 
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of farmers that I distinguished above is that amongst the farmers, who 
I categorize as the group who do not know about climate change or 
global warming, God is much more present in their explanations of the 
(changing) climate than amongst cognizant farmers.  
For the farmers in Babanki there is no reason to fear the climate, 
because the projected future is put in God’s hands. Joseph, the eldest 
of the three farmers, explains that they don’t really have problems 
with planting or harvesting. Apart from rising temperatures and the 
trees that have been cut down, he doesn’t see any environmentally 
related problems. ‘It is just that the grazers should be better educated. 
Their cows are destroying our crops.’ He has other problems to worry 
about than the climate. When I asked him whether he has any explana-
tion for the increasing heat he started to laugh. ‘I cannot really know 
because I am not God.’ This is an answer that I fairly often received. 
To fear the climate is to question an act of God. Why fear something 
that is in the hands of God? It is rather understood in terms of a sign, 
either a warning or a blessing. When the Pope arrived in Cameroon in 
March 2009, there had been no rain observed for a long time. After he 
landed and stepped out of the plane, it instantly started to rain. People 
referred to it as ‘a shower of blessing’. 
I recall a focus group discussion that I had with a women’s group 
in Wum, a mountainous town located in the Western Grassfields at 
some 45 km from Bamenda. Since there is no tarred road that con-
nects Wum, it is relatively isolated, especially in the rainy season. The 
president of the group of women invited me to visit their communal 
farm. Since 2006 this group of nineteen women who call themselves 
‘Mami Pikin No Di Sleep’ (mothers with small children don’t sleep) 
decided to farm together in order to make farming activities easier. 
The main objective of their group is ‘not to die of hunger and to help 
their children go to school’. During our focus group discussion, four 
of the members were present. They spoke about the difficulties they 
are facing as farmers. Their problems are not related to the environ-
ment or the climate. They revealed a long list of problems that mainly 
concerns a lack of technological support from the government, no 
means of transportation, cattle that destroy their crops and the lack of 
money to buy fertilizers. None of them is familiar with the notion of 
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climate change. However, when we started speaking about the last 
rainy season, they complained about excessive rains that destroyed 
some of their crops. The government delegation of environment and 
protection of nature had told them that this is due to the fact that they 
have cut down most of the trees. Elisabeth, the leader of the group 
could not really give an explanation for this: ‘The delegation has told 
us about the importance of trees. If these trees were not cut down we 
would not have faced these problems. [...] To my thinking it is God. I 
think God changes things in the way we cannot explain. All over this 
is how it is. It is only God.’ Another group member adds:  
We cannot know because we are not God. It is what God has planned. We 
are only listening to God. We are not God oh! God may change things 
and this year the rain may come at the right time. But sometimes it may 
not be so. All these changes are changed by God; we are not God; it is 
God that changes it for us. 
If the climate is in the hands of God, why is He sending so much 
rain? Should this be read as some form of punishment? For these 
women in Wum, the answer to this question lies indeed in the moral 
judgment of God. Van Beek emphasizes this as a third function: the 
climate as an expression of a moral relationship between a society and 
the supernatural. God uses elements to bless and to punish, to help or 
to fight. The climate and the weather therefore speak about oneself 
and deal intrinsically with guilt (Van Beek 1999: 176). Van Beek 
mentions, as the most obvious example, Israel’s God in the Old Tes-
tament, where God uses the weather to communicate with His people. 
Fertility follows faithfulness, and bad weather is a society’s own fault 
(ibid). When I asked the women why God made it rain so heavily last 
year, the conversation radically changed from a talk about nature, to a 
moral judgment about themselves, a societal critique and about a 
world that is changing too rapidly. 
  
(R= respondent; I= interviewer) 
R: [...] sometimes He may be angry at us because we have done a 
lot of bad things.  
I: What kind of bad things? 
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R: Some things that God doesn’t like us to do. Like this bad things 
that we do to others, like killing. There are many bad things that 
our children do like. 
I: Like what? 
R: Abortion, if you are carrying a child in your womb, it is given 
by God; it is bad to abort it. Some of the bad things are, some of us 
who are farmers will take assistance but people will divert it to an-
other area. They will not give us. It is the same. If none of this, we 
would not have been suffering. People have wicked minds. 
Special weather events are thus perceived to be either a blessing or 
a punishment – a sign of appreciation or of rejecting social behaviour. 
Rains that are too heavy are here understood as a punishment, the 
result of morally bad behaviour by themselves or their children. The 
fact that the government delegation and NGOs render people guilty by 
continuously stressing that the farmers in Bamenda are causing cli-
mate change themselves by cutting down trees and burning the bushes 
is invoking the deeply imbedded perception of the climate as a sign of 
the moral relationship between God and society. Furthermore, a pos-
sible explanation for the widespread awareness that cutting down trees 
is ‘bad’ is that it is inscribed in local cosmologies. Put in the words of 
the Fon of Guzang: ‘Our culture taught us that we are not to cut down 
any young tree, no matter the size.’  
In the course of the focus group discussion I asked the group mem-
bers if they ever experienced a rainy season that was as heavy as last 
year’s. There seemed to be a consensus amongst the women that this 
was the heaviest rainy season they had ever witnessed; until one of the 
members all of a sudden recalled, ‘I noticed some years a long time 
ago that the others have forgotten. There was no dry season in Wum, 
not at all. Only that I do not know the year. There was no dry season 
apart from two weeks. There was no dry season.’ To the question of 
whether their forefathers were facing the same climatic problems, I 
received a very surprising answer that fully underpins my assump-
tions: ‘They faced it, it was not like this. You know things have 
changed. You know there were no schools; our parents did not have 
the time. It is not like now where people like you come and teach 
things like this. That is why we are able to know.’ It became clear that 
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climate change is not a ‘reality’ for them, but, as stated before, more 
an on-going trend that their parents and grandparents had also been 
facing. What this group member in fact stressed, is that the impact of 
discourses and shifting accessibility to discourses (in time) has an 
effect on changing present patterns of perceiving the world.  
This statement touches upon the core of what this chapter seeks to 
explore. By showing different groups of farmers and the extent to 
which they have access to information and discourses, I want to 
demonstrate that the accessibility of climate-change discourses has a 
geographical defined dimension (and thus also a temporal one, i.e. 
with an on-going globalized world the role of media, lobbyists, global 
actors, scientists play an increasingly defining role in remote areas). 
Namely, the further from the geographical ‘source’ of climate-change 
discourses, farmers are, the less climate change – and the related sen-
timents that it evokes – seems to be a concern in farmers’ lives in the 
region of the Bamenda Grassfields. And the other way around: with an 
increased level of access to these discourses, the more the weather and 
the climate are perceived to be changing, and thus climate change is 
more likely to be a reality. 
‘Climate change kills, action now!’ Eschatological  
anxieties over the arrival of the apocalypse  
As described in the theoretical framework, an essential element in 
Foucault’s conception of discourse is that it is embedded in social 
relationships. He argued that power is not per se about physical force, 
nor does it solely reside with powerful actors like institutions; it is a 
fundamental feature of everyday human interaction (Foucault: 1967). 
Hannigan states in his book Environmental Sociology (1995) that dis-
courses define what is meaningful, shape processes of socialization 
and therefore provide institutions with a powerful means of incorpo-
rating individuals into relations of domination. At the level of institu-
tions, power is most effective in discourses, because they reduce re-
sistance and internalize consent (Foucault 1967). Foucault regarded 
this as central to a process of social control (Foucault 1967; Gelcich et 
al., in Hannigan 1995: 53). In the context of my research I mainly 
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refer to institutions like churches, NGOs, government-related bodies 
and the media as transmitters of discourses on climate change. In 
short, discourses and power are inextricably bound to believing in 
something, and with making people believe in something. Discourses 
itself are not power; they need to be translated. The following sections 
will examine the translation of climate-change discourses into belief 
that finally leads to action. 
Inspired by critical theory – which essentially does not take the 
prevailing order of the world as it is, but rather asks how that order 
came about – Smith emphasizes the importance of asking questions 
like: for whom is the discourse and who constructed it? Which inter-
ests are at play? Who is excluded and ‘silenced by the discourse’ 
(Smith 2005: 199)? These questions will guide the analysis of the 
discursive practices that follows in this section. Smith furthermore 
argues that climate change and the construction of it as a global phe-
nomenon hides a multitude of economic and political complications. 
To call upon a shared responsibility to humanity as a whole, implies 
that the global interest prevails at the expense of local interests and 
discourses (ibid: 200). Considering the ‘securitization’ of climate 
change as a global threat for humanity, a large part of its objective has 
to do with creating a common ground for action and non-action. In 
order to be in control of the socialization process, discourses are a 
powerful means to make people act. What became clear in my re-
search is that three fundamental sentiments play a vital role in this 
process, namely the construction of guilt, responsibility and fear. In 
the preceding sections, the relationship between the climate and guilt 
has been discussed. In the following section, the emotion of fear will 
be examined, and how fear and responsibility drive people into partic-
ipating in the collective fight against climate change. 
The last group of farmers that will be described are the ones who 
know about climate change. A first outstanding characteristic of cog-
nizant farmers is that knowing about climate change is inextricably 
bound up with believing in it. During my fieldwork I did not meet one 
single farmer who stated something in the line of ‘I don’t believe in it’ 
or ‘I don’t buy it’ – typical statements for the so- called climate scep-
tics. Apart from a couple of students in town who argued that global 
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warming was again one of these imperialistic tricks of the West to 
impose its power upon African countries, at the grassroots level – as 
much as at institutional spheres – I did not encounter any climate 
sceptic. To call the truthfulness of the discourse into question did not 
seem to be an option. Whereas in industrialized countries the fact or 
fiction debate – represented by different stakeholders and interest 
groups – colours the on-going claims-making process; in Bamenda 
‘knowing’ about climate change clearly equals believing in it. Among 
this group of farmers an apocalyptic fear was often expressed. As in 
the following quotation of a farmer who has known about climate 
change for five years by now: 
At the radio they talk about atmospheric pollution. That the American, 
Chinese with the industries destroy the ozone layer, and that people 
should plant a lot of trees. So that the gas that the industries emit should 
be absorbed by the trees at our level. The only thing the farmer can do is 
to plant trees. If the big polluters don’t take great measures, the world will 
be finished, people will be finished. [...] How can I not be afraid of this 
danger? But the problem is that so many people who do not know what is 
happening, they don’t know that there is danger coming (Interview, No-
vember 2009, Bafoussam). 
As climate-change discourses can be characterized as a secular 
end-of-time idea (see Van Beek 1999; 2000), the eschatological dy-
namics must also have fertile ground to develop outside the religious 
realm. In a dialogue with cardinal Martini,6 Humberto Eco writes that 
the end-of-time idea is currently more characteristic for the non-
Christian than for the Christian world. And, that the Christian world 
appropriated it as a topic for meditation, while the non-Christian 
world pretends to neglect it, yet is in fact possessed by it. In a book 
that has bundled conversations about the end of time with Eco et al., 
he additionally argues that although the profane world is insensitive to 
the biblical apocalyptic descriptions as described in the Book of Reve-
lation of John, they also do have apocalyptic fears. People with a secu-
lar vision are sensitive about acid rain, about the hole in the ozone 
                                                          
6  In cosa crede chi non crede? Rome (Editoriale Atlantide) 1987, in ‘Ge-
sprekken over het einde der tijden’ (1998), Humberto Eco, eds. Amster-
dam, Uitgeverij Boom. 
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layer, about the melting of the polar ice caps, about biodiversity loss, 
about climate change, etc. Moreover, he adds that within a religious 
worldview the end of the world is an episode, a rite de passage to-
wards a heavenly Jerusalem; within a non-Christian worldview, it is 
the end of everything (Eco et al. 1998: 22-23). Climate change under-
pins the idea that eschatological narratives are not necessarily bound 
to the religious realm – even though they might be informed by it. If 
environmentalism, in all its forms, is indeed – at least marginally – 
apocalyptic (Lee 1995), in this eschatological feature might very well 




During a meeting that was held concerning gender and climate 
change, I met Benedicta. As the president of a group called ‘Love for 
Children’, she spoke to me about her activities and concerns. In 2001, 
the group started as a common initiative group (CIG) to empower 
themselves and to be able to take better care of their children. For a 
year and a half, fighting climate change has been at the heart of the 
group’s objective. During several focus group discussions with the 
members of this group, I gained a few insights into the incentives for 
their role as convinced ambassadors in fighting climate change. 
As time went on we kept on hearing about the ozone layer. So we started 
questioning what is climate change all about? We learnt about the adverse 
effects for the world, we learnt that the atmospheric conditions were 
changing throughout the world, and this made us to be afraid. Now we 
have this problem of climate change with devastating effects. We started 
asking what is going to be the future for our children? The UN is calling 
on all to take part in the fight. Our members that are farmers are encour-
aged to go green, and the smoke they produce from ankara and bush fires 
is one of the causes of climate change. If we don’t act now, the effects 
will be disastrous for everybody. We know that it is us, the Africans, the 
women and under-privileged children that are going to suffer the most. 
We really need a safe climate. [...] The North is polluting and the South is 
suffering. If we die today, they will die tomorrow. It shouldn’t be war, let 
Them understand that we need to save our planet, because We also need 
to live. We call the world to order. Let us join together, form an alliance 
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and talk to the world about climate change. Let’s talk to the indigenous 
groups in Africa. All of us should act. Climate change kills, action now!7 
The major driving sentiment behind their activities, are strong feel-
ings of fear, and a sense of a shared responsibility. One of the women 
explained how she was told at the radio that people are going to die, 
and that she too was afraid of dying. This image was reinforced when 
she saw a program on TV, called ‘aquatic life’, which showed images 
of how a crocodile died because of the heat. “If a crocodile can die 
because of the heat, what about us? I was really terrified. People here 
now also go for days without water.” Benedicta added:  
The area around the cathedral has been destroyed by earth tremors, and 
some people live in houses that are cracked. When we see these things we 
are afraid. The landslide around the governor’s residence, and there is al-
so this flooding everywhere. In Bangladesh, In America, here in town a 
woman was swept away by water. Some children died in streams as well. 
We are bent on doing something because of the love for our children. 
What is the future of the children? It is bleak. Action needs to be done 
now (Focus Group discussion, Bamenda 10-02-2010). 
The following week, Benedicta insists on taking me to the cathe-
dral to show me the cracked houses. ‘See, this is what climate change 
is doing to our people!’ Talking about and understanding climate 
change seem groundless without any tangible evidence. Notions and 
ideas about climate change are linked up with an experienced reality, 
and make the climatic threat and global warming very ‘real’. 
Interestingly enough, for most farmers climate change initially be-
comes a reality through western media channels. When they see horri-
fying images on TV about the melting of the polar ice caps or flooding 
in Bangladesh, the belief grows that their ‘turn’ is about to come. 
Once the climate-change framework is at hand, the visible experiential 
focus is a fact. Each heavy rainfall, landslide and unforeseen weather 
pattern are interpreted through the climate-change lens. A similar 
trend can be observed in the West; for instance, when it turned out that 
errors were made by the IPCC, this was taken up by climate sceptics 
to disprove the existence of climate change. Or, in a reverse direction, 
                                                          
7  Interview, 8 February 2010. 
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we see that exceptional weather events have been pointed out to be 
clear and tangible signs of increasing changes in the climate. 
For government officials this serves as a scapegoat in order to ex-
plain the existing poverty, inequality and the deplorable situation that 
a large part of the population finds itself in. For farmers, however, the 
situation is fairly different, because they do not have full access to 
knowledge and are not in control of the discourse. They are being told 
that they have themselves to blame for the rising temperatures, and 
that the only way to prevent a big catastrophe from happening is to 
take action, and fast. A third group member shares her impression of 
climate change with us:  
 
 
Photo 5.4 & 5.5 Cracked houses around the cathedral in Bamenda 
town as the ultimate proof of climate change 
 





‘We have seen over the TV that something is wrong somewhere. We see 
a lot of flooding, rising seawaters even right into homes. Destruction of 
property, lives, land erosion and earth quakes like the one in Haiti. We 
see them over the TV and we can now confirm that it is a reality.’ 
The group members of ‘Love for Children’ are ready to fight, and 
to take responsibility for their part in this global problem. By going 
Green, planting trees, practicing organic farming and not burning the 
soil any longer, they hope to reduce their CO2 emissions. Their com-
munal farm on which they organically plant different sorts of vegeta-
bles by using organic manure is for a large part also occupied by a 
sugar-cane field. Benedicta explains: ‘We saw on television that in 
Brazil there are large sugar-cane plantations, which are very good to 
capture CO2 emissions. Now we know that sugar cane can reduce our 
carbon dioxide, so we decided to plant it.’  
According to them, their own government is not putting sufficient 
effort into mitigating climate change. Benedicta is tired of the gov-
ernment, whose people fold their arms and keep on pressing others to 
act:  
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All of us should act. Our government shouldn’t sit and say the grassroots 
should act, because our actions will mean nothing if they themselves are 
not acting. [...] They will tell the rural women to stop burning ankara; 
what do you provide to that woman and she knows if she doesn’t burn 
ankara her yields will be very poor? What do you give them in return? 
How do you help them out of poverty?   
Apart from the existential doubts that are principally led by fear 
and responsibility, there is clearly also a social component. Climate-
change discourses are intrinsically a deep protest against existing 
structures and forms of living, and therefore can be considered as a 
call for a global societal transformation. For Benedicta and the other 
group members, their fight is also directed at the government and at 
the countries in the North, who are the biggest polluters. Part of their 
objective is to form ‘a worldwide indigenous group collective’, to call 
the world and the industrialized countries to order. They want ‘climate 
justice’. 
Our government is not taking it seriously. We should not wait on our 
government to do something. We have to come into action now. Even the 
own government is complaining and they ask NGOs to assist them. We 
need to work in groups from the grassroots. If we wait for the government 
it is a waste of time, and the climate will not wait a second. We sat in our 
group and said to each other: with or without the government, we will do 
it! It is a new phenomenon so we empower ourselves and read. We tell 
our group members what climate change is all about. [...] Not only the ru-
ral women should do something, but the government should double their 
efforts. They go to international conferences. We followed Copenhagen 
on TV. No agreement in COP15, which is very embarrassing. We need 
climate justice! The rich nations are polluting the most and are least vul-
nerable. We don’t want war, but we need mutual understanding. We need 
to save our planet. 
This citation shows that there is also an element of empowerment 
related to the use of climate-change discourses. For these women, 
grouping together in the fight against climate change is an act of nego-
tiating their identity, of empowering themselves and making sense of 
this new phenomenon that is threatening the future of their children.  
Another incentive for this group of women to take action is the be-
lief that, if they take action quickly, there will be a short-term solution 
for the difficulties they are currently facing. This fight is then not only 
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a protective mechanism against catastrophe but will also lead to a full 
improvement of their lives. A group member pointed out that: ‘If we 
reduce all these causes such as deforestation and over exploitation of 
natural resources, etc., if we do that, poverty will be reduced, so eve-
rything comes down to climate change.’ The perceived urge of the 
collective fight against climate change can at the same time be seen as 
the way to redeem a promise. This promise encompasses ideas of a 
brighter future for their children; a world, in which they can live in a 
safe and sustainable environment, where poverty no longer exists. 
 
Wendy 
Wendy is the president and coordinator of ACTWID (Association for 
Creative Teaching for Women in Development). This organisation 
was initially founded in 1989 as a means to empower women and to 
strive for gender equality. Currently they are predominantly focused 
on health and environmental issues, and they consider themselves as a 
pioneering civil-society initiative in fighting climate change. The or-
ganisation became popular among rural women, and nowadays there 
are almost fifty women’s groups from the Northwest region registered 
under her CIG. As time passed by, the government started to recog-
nize their strength and invited them to participate on Environment 
Day. The organisation’s outlook has from the beginning strongly been 
anchored in gender issues, which in the course of time extended to 
gender and climate change. As a grassroots representative for rural 
women, Wendy was invited by the U.N. to join the negotiations in 
Copenhagen. While acknowledging the urgency of mitigating climate 
change, she also pointed out that it is not that easy for farmers, as the 
majority live under the poverty line: 
In the villages we discourage the burning of ankara. They have under-
stood, but they tell us that it is easier to burn even the farm if you don’t 
have somebody to clear it. We know it is because of poverty. Cooking 
sends out smoke, which damages the environment. They are ignorant, but 
if they don’t burn, what then should they do? It needs an alternative. If we 
stop burning the wood, where is the stove that you want us to use? That’s 
the problem. We are teaching everybody to go green. To start practically 
in their homes, controlling their garbage, selecting the plastic. This is all 
about climate change, and you will live a better and longer life if you go 
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green. Every household should stop cutting trees and plant more [...]. We 
know the dangers of climate change are already being caused. The GHG 
emissions are increasing, and we want to see how we can reduce our 
GHG emissions. We want to fight by doing these little things. Most peo-
ple don’t know that they are causing it themselves (Interview, January 
2010, Bamenda). 
A few days later Wendy invited me to join her weekly group gath-
ering. During this conversation some women shared their incentives 
for taking action about the climate: 
 
A: ‘Climate change makes us to be afraid. There may be high star-
vation and deaths, so we need to fight by working harder on our 
farms. We have been encouraging CIGs to go green and fight. If 
we act now we are going to save many lives. Some people just die 
from small illnesses, whereas if we teach them how to go green, 
they will live longer.’ 
B: ‘What do we do instead of talking? We should act! To reduce 
our carbon we should stop burning ankara as it destroys the soil 
and much gas is emitted. Our dream is to live in a zero carbon 
world. Climate change kills, and if we don’t act now to save lives, 
then we should expect the adverse effects.’ 
A: ‘Since our government is not taking action, we as the civil soci-
ety should act. We are not tired of lobbying, we have to continue.’ 
Not only at the NGO level can a Green paradigm shift be observed 
but also at the grassroots level. Whereas before, these women were 
engaged in fighting for (among other things) female rights, nowadays 
their main occupation is fighting the climate and thereby mobilizing as 
many women’s groups as possible. Wendy has raised a crucial prob-
lem: ‘If they don’t burn, what then should they do? If we stop burning 





During one of my weekly walks through the Bamenda Grassfields, I 
encountered Elisabeth – a seventy-five year old (approximately) sub-
sistence farmer. Like many other farmers in Bamenda, she is practic-
ing slash and burn. Elisabeth lives on a steep hill. Her neighbour helps 
her to fetch water. Elisabeth speaks about the great changes that she 
experienced since she was young. ‘The world is changing. I don’t 
know the cause, but the world is changing in a terrible way. Even the 
child that you put to the world will abuse you. Nobody looks you into 
the eyes. In my time people were not dying as much as now; every-
body is sick. [...] Places are too hot nowadays and this year there 
hasn’t even been a Christmas’ rain yet.’ Nevertheless, she always 
knows when to start clearing her farm. ‘When the termites don’t come 
out of their houses anymore, we know that it is time to clear our rainy 
season farm. [...] It is just because I am alone that I have to burn it.’  
In the course of the conversation with Elisabeth and a couple of 
other female farmers, one of the women asked her why she is burning 
her soil and what she would do if the government tells her to stop 
burning it: 
If the government tells me to stop burning the soil, let them come here 
and put food in my mouth. It will surprise me, because then I will see the 
government for the first time. Do they still exist? If I stop working the 
farm, stop burning the soil and there is no manure, will they provide me 
with food? Should I die of hunger? Like now, if I die nobody will know 
that something has happened, that a life is lost, that I died of hunger. Let 
them come first and see that I am alive before they tell me to stop burning 
my soil (Interview, Bafut, February 2010. Translated from Pidgin). 
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The case of Elisabeth illustrates what it means to be a subsistence 
farmer in Bamenda and, moreover, how old practices are confronted 
with new (global) politics that are informed by emerging discourses 
on climate change. Even though the prevention and prohibition of 
slash and burn methods, and on-going tree planting efforts have been 
part and parcel of former environmental narratives, in my research it 
has become clear that in face of the ‘climatic threat’ there is an ever 
stronger and a growing emphasis on setting norms about how humans 
should (and thus should not) relate to their environment – without 
providing grassroots farmers with alternative means and farming 
methods. This furthermore leads to the realization that these discours-
es are (at the dawn of) establishing a new connection between the 
‘global’ and the ‘local’: a process that constitutes power relations 
across different scales, undergoes a continuous ‘translation’ and is 
subjected to the implementation of new projects, thereby having a 
‘real’ impact on the day-to-day realities of the Grassfielders. Moreo-
ver, taking into account the increasing amount of (international) fund-
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ing that is being made available for different actors and organisations 
at the local level, which are involved in addressing climate change 
related issues, it can be said that there is clearly a strong link between 
the accessibility to financial flows and the actors through which these 
discourses are channelled. Therefore, it should be stated here that 
gaining more insight into the translation process of climate change – 
and thus into the spaces and processes of global and local encounters – 
similarly contributes to an understanding of the (rapidly) changing 
sociocultural and political landscape. 
Moving beyond existing approaches to understanding climate-
change ‘realities’ in Africa – in which the biophysical consequences 
have been by and large taken as the focal point of analysis – this study 
has explored alternative perspectives. In this thesis I demonstrated 
how the ‘life-blood’ of climate-change discourses, operating as a vital 
force, lies in its potential to both appropriate and to be incorporated by 
differing discursive, ontological and sociopolitical realms. By portray-
ing different ‘translation regimes’ I highlighted how climate-change 
discourses operate in different contexts, and how ‘truth’ is embedded 
in, and produced by, systems of power. The rather indeterminate char-
acter of this new message that circulates within society has as much 
the capacity to explain and make sense of rapid sociocultural change, 
modernity’s challenges, as it is capable of revitalizing existing politi-
cal structures and worldviews. It became apparent that, dependent on 
one’s position in society, and hence people’s access to climate-change 
information and (financial) means, this discursive field can serve as a 
resource, in which a particular form of power can be exploited. These 
transformative dynamics fully underpin the claim that is made in criti-
cal discourse analysis, namely that discursive practices contribute to 
the creation and reproduction of unequal power relations between 
social groups. In the context of my research these so-called ideologi-
cal effects of climate-change discourses have become visible both in 
the confrontation of global interests vis-à-vis local realities as well as 
within the context of Bamenda itself. 
In chapter three it became clear that at the level of the civil society 
(in the sphere of NGOs, CIGs and CBOs) these emerging climate-
change discourses are clearly (partly) reshaping the existing focus of 
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these organisations. While former initiatives have embraced other 
development paradigms related, for example, to gender equity, HIV-
Aids, orphanages, broader environmental issues, education, etc., now-
adays by and large a Green paradigm is propagated that aims at main-
streaming climate-change adaptation and mitigation with development 
initiatives. As a result of the so-called securitization of climate change 
at the international level as a top-priority matter, it is very likely that 
Africa will face an intense reshaping of development efforts. The find-
ings of my research are in line with both the critique and caution that 
have been expressed towards the seemingly alarming and rigorous 
initiatives to combat climate change, as a one size fits all solution for 
Africa, which entail the risk of taking precedence over the more nu-
anced and locally fine-tuned approaches. 
In chapter four it has been demonstrated how global discourses on 
climate change enable traditional rulers in Bamenda to re-appropriate 
local discourses, to redefine their (symbolic) power and, hence, to 
revitalize their traditional belief system. Even though the rulers’ sym-
bolic power is still engrained in the Bamenda Grassfields, during the 
colonial period they lost much of their political influence as they 
turned into auxiliaries of the administration. In November 2009 a 
group of traditional rulers of the Northwest region in Cameroon joint-
ly formed an organisation, which they called Cameroon Traditional 
Rulers Against Climate Change (CAMTRACC). In practice, this initi-
ative to fight against climate change is resulting in the implementation 
of the traditional injunctions at the palaces’ institutional level, thereby 
risking the downplaying of local farmers’ interests if they fail to con-
tribute to the global fight against climate change. In addition to this, it 
has been shown how the Grassfielders’ local cosmology – with the 
rulers at the heart of the transcendental connection between humans 
and the environment – has formed a fertile ground for both appropriat-
ing climate-change discourses within their belief system, as well as 
using it as an instrument to reinforce the political and symbolic power 
of the palaces within the broader institutional set up. As such, it has 
been pointed out that climate-change discourses do not merely follow 
a unilinear, top-down translation process; rather, this study has made 
visible how different ‘truth regimes’ fuse in their encounter. In other 
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words, the discourse presented here, an analytical approach combined 
with an ethnographic account, aims at taking into account both the 
translation process (and thus how the content of the message is rein-
terpreted), as well as the related practices that shape and are shaped by 
this process. 
In the exploration of the translation of globally constructed dis-
courses in the Bamenda Grassfields, it also became clear that, while 
taking on widely varying forms in different settings, climate-change 
discourses similarly maintain a certain consistency across different 
contexts. A recurrent element of the narrative is the eschatological 
dimension that is entailed by the construction of fear, guilt and re-
sponsibility. In all the different discursive spaces, through which cli-
mate change is travelling, there appears to be a prevailing apocalyptic 
element of facing the end of the world, a sentiment that evokes ques-
tions of how to deal with the environment in particular and of human 
existence in general. By blaming each individual farmer for being part 
of the problem and thus of the solution, clear affinities with religious 
narratives – both in a Christian and in a ‘local’ ontology – can be ob-
served that touch upon highly moral and existential issues. As such, it 
can be said that, from a scientific discourse, climate change is by and 
large translated into a moral message at the local level, which operates 
as a platform to negotiate power, identity, the Earth and man’s place 
herein. I contend that until now these processes have largely been 
neglected in the climate-change literature. Hence, both the content of 
the message, the fearful element together with the internationally pro-
posed solution to ‘Think globally and act locally’, as well as the insti-
tutional structure that enables the message to travel, deserve in my 
understanding much more critical scrutiny in climate change-related 
literature and policy relevant research. 
Against this background, in addition to existing approaches, in this 
thesis I propose both a methodological and theoretical reconfiguration 
in the study of climate-change ‘realities’, particularly in those parts of 
the world that are considered to be mostly vulnerable to the biophysi-
cal effects of climate change. At the methodological level I propose an 
approach that focuses on connectivity, which entails having a keen 
eye for the encounter of worldviews, knowledge production and moral 
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order. At the theoretical level I argue that in order to understand how 
people relate to and adapt to their environment, discursive changes 
(understood here as being in a constant dialectical relationship with 
the natural environment) deserve as much attention as the biophysical 
changes that until now have been the focus of climate-change re-
search.  
I have demonstrated that in the Bamenda Grassfields there is a 
considerable difference in environmental perception between farmers 
who have heard about climate change (as a Western construct) and 
farmers who have not, or farmers who have vaguely heard about ‘this 
thing called global warming’. This is not to say that the climate is not 
changing, but it is important to bear in mind that it is still very diffi-
cult to isolate natural climate variability from humanly induced cli-
mate change. It became apparent that, as soon as people have a ‘dis-
cursive frame’ at hand that speaks about climate change, there is a 
tendency to see or explain their existing problems through that lens. I 
have shown that many of the occurring environmental problems like 
increasing landslides, pollution and flooded riverbanks in Bamenda 
are more likely related to infrastructural problems and high population 
density. In the media but also among ordinary people these events 
were by and large attributed to climate change. Even though many 
farmers stated that the seasons are difficult to predict and that the tem-
peratures are higher than before, it appeared that the way they relate to 
and understand these environmental problems are informed by 
knowledge about global warming.  
In conclusion, it has become clear that this new message has trans-
formative powers in the sense that in different ‘translation regimes’ 
(e.g. NGOs, churches, traditional authorities, the government) a para-
digm shift can be observed, which enables different actors to maintain 
or reinforce their position within society. In a similar vein it has been 
demonstrated that as a result of the securitization of climate change 
ordinary farmers in Bamenda risk the downplaying of their interests in 
the face of international agencies that set the agenda to save the planet 
from its own destruction. Since climate-change policies – in the form 
of adaptation and mitigation measures – are a rather nascent dynamic, 
the impact upon local societies in the developing world is still fairly 
Concluding reflections  
211 
unclear. It is therefore evident that further research is needed in order 
to gain more detailed knowledge about how discourses about climate 
change are related to, and have the power to transform, the sociopolit-
ical landscape. With this study I have attempted to contribute to the 
development of an alternative perspective that seeks to address the 
power processes, in which the social construction of climate change 
takes place. In addition to the existing body of literature and studies 
that focus on how global warming impacts upon the local level in 
vulnerable societies, and in order to bridge existing knowledge gaps 
between policy circles and local realities, I argue that it is crucial to 
shed light on – and to foster novel ideas and critical insights into – the 
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Appendix: variations in rainfall and temperatures over the years 
 
Average rainfall variations over the past 42 years: 
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Average Temperature variations over the past 42 years:  M
onths  
 1961 – 
 1965 
 1966 – 
 1970 
 1971 - 
 1975 
 1976 - 
 1980 
 1981 - 
 1985 
 1986 - 
 1990 
 1991 - 
 1995 
 1996 - 
 2000 









































































































































































































































































































Source: Regional Service of Meteorology for the Northwest Region 
 
 
 
